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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review by this cross-appeal:
1. Did the trial court err by applying the equitable doctrine of laches and refusing to
rescind the Rossi Hills transaction?
2. Did the trial court err by ruling the warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note
do not constitute a single contract or transaction; and by refusing to rule that Doms was
excused from performance and not in default under the trust deed and trust deed note?
3. If rescission is denied, did the trial court err by awarding Doms only one-half the
amount of damages found by the expert appraiser, Jerry Webber, as a result of the
encumbrances on Rossi Hills?
4. Did the trial court err by ruling that Doms' Counterclaim against the Estate of D.C.
Anderson, as it relates to the remedy of damages, is time-barred by the probate "nonclaim"
provisions of U.C.A. §§ 75-3-801 and 75-3-803?
5. Did the trial court err by refusing to award attorney's fees and appropriate costs
to Doms?
6. Did the trial court err in its award of attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiffs?
Standards of Appellate Review: All of the above six issues present questions of law,
either in whole or in part, which should be reviewed for legal correctness without deference
to the trial court's rulings. City of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 796 P.2d 697 (Utah
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1990). Issues 2 and 4, regarding the transaction documents between the parties and
construction of probate statutes, respectively, present questions of law only.
Issues 1 and 3, regarding laches/rescission and damages, respectively, present some
initial questions of law which should be reviewed according to the legal correctness standard.
Issues 1 and 3 also involve mixed questions of law and fact which, on review, do not warrant
the deference due findings on questions of pure fact. Margulies by and through Margulies
v. Unchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985). The overall standard of review which should be
applied to issues 1 and 3 is an abuse of discretion standard. Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises
v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975); Mavbev v. Kav
Peterson Construction Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984).
Issues 5 and 6, regarding awards of attorney's fees and costs, present initial questions
of law as to which parties are entitled to attorney's fees and costs. The overall standard of
review in regard to any awards of attorney's fees and costs is an abuse of discretion standard.
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or rules determinative of or
pertinent to the issues presented for review is contained in the body of this brief or in the
addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In March of 1982, Defendant/Appellee and Cross-Appellant Eugene E. Doms
("Doms") and Michael R. McCoy ("McCoy") purchased the subject property of this appeal
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("Rossi Hills") from Plaintiffs for $276,750.00 (F. of F. 17; Ex. 69D).1 Rossi Hills is located
in the Park City Survey, Summit County, State of Utah (F. of F. 1; Ex. IP).
Doms and McCoy purchased Rossi Hills as part of a residential development to be
built in conjunction with two other adjacent parcels (F. of F. 26, 35). Doms and McCoy
eventually became adversaries in 1983, and McCoy had nothing further to do with the
development of Rossi Hills or this lawsuit (R. 7185-91, 7517-20; Ex. 78D). From a
subsequent land survey and diligent legal investigation, Doms learned in December of 1984
that a road (the "loop road") and other physical encroachments were located on the property
and constituted prescriptive easements and encumbrances (R. 7498-7500, 7611, 7625).
In January of 1985, Doms informed Plaintiffs he was entitled to rescission of the
transaction and the return of all money received by Plaintiffs (R. 7504-07). Doms even
offered to deed Rossi Hills back to Plaintiffs in exchange for cancellation of the trust deed
note, thus allowing Plaintiffs to keep all money already received under the contract (F. of
F. 44; R. 7507-08).
Plaintiffs responded byfilingtheir Complaint to foreclose on June 6,1985 (F. of F. 45;
R. 1-9). Plaintiffs eventually obtained a default judgment against Doms and McCoy in
January of 1988 (R. 34-40). The default judgment against Doms was subsequently set aside
(R. 76-78, 126-27), but not as against McCoy. Doms filed an Answer and Counterclaim, an

1

Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this brief to Findings of Fact (F. of F.),
Conclusions of Law (C. of L.), and Judgment (Judg.) are to the trial court's final Second
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99; Add. 1) and Second
Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07; Add. 2). All references to exhibits are to trial exhibits
admitted into evidence at trial on April 17-19,1990, and August 21-24,1990. All references
to attorney's fees exhibits are to exhibits admitted into evidence at the hearing held on
attorney's fees on December 31, 1991.
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Amended Counterclaim, and eventually a Second Amended Counterclaim (R. 41-44,102-05,
237-42).
Following three days of trial on April 17-19, 1990, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision denying rescission based upon the doctrine of laches (R. 4188-95). Following
four days of trial on August 21-24, 1990, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision
ruling that Doms suffered $83,000.00 in damages as a result of the encumbrances on the
property (R. 4348-54). Subsequently, a hearing was held on December 31, 1991, in regard
to awards of attorney's fees and costs (R. 6360-6540).
Following extensive objections, motions and argument by the parties over the
appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, the trial court entered its final
Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99) and Second
Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07) on June 23, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In March of 1982, Doms and McCoy purchased Rossi Hills for $276,750.00 (F. of F.
17; Ex. 69D). D.C. Anderson (who subsequently died in September of 1983) and his wife,
Ellen Anderson; and Dan Scott and his wife, Jeanne Scott; all executed the warranty deed
as grantors and transferred Rossi Hills to Doms and McCoy as tenants in common (F. of F.
1, 4; Ex. IP; Add. 3). This deed of conveyance was a warranty deed under Utah law and
conveyed with it all of the statutory warranties and covenants pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12
(F. of F. 1-6; C. of L. 1).
Pursuant to an earnest money agreement dated November 12, 1981 (Ex. 63D; Add.
4), D.C. Anderson and Dan Scott received $10,000.00 as earnest money and another
$72,500.00 as the down payment, leaving a balance due of $194,250.00 after closing of the
sale (F. of F. 18; Exs. 4P, 69D). Doms and McCoy executed a trust deed and trust deed
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note in the amount of $194,250.00, which called for monthly interest payments of $2,266.25
up to and including January 10, 1985 (F. of F. 19, 20; Exs. 2P, 3P; Add. 5, 6). All of these
monthly interest payments were received by Plaintiffs, in the total amount of $72,520.25 (F.
of F. 22; Ex. 6P; Add. 7). The entire unpaid balance of $194,250.00, together with interest,
was due on January 25, 1985 (F. of F. 19; Ex. 3P).
Rossi Hills was purchased by Doms and McCoy as part of a residential development
to be built in conjunction with two other adjacent parcels known as the "Slipper Parcel" and
"Block 62" (F. of F. 26, 35). Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the Slipper Parcel
in October of 1982 to further the integrated residential development potential of the three
parcels, and strengthen their position with the developers of Block 62 and the other interestholders of the Slipper Parcel (F. of F. 36, 37). Prior to Doms' purchase of Rossi Hills and
the interest in the Slipper Parcel, Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the
development of the three parcels prepared by an architect by the name of Richard Kohler
(F. of F. 39; Ex. 68D). Doms relied upon this architectural plan for the residential
development of the three parcels (R. 7430). Prior to purchasing Rossi Hills in March of
1982, Doms met with D.C. Anderson and Anderson's real estate agent, Michael Sloan, in
the fall of 1981 (F. of F. 33, 34). Both Sloan and Anderson represented to Doms that Rossi
Hills was a "prime piece" of development property and its "highest and best use" would be
as part of the integrated residential development with Block 62 and the Slipper Parcel (F.
of F. 35).
In October of 1982, Doms retained attorney Gerald H. Kinghorn for the purpose of
closing a deal with regard to Doms' purchase of an interest in the Slipper Parcel, and
continuing negotiations with the owners of Block 62 for purposes of creating the three-parcel
development based upon representations of Sloan and the architect, Kohler (F. of F. 38).
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Kinghorn subsequently met several times with the owners of Block 62 between October of
1982 and the summer of 1983 in an effort to negotiate a joint venture agreement which
would be acceptable to all of the parties (R. 7421, 7479-80; Exs. 81P, 82P).
In anticipation of the three-parcel development, Doms and McCoy conveyed Rossi
Hills by warranty deed to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. ("Domcoy") on August 20, 1983 (R.
7182-84; Ex. 16P; Add. 8). Domcoy was a closely held Utah corporation formed in October
of 1981 for the general purpose of acquiring, developing and selling real property (R. 717981; Ex. 3IP). The two corporate officers of Domcoy were McCoy as president and Doms
as secretary/treasurer; and the directors were Doms and his wife, and McCoy and his wife
(Exs. 3 IP, 32P). Doms and McCoy had problems over a number of issues and eventually
became adversaries in 1983 (R. 7185-86).
Negotiations for the joint venture agreement broke down in the summer of 1983 as
a result of the position taken by the owners of Block 62, who informed Kinghorn that the
percentage of profit to be received by Doms would be much smaller than anticipated due
to the fact that much of Rossi Hills was undevelopable due to apparent easements and
encumbrances on the property (R. 7481-83). Kinghorn was told by the Block 62 group that
they had been through all of this before with the previous owners of the property, and
Kinghorn relayed this information to Doms (R. 7482, 7484, 7603-04).
Pursuant to Doms' instructions to find out what the Block 62 group was talking about,
in the spring of 1983 Kinghorn walked the loop road on Rossi Hills and observed the
encroachments which the Block 62 owners believed constituted easements and encumbrances
on the property (R. 7484-87). Although the loop road appeared to be located on Rossi
Hills, Kinghorn was uncertain about the location of the loop road and other encroachments
because he did not know the exact boundaries of the property (R. 7486).
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Kinghom contacted Doms and informed him a road and other encroachments
appeared to exist on the property and might constitute easements and encumbrances (R.
7619). Doms instructed Kinghom to immediately take whatever steps were necessary to
determine whether or not the loop road and other encroachments did in fact constitute legal
easements and encumbrances (R. 7620).
In August of 1983 Kinghom retained surveyor Bing Christensen to locate and stake
the boundaries of Rossi Hills (R. 7489). Although Christensen claimed to have placed
stakes on the property to determine the boundaries sometime in the fall of 1983, it was
November when he informed Kinghom, and there was already two feet of snow on the
ground and no way to locate the stakes (R. 7491). After the snow melted in the spring of
1984, Kinghom walked the property and was unable to locate any of the stakes (R. 7491-92).
Shortly thereafter, in the spring of 1984, Doms and Kinghom both contacted Alliance
Engineering in Park City, Utah, and eventually retained Alliance in the late summer of 1984
to do a complete land survey of Rossi Hills (R. 7493-94). At about the same time, in March
of 1984, Kinghom met with attorney Edward S. Sweeney, who represented the Estate of
D.C. Anderson (and Ellen Anderson, who was the personal representative of the estate),
and Dan Scott (R. 7500). At this meeting, Kinghom expressed concerns to Sweeney that
the loop road and other physical encroachments which appeared to be on Rossi Hills may
constitute easements and encumbrances on the property (R. 7504-05).
In October of 1984, Alliance Engineering completed their land survey of Rossi Hills
(R. 7494; Ex. 77D). This land survey clearly revealed to Kinghom and Doms for the very
first time that the loop road and other physical encroachments were physically located on
the property (R. 7170-72, 7496). Doms then instructed Kinghom to do further investigation
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and form a legal opinion as to whether or not these encroachments constituted prescriptive
easements or otherwise were encumbrances under Utah law (R. 7175, 7624-25).
Kinghorn personally talked to several long-time residents of Park City regarding the
physical encroachments and the use of the loop road by abutting property owners (R. 749899). Several of these people told Kinghorn that Elden and Ella Sorensen, and other people
who resided on property abutting Rossi Hills, had always used the loop road for access to
their property long enough to qualify as prescriptive easements (R. 7498-99). Kinghorn also
was aware that the Park City Planning Department required all developments in Park City
to recognize and respect lawful prescriptive easements and other property interests which
exist upon property (R. 7499). Kinghorn then formed a legal conclusion for the first time
that the loop road and other encroachments constituted prescriptive easements and
encumbrances upon Rossi Hills, and shortly thereafter reported his conclusion to Doms in
December of 1984 or early January of 1985 (R. 7500, 7611, 7625).
Doms and Kinghorn both concluded that neither the three-parcel development nor
Rossi Hills by itself would be economically feasible to develop because there was not enough
useable land due to the encumbrances (R. 7398-7400, 7445-46, 7500). Doms accepted
Kinghorn's legal opinion and instructed him to attempt to negotiate a resolution to the
problem that would avoid litigation (R. 7176-77, 7500-01). Doms instructed Kinghorn to
offer to deed the property back to the Andersons and Scotts in exchange for cancellation
of the trust deed note and not to demand the return of money which had already been paid,
in order to attempt to avoid expensive and protracted litigation (R. 7176-77, 7501-02, 7625).
In a telephone conversation with Sweeney in January of 1985, Kinghorn informed
Sweeney about the survey (Ex. 77D), and that the loop road and other encroachments
constituted a serious problem which needed to be resolved; and that he wanted to meet with
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Sweeney and present a proposal and discuss these issues (R. 7504-05). On January 17,1985,
Kinghorn had a lengthy meeting with Sweeney in Kinghorn's law office (R. 7505). At this
meeting, Kinghorn showed Sweeney the Alliance Engineering land survey of Rossi Hills,
which clearly showed the loop road and other physical encroachments located upon the
property (R. 7506). Kinghorn told Sweeney the names of the people he had talked to in
Park City regarding use of the loop road by the Sorensens and others far in excess of 20
years as access to their property, and that in his legal opinion the loop road, back yards,
sheds and fences constituted prescriptive easements on the property under Utah law (R.
7506-07).

Kinghorn further told Sweeney these prescriptive easements constituted a

violation of the covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed conveying
Rossi Hills to Doms, pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12; and Doms was entitled to rescission of
the transaction and the return of all money received by Plaintiffs (R. 7507).
As a compromise, in lieu of seeking full rescission, Kinghorn presented Doms' offer
to deed the property back in exchange for cancellation of the trust deed note, and allowing
Plaintiffs to keep all money already received under the contract (F. of F. 44; R. 7507-08).
Sweeney told Kinghorn he would have to talk to his clients, but not to worry about making
the principal payment of $194,250.00 due January 25, 1985, until he got back to Kinghorn
(R. 7508).
On March 18, 1985, Kinghorn again met with Sweeney and another lawyer in his law
firm by the name of Peter Mulhern at Kinghorn's law office to further discuss the matter (R.
7509). In a lengthy meeting, Kinghorn reiterated to Sweeney and Mulhern all of the
information he had given to Sweeney at the January 17,1985, meeting (R. 7510). Kinghorn
again made the offer that Doms, in an attempt to avoid litigation, would deed the property
back to the Andersons and Scotts in exchange for cancellation of the trust deed note, and
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they could keep all payments already received by them (R. 7511-12). Mulhern and Sweeney
indicated they would get back to Kinghorn and assured Kinghorn that Doms would not be
expected to make the $194,250.00 payment purportedly due under the trust deed note until
they got back to Kinghorn in regard to this matter, and the situation was straightened out
(R. 7514).
However, Plaintiffs did not subsequently respond to Doms' offer or contact Kinghorn,
but rather filed a Complaint to foreclose on the property on June 6, 1985 (F. of F. 45; R.
7514-15). This Complaint is Civil No. 8339, the main case now on appeal (R. 1-9; Add. 10).
After Plaintiffs filed their foreclosure Complaint in June of 1985, Kinghorn engaged
in numerous discussions with various counsel representing Plaintiffs at that time, and several
extensions, stipulations and agreements were entered into to allow Doms to locate new
counsel because Kinghorn was going to have to be a witness in this case (R. 3182-85).
Contrary to an agreement between Kinghorn and counsel for Plaintiffs at that time, and
unbeknownst to Kinghorn, Plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of judgment by default and
obtained a default judgment against Doms and McCoy on or about January 20,1988 (R. 3440, 3185-86).
On January 29,1988, Kinghorn filed an Answer and Counterclaim to rescind the Rossi
Hills transaction, unaware that a default judgment had been entered against Doms (R. 4144; Add. 11).
The default judgment against Doms was subsequently set aside by the trial court
effective June 1,1988, upon Doms' payment of $4,467.60 to Plaintiffs, which represented all
attorney's fees and costs incurred by Plaintiffs in the action up to and including that date (R.
76-78, 126-27). The trial court issued an Order that whether or not it was appropriate to
award that amount as attorney's fees was an issue reserved until final disposition of the case
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on the merits (R. 245-47; Add. 12). The default judgment against McCoy was never set
aside.
On June 15,1988, Doms filed an Amended Counterclaim (R. 102-05; Add. 13). In this
Amended Counterclaim, Jeanne Scott (the wife of Dan Scott) and Ellen Anderson,
personally, were joined as involuntary Plaintiffs pursuant to an Order of the trial court (R.
248-50). On July 6, 1988, Doms filed a Second Amended Counterclaim against all four
Plaintiffs (R. 237-42; Add. 14). Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim alleged breach of the
implied statutory covenants of warranty contained in the warranty deed pursuant to U.C.A.
§ 57-1-12, breach of contract, and fraud and misrepresentation; and sought rescission of the
Rossi Hills transaction or, in the alternative, damages (R. 237-42).
The major portion of Rossi Hills was sold in May of 1987 to Summit County for nonpayment of property taxes (R. 3115). Due to the adversarial relationship between Doms and
McCoy, and a lack of communication with Kinghorn, Doms was unaware that this had
occurred until sometime later (R. 3115).
In July of 1988, after researching and investigating the status of the title to Rossi Hills,
Doms' new counsel (and present counsel herein) informed Doms the tax sale had indeed
taken place in May of 1987; and Summit County was in fact deemed to be the owner of the
major portion of Rossi Hills (R. 3116). Doms immediately instructed counsel to do whatever
was necessary to redeem or purchase back Rossi Hills from Summit County (R. 3116). In
August of 1988, pursuant to instructions of counsel, Doms tendered a cashier's check paid
to the order of the Summit County Treasurer in the amount of $4,175.51, to pay all
delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs, plus the 1988 estimated taxes, due to Summit
County; and for conveyance of the property back to Domcoy, the record owner of the
property prior to the tax sale to Summit County (R. 3116, 3158).
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Upon receipt of this payment, Summit County, by quit-claim deed dated August 24,
1988, conveyed Rossi Hills back to Domcoy, the prior record owner (R. 3117, 3160-61; Add.
15). On August 26,1988, Domcoy conveyed Rossi Hills by warranty deed to Doms (Ex. 17P;
Add. 16).
The action proceeded through a lengthy discovery process and the consolidation with
another case, Civil No. 10066 (Supp. R. 244). Civil No. 10066 (the "tax sale case") was filed
by Plaintiffs in December of 1988 to declare unconstitutional and set aside the May 1987 tax
sale of Rossi Hills to Summit County and to quiet title to the property in Plaintiffs (Supp.
R. 2-66). The Summit County tax sale was subsequently declared void and set aside by the
trial court upon stipulation of all of the parties in the tax sale case (C. of L. 42; Judg. 1116).
In February of 1989, Plaintiff Jeanne Scott filed a Petition in the Utah Supreme Court
for Permission to File an Interlocutory Appeal from an Order of the trial court denying her
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of In Personam Jurisdiction over her in the action (Add. 17).
Pursuant to a Minute Entry dated March 9, 1989, the Supreme Court denied this Petition
for an Interlocutory Appeal (Add. 18).
Shortly thereafter, in June of 1989, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ in
the Utah Supreme Court, seeking to restrain and prohibit the Third Judicial District Court
and the judges thereof from proceeding further in the trial of this case based upon exactly
the same in personam jurisdiction arguments which were rejected by the Utah Supreme
Court in Plaintiff Jeanne Scott's Petition to File an Interlocutory Appeal (Add. 19). In an
Amended Minute Entry, dated July 31, 1989, the Supreme Court denied this Petition for
Extraordinary Writ (Add. 20).
In a bifurcated trial, the trial court first decided to resolve the issue of whether or not
the Rossi Hills transaction should be rescinded (R. 7315). FoUowing three days of trial on
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April 17-19, 1990, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision denying rescission based
upon the doctrine of laches (R. 4188-95; Add. 21).
The remainder of the trial was held on August 21-24, 1990, and related primarily to
the issue of damages suffered by Doms as a result of the encumbrances on Rossi Hills (R.
7753-8285, 6541-89). Following this portion of the trial, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision which ruled that Doms suffered $83,000.00 in damages as a result of the loop
road and other encumbrances existing on Rossi Hills as of March of 1982, when the
transaction was closed and the warranty deed delivered (R. 4348-54).
Subsequently, a hearing was held on December 31, 1991, to determine which parties
were entitled to awards of attorney's fees and costs in the action (R. 6360-6540). Plaintiffs
and Doms submitted attorney's fees affidavits, memoranda of costs, other documents
regarding expenses; and Plaintiffs' counsel and Doms' counsel testified at this hearing.
Following extensive objections, motions and argument by the parties over the
appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, the trial court entered its final
Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99; Add. 1) and Second
Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07; Add. 2) on June 23, 1992.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred by applying the equitable doctrine of laches and refusing to
rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. Rescission is the appropriate remedy based upon
Plaintiffs' breach of the statutory warranties and covenants contained in the warranty deed
pursuant to U.C.A § 57-1-12, and also upon Plaintiffs' misrepresentations of material facts
prior to the Rossi Hills transaction. Laches cannot be applied against Doms for a number
of compelling reasons: (1) Doms acted promptly to rescind after obtaining knowledge,
through diligent efforts, that there were legal encumbrances on the property; (2) Doms
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diligently attempted to develop the property and thereby mitigate damages; (3) Plaintiffs
failed to establish they were prejudiced by any alleged delay; and (4) Plaintiffs have come
into a court of equity with "unclean hands."
The trial court erred by ruling the warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note do
not constitute a single contract or transaction, which must be construed together in
determining the rights and obligations of the parties. Plaintiffs were in breach of this
contract when they delivered the warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills with encumbrances
and title defects. Because Plaintiffs were in breach of the Rossi Hills contract, Doms was
excused from all performance regarding the Rossi Hills transaction, and therefore was never
in default under the trust deed and trust deed note. Furthermore, Plaintiffs cannot foreclose
or otherwise seek equitable relief because they have come into a court of equity with
"unclean hands."
If rescission is denied, the trial court erred by awarding Doms only one-half the
amount of damages found by the expert appraiser, Jerry Webber, as a result of the
encumbrances on Rossi Hills. The trial court should have awarded the $166,050.00 in
damages found by Jerry Webber because it represents the only determination based on
assumptions and conditions permitted by law. The trial court should have excluded or
disregarded the testimony and appraisal report of Plaintiffs' appraiser as a sanction against
Plaintiffs for violating discovery rules; and also because the opinions of Plaintiffs' appraiser
were based on assumptions and conditions not permitted by law.
The trial court erred by ruling that Doms' counterclaim against the Estate of D.C.
Anderson, as it relates to the remedy of damages, is time-barred by the probate "nonclaim"
provisions of §§ 75-3-801 and 803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. Doms' causes of
action against the estate are not "claims" under the Probate Code, and therefore were not
14

required to have been filed against the estate.

Notwithstanding the application of the

nonclaim provisions to Doms' remedy of damages, Doms is still entitled to a set-off for the
damages against the purchase price of Rossi Hills.
The trial court erred by refusing to award attorney's fees and appropriate costs to
Doms. Doms is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs for sustaining
his title to Rossi Hills against Plaintiffs' foreclosure and quiet title actions. Doms is also
entitled to an award of out-of-pocket attorney's fees as consequential damages flowing from
Plaintiffs' breach of contract.
The trial court erred in its award of attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs because Doms is the prevailing party in this
lawsuit and was never in default under the trust deed and trust deed note, which provided
the only possible basis upon which Plaintiffs could make a legitimate claim for attorney's fees
or costs. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their petitions
to the Utah Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal and extraordinary writ because
Plaintiffs lost both of these petitions. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or
costs pursuant to their motions for sanctions in regard to Doms' objections to discovery
requests because all of Doms' objections were substantially justified under Rule 37(a)(4),
U.R.C.P. Finally, Doms is entitled to a refund of a substantial amount of the attorney's fees
and costs paid to Plaintiffs as a condition of the trial court setting aside the default
judgment.
Doms' cause of action in his counterclaims alleging breach of the warranties and
covenants in the warranty deed is not barred by the six-year limitation contained in U.C.A.
§ 78-12-23(2). Doms' original counterclaim was filed less than six years after Plaintiffs'
breach of the warranties and covenants in the warranty deed.
15

Furthermore, Doms'

counterclaims are deemed under Utah law to "relate back" to June 6, 1985, the date
Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed. Finally, notwithstanding the statute of limitations, Doms'
claims are entitled to be set-off against Plaintiffs' claims in their Complaint up to the
purchase price of the property.
If rescission is denied, the doctrine of election of remedies does not preclude Doms'
remedy of damages. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly allow a party to demand
relief in the alternative or of several different types, and a party may state as many separate
or alternate claims as he has regardless of consistency. The doctrine of election of remedies
does not prevent recourse to any particular remedy, but operates only to prevent double
redress for a single wrong.
Plaintiffs lack standing to attack the validity of the warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills
from Domcoy to Doms because Plaintiffs are strangers to the warranty deed and are not
stockholders or creditors of Domcoy. Furthermore, Domcoy had clear power and authority
to convey Rossi Hills to Doms under the applicable provisions of the Utah Business
Corporation Act regarding the winding up of affairs of a dissolved corporation.
Doms is prosecuting his Second Amended Counterclaim as the real party in interest
because he is the fee simple title holder to Rossi Hills, and in fact is the only party in
interest. Doms and McCoy did not purchase Rossi Hills as a partnership, and Rossi Hills
was never partnership property. Even assuming, arguendo, there ever was a partnership
between Doms and McCoy, any such alleged partnership was terminated in May of 1982.
Doms is prosecuting his Second Amended Counterclaim as an "immediate grantee"
under the warranty deed from Plaintiffs, not a "remote grantee." Doms cause of action for
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breach of the covenants and warranties in the warranty deed arises from the original deed
executed by Plaintiffs conveying Rossi Hills to Doms. Doms is being sued by Plaintiffs as
an immediate grantee, and in turn is counterclaiming against Plaintiffs as an immediate
grantee. Furthermore, Plaintiffs also breached the covenant of general warranty of title
when they delivered the warranty deed to Rossi Hills, and a remote grantee can bring an
action on this covenant because it runs with the land. Finally, Doms' cause of action for
misrepresentation is not dependent upon any covenants and warranties in the warranty deed
and is not affected by Doms' status as either an immediate or a remote grantee.
Jeanne Scott and Ellen Anderson are properly joined as involuntary Plaintiffs because
they are necessary parties under Rule 19(a), U.R.C.P. This issue has been decided by the
Utah Supreme Court in the Court's ruling denying Plaintiffs' Petition for an Extraordinary
Writ.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY
APPLYING THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF LACHES AND
REFUSING TO RESCIND THE ROSSI HILLS TRANSACTION,
A.

Rescission is the appropriate remedy based upon Plaintiffs* breach of the statutory
warranties and covenants contained in the warranty deed pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1The trial court correctly ruled that the deed executed by Plaintiffs conveying Rossi

Hills to Doms and McCoy was a warranty deed under Utah law and conveyed with it all of
the statutory warranties and covenants pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12 (Ex. IP; F. of F. 1-6;
G of L. 1; Add. 23).
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The trial court also correctly ruled that the loop road, sheds, fences and backyard
areas bordered by the fences and sheds, all as shown on the Alliance Engineering survey
(Ex. 77D), constitute encumbrances upon Rossi Hills which were not excepted in the
warranty deed, and thus a breach of the statutory covenants contained in the warranty deed
pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12 (C. of L. 2-4; Judg. K 3).2 The trial court also correctly ruled
that the aforesaid statutory covenants were breached upon delivery of the warranty deed on
March 23, 1982 (C of L. 5).3 The trial court made its Findings of Fact and based its
aforementioned Conclusions of Law on the uncontradicted testimony of Ella and Elden
Sorensen, who have resided on Ontario Avenue since 1941, and whose rear property abuts
and in fact intrudes upon Rossi Hills (R. 7342-77; F. of F. 8-13). All of the uses of the loop
road, sheds, fences and backyards by the Sorensens and other abutting property owners
clearly constitute prescriptive easements under Utah law and are therefore encumbrances
under U.CA. § 57-1-12.4
In addition, Ex. 77D and the uncontradicted testimony of Ella and Elden Sorensen
clearly establish that the Sorensens actually had acquired title to the portion of their
backyard intruding upon Rossi Hills when Plaintiffs conveyed Rossi Hills to Doms in March
of 1982. The Sorensens testified their shed and backyard fence had been there since at least

2

See Bergstrom v. Moore. 677 P.2d 1123,1124-25 (Utah 1984); Brewer v. Peatross. 595
P.2d 866, 868 (Utah 1979).
3

See Bergstrom. supra, at 677 P.2d 1125; Brewer, supra, at 595 P.2d 868.

4

See Marchant v. Park City. 788 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1990); Jensen v. Brown. 639 P.2d
150, 152 (Utah 1981); Crane v. Crane. 683 P.2d 1062,1064 (Utah 1984); Malouf v. Fischer.
159 P.2d 881 (Utah 1945); Richins v. Struhs. 412 P.2d 314 (Utah 1966); Willie v. Local
Realty Co.. 175 P.2d 718 (Utah 1946).
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1941 and nothing had changed since then (R. 7345-46). The Sorensens further testified that
they and the other residences on Ontario Avenue have used their property openly and
notoriously in their backyards out to the fences since 1941, and that nobody had ever asked
them to move any of the sheds or fences (R. 7366-67).
Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence as recently set forth by the Utah
Supreme Court, the Sorensens have acquired actual title to the portion of their backyard
intruding on Rossi Hills. See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990). It is clear
from the Sorensens' testimony and the Alliance Engineering Survey (Ex. 77D), that the
Sorensens have acquired title out to their fence line and shed. Plaintiffs therefore breached
the covenant of general warranty of title when they conveyed Rossi Hills to Doms in March
of 1982.
Rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction is clearly appropriate pursuant to precedent
established 98 years ago. In Adams v. Reed, 40 P. 720 (Utah 1985), affirmed, Adams v.
Henderson, 168 U.S. 584 (1897), the Utah Supreme Court held that where an easement
exists on land or there is a defect in title, equity will rescind the warranty deed, note and
mortgage. 40 P. at 723-25.
The prescriptive easements and the actual lack of title in Plaintiffs at the time of the
Rossi Hills transaction are considered "irremediable" under Utah law. Neves v. Wright, 638
P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah 1981). The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have further held
that when the unexcepted encumbrances on a grantor's title are irremediable and the
grantor cannot fulfill his covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed,
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rescission is the appropriate remedy. Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah
1984).5
The facts of the instant case are strikingly similar to those in this Court's recent
decision of Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah 1990). In Breuer-Harrison,
this Court upheld the trial court's summary judgment of rescission as the appropriate remedy
for the plaintiffs, even though the plaintiffs did not assert their right of rescission for five
years after they learned of an irremediable pipeline easement.
Notwithstanding the trial court's findings that Doms knew some sheds and a road
existed on the property, Plaintiffs are still subject to the statutory covenant against
encumbrances under U.C.A. § 57-1-12. Actual or constructive knowledge by a grantee of
an encumbrance is inadmissible parol evidence and not a valid defense, as the covenant
against encumbrances protects against all known as well as unknown encumbrances. Jones
v. Grow Investment & Mortgage Co., 358 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1961); Bergstrom, supra, at
677 P.2d 1125.6

5

See also Neves v. Wright, supra, at 638 P.2d 1198; Smith v. Permain, 548 P.2d 1269
(Utah 1976); Thackeray v. Knight, 192 P. 263 (Utah 1920); Callister v. Millstream Associates,
Inc., 738 P.2d 662,664 (Utah App. 1987); Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 724
(Utah App. 1990).
6

Plaintiffs make the untenable argument in Point VII of their opening brief that this
Court should disregard the law in Utah as clearly set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in
Jones and Bergstrom. supra.
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B.

Rescission is the appropriate remedy based upon Plaintiffs' misrepresentations of
material facts prior to the Rossi Hills transaction.
Utah law has long recognized that rescission is the appropriate remedy based upon

negligent or even totally innocent misrepresentations of material facts regarding the real
property which forms the subject of a contract. See Adams v. Reed, supra, at 40 P. 725;
Zuniga v. Leone. 297 P. 1010 (Utah 1931). The weight of authority throughout the country
also recognizes that even innocent misrepresentation of material facts is a proper basis for
rescission of a contract. See, e^g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164; Barrer
v. Women's National Bank. 761 F.2d 752, 757-58 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
In regard to non-disclosures preceding the Rossi Hills transaction in the instant case,
a clear duty was imposed upon Michael Sloan, Plaintiffs' agent and a licensed real estate
broker, to disclose to Doms all facts material to the Rossi Hills transaction. Dugan v. Jones,
615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980).7 Any misrepresentations made by Sloan to Doms
regarding the Rossi Hills transaction, whether positive assertions or non-disclosures, are
imputed to Plaintiffs under the law governing principal and agent.8
The Rossi Hills transaction should have been rescinded by the trial court based upon
the following specific misrepresentations established by the evidence at trial:
Material Misrepresentations
1. Sloan testified, and the trial court found, that Sloan told Doms the loop road didn't
matter as an encroachment because an improved road would follow or make use of

7

See also Secor v. Knight. 716 P.2d 790, 795 (Utah 1986); First Security Bank v.
Banberrv Development 786 P.2d 1326, 1329-33 (Utah 1990).
8

See, e.g., Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 104 P.2d 619, 623 (Utah 1940); Xanthos v. Board
of Adjustment of Salt Lake City. 685 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Utah 1984).
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it (F. of F. 42; R. 7668, 7672). Sloan also testified that he knew what a prescriptive
easement was and he did not believe the loop road was a prescriptive easement (R.
7673-75).
2. Sloan testified, and the trial court found, that Sloan told Doms the encroachments
would not impair the three-parcel development with Block 62 and the Slipper Parcel
(F. of F. 42; R. 7668, 7683-84).
3. Doms testified, and the trial court found, that Sloan and D.C. Anderson told Doms
that Rossi Hills was a "prime piece" of development property (F. of F. 35; R. 7101,
7227, 7236, 7404-05).
4. Sloan and Doms both testified, and the trial court found, that Sloan and D.C.
Anderson told Doms the "highest and best use" of Rossi Hills was the three-parcel
development (F. of F. 35; R. 7680, 7158-60).
5. Sloan and Doms both testified that Sloan told Doms, with D.C. Anderson present,
the three-parcel development would be a "profitable venture" and a "good, sound
investment" (R. 7679, 7404-05, 7410-12).
6. Sloan testified in his deposition he told Doms that Rossi Hills was the "best
undeveloped piece of property outside Deer Valley within walking distance to town"
(R. 454, p. 42 1. 19-22).
7. Doms testified that Sloan and D.C. Anderson told Doms that Rossi Hills could be
developed on its own as a "stand alone" piece of property (R. 7111, 7158-60).
8. Doms testified that Sloan and D.C. Anderson told Doms the three-parcel
development could be built under then current Park City ordinances (R. 7417-18,
7617).
9. Sloan testified in his deposition he told Doms that attempts at the three-parcel
development had previously failed, but Doms could get the deal done by working with
the Mountain Realty Group (R. 454, p. 44 1. 21 - p. 45 1. 13).
Material Non-Disclosures
10. Plaintiffs and Sloan failed to tell Doms that Plaintiffs' attempts at the three-parcel
development had previously failed because of the encroachments on Rossi Hills (R.
7437-38, 7481-82, 7484, 7593-94, 7603-04).
11. Plaintiffs and Sloan failed to tell Doms that the three-parcel development had
already been submitted for preliminary approval to Park City and rejected (R. 7556).
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The preponderance of the evidence clearly establishes that the aforementioned
misrepresentations of material facts were made to Doms, whether by positive assertions or
Plaintiffs' non-disclosures. Doms reasonably relied on these misrepresentations which
induced him to purchase Rossi Hills, and the trial court erred by not rescinding the Rossi
Hills transactions based upon said misrepresentations of Plaintiffs.
C.

Laches cannot be applied against Doms because he acted promptly to rescind after
obtaining knowledge, through diligent efforts, that there were legal encumbrances on
the property.
In the very recent case of Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 227 (Utah 1992),

the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: "In order to prove that Sandy was guilty of
laches, defendants had to show that there was a clear lack of diligence on the part of Sandy,
and that they suffered identifiable damage, injury, or prejudice arising from the unwarranted
delay. 827 P.2d at 229-30 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).9
In Breuer-Harrison, this Court affirmed the trial court's granting of rescission on the
buyers' motion for summary judgment even though the buyers had delayed five years in
seeking rescission after they obtained knowledge of a pipeline easement on the property.
In reaching this conclusion, this Court stated the following:
However, even though the pipeline easement was incurable, the circumstances
in this case did not demand immediate rescission of the contract by B-H. The
complete impact of the pipeline easement was not known until further
engineering work was completed and the development cost of the property
became prohibitive in light of the pipeline easement.
799 P.2d at 726 (emphasis added).

9

See also Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535
P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975); Breuer-Harrison. supra, at 799 P.2d 726.
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In the instant case, Doms sought rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction less than
three years after he purchased the property (R of F. 44). Furthermore, even assuming
Sloan had told Doms about the loop road and sheds on the property prior to the sale (which
Doms adamantly denies), Doms still did not have knowledge that these encroachments
constituted prescriptive easements or other legal encumbrances which would give him
grounds to seek rescission of the transaction. Sloan himself admitted at trial that he told
Doms these encroachments would be no problem and would not impair the three-parcel
development (F. of F. 42; R. 7668, 7672, 7683-84). Sloan further admitted that he did not
believe the loop road was a prescriptive easement (R. 7673-75). In addition, Doms received
a warranty deed containing covenants against encumbrances and other defects in title.
Relying on Sloan's representations and the warranty deed, Doms had absolutely no reason
to suspect that the encroachments would present a problem or were legal encumbrances of
any kind (R. 7195, 7401-02, 7625-26).
Furthermore, the uncontradicted facts of this case clearly establish that Doms acted
promptly to rescind after obtaining knowledge, through diligent efforts, that there were legal
encumbrances on the property which would give him grounds to seek rescission. Not only
was there no unreasonable delay by Doms in this case, there was in fact virtually no delay
at all in seeking rescission from the time Doms first learned there were legal encumbrances
on the property.
The foregoing facts clearly establish that Doms was in fact very diligent and did not
delay in seeking rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction. A more complete chronology is
set forth in the Statement of Facts of this brief, supra, and Doms' arguments against
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application of laches are presented in detail in his "Trial Brief Regarding Issue of Laches,"
which Domssubmitlcd to

- on Apnl 'II I "HI |l<
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brief sets forth in great u . « « «*c evidence which clearly demonstrates that Doms was
entitled to rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction.
Neverthele!

a Memorandum ?\\~:*:rr - - • *

,y Lne trial court ruled

that Doms waited an unreasonable amount of time to seek rescission, and that rescission was
((mdnir Ivnrril by llhr ilncliinc \\\ hrlir I h1 liSK1!') -Iilil
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conclusions contained in said Memorandum. Decision are incorporated into the trial court's

of Law 33-40, and paragraph 13 of the Judgment. Conclusions of Law 33-40 are reviewed
by this Court simply for legal correctness, and all of these are incorrect legal conclusions.
In particular, Conclusion,, of I aw 'VI constitutes a dviu t rnti of ln\v, as it states that it was
not necessary for Doms to obtain a H ii^l opinion that the loop n
ments wei e pi escripti < e easeiu

' ^ther encroach.
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before Doms could make his rescission olilli i
D.

Laches cannot be applied against Doms because he diligently attempted to develop
the property and thereby mitigate damages.
In Breuer-Harrison. supra, the buyer of the property sought to mitigate the damage
t

concluded that "a non-breaching party may appropriately attempt in. good faith to mitigate
damages by attempting to honor the contract and work around, pi oblems presented b) the
bi each.11 799 P.2d at /^u. m ieie'-vry* *ne sellers' claim of laches, this Court further
concluded as follows:
As we have stated, B-H's delay in exercising its rescission rights was due to its
efforts to mitigate damages due to the pipeline and easement not because they
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were relinquishing their later-asserted claim of rescission. Further, since the
delay was a reasonable attempt to work around the easement, we reject the
Combes' laches claim.
799 P.2d at 727 (emphasis added).
A very similar situation occurred in the instant case. The undisputed facts and
evidence show that Doms and his lawyer, Kinghorn, diligently pursued efforts to develop the
property and work around the loop road and other encroachments. The trial court even
acknowledged in open court on two separate occasions that Doms was diligently attempting
to develop the property (R. 7422-23, 7615-16). Therefore, Plaintiffs' laches claim should
have been rejected by the trial court, and the trial court erred by not granting rescission of
the Rossi Hills transaction.
E.

Laches cannot be applied against Doms because Plaintiffs failed to establish that they
were prejudiced by any alleged delay.
Both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have made it clear that in addition to

unreasonable delay or lack of diligence, the second element of laches which must be
established by the party asserting such a claim is an identifiable injury or prejudice owing
to such lack of diligence or delay.10 In Papanikolas, the Utah Supreme Court stated that
"the propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon the gravity of the prejudice . . .
and the length of . . . delay." 535 P.2d at 1260. In the instant case. Plaintiffs presented no
evidence whatsoever to show they have been injured or prejudiced by any alleged
unreasonable delay by Doms. Furthermore, based upon this complete lack of evidence, the
trial court failed to enter any findings or conclusions that Plaintiffs had suffered any injury
or prejudice. Laches is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof was on Plaintiffs to

10

See Sandy City, supra, at 827 P.2d 229-30; Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises, supra, at 535
P.2d 1260; Breuer-Harrison, supra, at 799 P.2d 726.
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establish a clear lack of diligence by Doms and an identifiable injury or prejudice to
Plaintitls. SiiiiiL IMiimUlls riuiiplctcly lulled li isLibhsli «tit st/omitl rlrnu iiiiil I! Indies, the
trial court erred by applying the doctrine against Doms and refusing to rescind the Rossi
I Ills transaction.
I.

Laches cannot be applied against Doms because Plaintiffs have come into a court of
equity with "unclean hands."
It is a well-settled principle of jurisprudence that equity "reserves its rewards foi those

who are themselves acting in fairness and good conscience, or as is sometimes said, to those
who have come into court with clean hands." Jacobson v. Jacobson. 557 P.2d 156,158 (Utah
1976).11
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1974); Annotation, Clean Hands in Equity, 4 A.L.R. 44, 73.12
The facts and evidence of the instant case clearly establish that Plaintiffs have come
into court with "unclean hands," and therefore have no right to seek equitable relief such as
laches. Again, the numerous misrepresentations made by Plaintiffs dictate they cannot be
s
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hands" because they did not attempt, in any way whatsoever, to remedy their breach of the
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encumbrances and detects in title. D.C Anderson and Dan Scott owned Kuusi Hills for

11

See also LHIW. Inc. v. DeLorean. 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988); Hortoii v. 'Morton,
695 P.2d 102, 107 (t Jtah 1984); Travelers Insurance Company v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484, 485
(Utah 1975).
Military Academy, 223 P.2d 1 72, 1 74-75 (Ore ^ 0 )

approximately 16 years before they sold it to Doms in March of 1982 (R. 2724, pp. 21-24).
Plaintiffs clearly had knowledge of the encroachments on the property (F. of F. 14), and yet
refused to do anything to attempt to remedy their breach of the covenants and warranties,
even when Doms and Kinghorn presented convincing evidence that these encroachments
constituted legal encumbrances (F. of F. 15). In fact, Plaintiffs frustrated every attempt by
Doms to negotiate a reasonable resolution. When Doms gave notice of his intent to rescind
in January of 1985 by way of a settlement offer which was much better for Plaintiffs than a
straight rescission, Plaintiffs demonstrated a complete lack of good faith by failing to even
respond to the rescission offer, but rather filed a foreclosure complaint against Doms and
McCoy in June of 1985 (F. of F. 44, 45).
It is clear that Plaintiffs have come into a court of equity with "unclean hands." The
trial court therefore erred by applying the equitable doctrine of laches against Doms and
granting Plaintiffs equitable relief to which they were not entitled.
G.

The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded with directions to
enter a judgment rescinding the Rossi Hills transaction.
The application of the equitable doctrine of laches in favor of Plaintiffs and against

Doms to deny rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction constitutes a manifest injustice which
cannot reasonably be supported by the evidence, and therefore is an abuse of discretion by
the trial court. Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises, supra, at 535 P.2d 1260. The judgment of
the trial court should be reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court for entry of a
judgment of rescission of the entire Rossi Hills transaction. Rossi Hills is undeveloped land
which can be returned to Plaintiffs in the same condition as it was in 1982. The judgment
of rescission should revest title in the Plaintiffs, who held title to Rossi Hills prior to the sale,
and order the return of all money received by Plaintiffs pursuant to the Rossi Hills
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transactioi
annum un^

is prejudgment interest on all such sums at the statutory rate of 1 0%' per
T^qn, supra, a
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Industries. Inc. 560 P.2d 5 J , 317 (Utah 1977), cert denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THE WARRANTY DEED,
TRUST DEED AND TRUST DEED NOTE DO NOT CONSTITUTE A SINGLE
CONTRACT OR TRANSACTION. AND BY REFUSING TO RULE THAT POMS
WAS EXCUSED FROM PERFORMANCE AND NOT IN DEFAULT
UNDER THE TRUST DEED AND TRUST DEED NOTE.
A.

The warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note constitute a single contract or
transaction and must be construed together in determining the rights and obligations
of the parties.
The warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills to Doms and McCoy was executed by

Plaintiffs in consideration for the execution of the trust deed and trust deed note by Doms

constitute a single contract or transaction evidencing the sale of Rossi Hills.

of conveyance such as a warranty deed.13 Further moi e, the Utah Supreme Court has
definitively ruled that the legal debt or obligation secured by a trust deed or mortgage is part
of and inseparable from the trust deed or mortgage: " As a matter of law, in order to
establish a valid trust deed or mortgage, a legal debt or obligation with a specific amount
In accord General Glass Corp. v. Mast Consl i i ic 1 ion Co,. 766 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App.

^ee U.CA §§ 57-1-12, 57-14,4, 57-1-19 (Add. 23); Brown v. Skeen. 58 P.2d 24, 32
(Utah 1936); Bvbee v. Stuart. 189 P.2d 118, 122 (Utah 1948); Kiar v. Brimlev. 497 P.2d 23,
25-26 (Utah 1972); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Nat. Res. Co.. 627 P.2d 56. ™ "Ttah 1981);
Bown v. Loveland. 678 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984).
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a mortgage or a beneficiary under a trust deed is Ma mere lien, incapable of being separated
from the debt and transferred bv itself." State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsev, 565 P.2d 413, 415
(Utah 1977)(emphasis added); Belnap v. Blain. 575 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1978).
The unquestioned law in Utah is that a note and mortgage (which includes the
warranty deed) constitute a single contract. In First Savings Bank of Ogden v. Brown, 54
P.2d 237, 240-41 (Utah 1936), the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: "The note and
mortgage, given at the same time, and as parts of the same transaction, must be construed
together as constituting one contract. They supplement each other and express the entire
contract between the parties." (emphasis added).14
The fact that a warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note are deemed to constitute
a single contract under clear Utah law simply follows the general rule of law in Utah and
throughout the country that contemporaneously executed instruments regarding the same
subject matter or transaction must be construed together as a single contract. This basic
principal of law is clearly set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v.
Lentz. 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972):
[W]here two or more instruments are executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the course of the same transaction, and concern
the same subject matter, they will be read and construed together as far as

14

See also Brown v. Skeen. 58 P.2d 24, 32-33 (Utah 1936); Bvbee v. Stuart. 189 P.2d
118, 122-23 (Utah 1948); Kjar v. Brimlev, 497 P.2d 23, 25-26 (Utah 1972).
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determining the respectiverightsand interests of the parties, although thev do
not in terms refer to each other.

The fact that the warranty deed must be considered i; • he part of a single contract or
transaction along with the othei documents of transit ;.. *„...,her emphasized by all t.»:l the
Utah rescission cases cited in Point I, supra. In each of these cases, the entire transaction
was rescinded, not just the warranty de s cil
T h e liiiiiill
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advanced by Plaintiffs that the Rossi Hills transaction should be split into separate contracts
ni'iiliug tin; „ali evidenced by the \A aiiaiiiLy d a d i

in iiinliriil, i in I llllii 'lin.iiu uii1"

evidenced by the trust deed and trust deed note as another contract. The trial court
erroneously applied the doctrine of merger, which has nothing to do with this issue, to
somehow

*

i separate contracts. Fherefore,

Conclusions ot Lav t \ *• and 9 represent cieai vi:. ^ 01 .aw by the trial court and must

B.

Plaintiffs were in breach of contract when they delivered the warranty deed conveying
Rossi Hills with encumbrances and title defects,
q

s

contained in the warrantv deed pursuant \.- t A \ c w~;. ^ were breached by Plaintiffs
_ ue]ivery of the warran

:..

A . .

*•

pcipiuni \. ,>ium-. -

5,

1125 ^Jtah 1984); Soderberg v. Holt 46 P.2d 428, 431 (Utah 1935).

15

In accord First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell 659 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah
1983); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d 1357, 1358-59 (Utah App. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(2); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 388; 55 Am. Jur.
2d Mortgages § 176: ^ C ^ S . Mortgages § 156; 1 7 A n IS. Contracts § 298.
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C.

Poms was excused from all performance regarding the Rossi Hills transaction, and
therefore was never in default under the trust deed and trust deed note.
In Bergstrom v. Moore, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: "If it plainly

appears that a seller has lost or encumbered his ownership so that he will not be able to
fulfill his contract, he cannot insist that a buyer continue to make payments." 677 P.2d at
1125 (citations omitted and emphasis added).16 In other words, the buyer is excused from
performance under the contract because he is not considered under the law to be in default.
In regard to the law of contracts in general, clear Utah case law and the general rule
of law throughout the country hold that where one party to a contract has failed or refused
to perform an obligation under it, the non-breaching party is excused from performance
under the contract, and may recover all money already paid and other losses incurred by
him.

Sprague v. Bovles Bros. Drilling Co.. 294 P.2d 689, 693 (Utah 1956).17

The

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 274(1), cited by the Utah Supreme Court in Sprague,
frames the issue in terms of a failure of consideration by the breaching party which
discharges the non-breaching party from his duties under the contract. Comment (a) to §
274 explains that in any such case the non-breaching party is excused from performance and
may reclaim what he has given, or its value. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held

16

The cases cited in Bergstrom include Marlowe Investment Corp. v. Radmall 485 P.2d
1402 (Utah 1971); Tremonton Investment Co. v. Home, 202 P. 547 (Utah 1921); Foxlev v.
Rich, 99 P. 666 (Utah 1909). See also Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195,1198-99 (Utah 1981);
American Savings & Loan Assoc, v. Blomquist, 465 P.2d 353, 355 (Utah 1970); Huck v.
Haves, 560 P.2d 1124, 1126 (Utah 1977).
17

Sprague cites the following authority in support of this proposition: Anvil Mining Co.
v. Humble, 153 U.S. 540 (1894); 5 WlLLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1303 (rev. ed.); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 274(1). See a]so 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §§ 621, 664, 701; 17A
C.J.S. Contracts § 452; Sjoberg v. Kravik, 759 P.2d 966, 969 (Mont. 1988); Sharbono v.
Darden, 715 P.2d 433, 435 (Mont. 1986); O'Hara Group Denver, Ltd. v. Marcor Housing
Systems. Inc., 595 P.2d 679, 684-85 (Colo. 1979).
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that failure of consideration is a complete defense to any claim of the breaching party based
u p o n the contract, and thai illin nun-bleaching pail) is excused h u m [tntniniaiin .null nut
in default under the contract. 1 8
D.

Plaintiffs cannot foreclose or otherwise seek equitable relief because thev have come
into a court of equity with "unclean hands."
In paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Plaintiffs elect to seek foreclosure of the trust

deed and trust deed note as a note and mortgage pursuant to paragraph
ancj

ieed

u.CA. § 57-1-23 (R. 1-9). An action to foreclose a morh^ue is deemed to be an action

in equity under clear holdings of the Utah Supreme Court
'li1' I1 M 41 \ 111 11 I Ill I'll f| Udnap v. Blaitt

(

I' \i f»l

^ Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey.
•

Jtah 1978). However,

Plaintiffs a r e n o t entitled to a decree of foreclosure or any other eqi litable relief because

E.

If rescission is denied, t h e judgment of t h e trial court should be reversed and
r e m a n d e d with directions to enter judgment in accordance with the law a s set forth
above.
Conclusions of Law 6-9, 20-32 and 51-54; and paragraphs 1, 5-12 a n d 19-22 of the

Judgment; all constitute errors of law by the trial cour t which must b e reversed under the
1 egJJ I c"11rrec111ess s I \i it 1< II; i HI 11 ,»II 11' \ mi< \ ;

nrt's

rulings sphtting the Rossi Hills transaction mtr ;wr;trate contracts: ; ... ng Doms in aeiault
a
"h) bi id" procedure involving mortgages and/or trust deeds; awarding Plaintiffs amounts due

18

See Assets Realization Co. v. Cardon. 272 P. 204, 207 (Utah 1928); General Ins. Co.
of A m . v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.. 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976); Bentlev v. Potter, 694
P.2d 617, 619 ( U t a h 1984) (quoting 6 S. WiLLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 814, at
17-78 (3d ed. 1 962)); C o p p e r State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance, 770 P.2d 88, 91 (Utah
1988)
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under the trust deed and trust deed note plus interest; and awarding Plaintiffs attorney's fees
and costs based upon Doms' alleged default under the trust deed and trust deed note.
If rescission is denied, on remand the trial court should be directed to enter a
judgment consistent with the principals of law set forth in subpoints A through D above.
The judgment should be that Doms must pay the purchase price of the property, with a setoff for all amounts received by Plaintiffs toward the purchase of the property and for any
damages suffered by Doms as a result of Plaintiffs' breach of contract.
Doms owes Plaintiffs nothing under the trust deed and trust deed note, and is entitled
to the following amounts as set-offs against the $276,750.00 purchase price of Rossi Hills:
1. $82,500.00, which represents the earnest money payment of $10,000.00 and the
down payment of $72,500.00 (F. of F. 18).
2. $72,520.25, which represents the sum total of all monthly payments received by
Plaintiffs under the trust deed note (F. of F. 22).

Since Doms was excused from

performance under the trust deed note, no interest ever accrued and all such monthly
payments were principal payments and represent additional set-offs against the purchase
price of the property (F. of F. 21).
3. The amount of damages suffered by Doms as a result of the encumbrances existing
on Rossi Hills, the trial court concluded, was $83,000.00 (C. of L. 19). However, Doms
submits that the trial court abused its discretion in this award, and the damages suffered by
Doms as a result of the encumbrances should be $166,050.00 (See Point III, infra),
4. Prejudgment interest under U.C.A. § 15-1-1 should be awarded to Doms at the rate
of 10% per annum, on all amounts received by Plaintiffs pursuant to the Rossi Hills
transaction from the date each such payment was received to the entry of judgment by the
trial court on remand. Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert.
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denied. 431 U.S. 930 (1977); Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co.. 88 P. 1003, 1006-07 (Utah
1907).
5. Prejudgment interest on the amount of damages ultimately awarded to Doms
should also be awarded from March 23,1982, the date the warranty deed was delivered, to
the final entry of judgment by the trial court on remand. Bjork. supra; Fell, supra.19
6. All attorney's fees and costs should be awarded to Doms, plus prejudgment interest
on the award of attorney's fees (See Point V, infra).
POINT in
IF RESCISSION IS DENIED. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY
AWARDING DOMS ONLY ONE-HALF THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
FOUND BY THE EXPERT APPRAISER. JERRY WEBBER. AS A
RESULT OF THE ENCUMBRANCES ON ROSSI HELLS.
A.

The proper measure of damages is the "benefit of the bargain" rule.
The trial court correctly ruled that damages should be measured as of the date of

Plaintiffs' breach of contract, which occurred on March 23,1982, the date the warranty deed
was delivered (C. of L. 13). Soderberg v. Holt. 46 P.2d 428, 434 (Utah 1935).20 The trial
court also correctly ruled that the proper measure of damages under Utah law is the
difference in value of the property without any encumbrances minus the value of the
property with the encumbrances, which is simply the "benefit of the bargain" rule (C. of L.
15). Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Standard West. 755 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988);
19

See also Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co.. 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976);
Gillespie v. Blood. 17 P.2d 822 (Utah 1932); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love. 196 P. 305
(Utah 1921); Wheatlev v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.. 162 P. 86 (Utah 1916); Railroad v.
Board of Education. 99 P. 263 (Utah 1909); East Canyon Land & Stock Co. v. Davis &
Weber Counties Canal Co.. 238 P. 280 (Utah 1925).
20

This rule is simply the general rule of law followed throughout the country in breach
of contract actions. See, e.g.. Sagebrush Development. Inc. v. Moehrke. 604 P.2d 198 (Wyo.
1979); McCoy v. Rilev. 771 P.2d 25 (ColoApp. 1989); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 74.
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Smith & Boyer, Survey of the Law of Property. Ch. 19, p. 313 (2d ed. 1971). The benefit
of the bargain" rule, and thus the same measure of damages, is also used to determine
Doms' damages suffered as a result of Plaintiffs' misrepresentations. Dugan v. Jones, 615
P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980).
B.

Damages must be determined with all encumbrances in place and as they
existed in March of 1982,
The trial court correctly ruled that damages should be measured with all the

encumbrances in place and as they existed on March 23, 1982, the date the warranty deed
was delivered to Doms and the contract thereby breached by Plaintiffs (C. of L. 14). Lyman
Grazing Association v. Smith. 473 P.2d 905, 907 (Utah 1970); Merrill v. Bailev & Sons Co.,
106 P.2d 255, 259 (Utah 1940).21
C.

The trial court should have awarded the $166,050 in damages found by the
appraiser, Jerry Webber, because it represents the only determination based
on assumptions and conditions permitted by law.
An expert real estate appraiser, Jerry R. Webber, compiled an extensive appraisal

report totaling 112 pages (including 37 pages of addenda), in which Webber appraised the
fair market value of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 both with and without the encumbrances
found by the trial court to exist on Rossi Hills (Ex. 88D). Webber calculated that the fair
market value of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 without considering any encumbrances of any
kind on the property was $276,750.00, which corresponds exactly to the purchase price
actually paid for the property. This calculation was based on a maximum of ten residential

21

See ajso Carson v. Elliott. 728 P.2d 778 (Idaho App. 1986); Warsaw v. Chicago
Metallic Ceilings. Inc.. 676 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1984); Dver v. Compere. 73 P.2d 1356 (N.M.
1937); 28 C.J.S. Easements §§ 96-97; 2 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law
of Real Property § 426 (repl. ed. 1980).
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units (five duplexes) which could be built on the property, with a valuation of $27,675.00 per
unit (R. 7863-64; Ex. 88D, p. 55).
Webber also calculated the fair market value of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 based
upon the assumptions and conditions that the loop road and all other encroachments on the
property are legal and enforceable by law, and cannot be relocated or removed in any way.
Webber calculated that a maximum of four residential units (two duplexes) could be
developed on the property under these assumptions and conditions.

With the same

valuation of $27,675.00 per unit, Webber calculated the fair market value of Rossi Hills in
March of 1982 with all the encumbrances in place and as they existed at that time to be
$110,700.00. (R. 7848-49, 7864, 7866, 7870, 8208-09; Ex. 88D, pp. 38-39, 55, 75; Add. I to
Ex. 88D, H 10). Unlike Plaintiffs' appraisal (See Point III. E, infra), this appraisal did not
assume that any of McHenry Avenue, a platted but undeveloped Park City street, would be
vacated and could be utilized as part of the development (R. 8197).
Applying the correct law as set forth by the trial court in Conclusions of Law 13-15,
the damages suffered by Doms as a result of the encumbrances on Rossi Hills in March of
1982 should be $166,050.00, which represents the difference in the fair market value of the
property without any encumbrances ($276,750.00) minus the value of the property with the
encumbrances ($110,700.00). As will be discussed, infra, thisfigureof $166,050.00 represents
the only determination of damages received by the trial court as evidence which was based
on assumptions and conditions permitted by law.
Examination of Exhibit 89D (Add. 24) reveals further evidence which supports
Webber's conclusion that the fair market value of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 with all of
the encumbrances in place was $110,700.00. The diagonal lines, drawn by Webber, and the
blacked-out loop road show that the buildable area has been reduced by approximately sixty
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percent. Sixty percent of the purchase price of $276,750.00 equals $166,050.00, which is
exactly the same figure calculated by Webber to be the damages based upon the number of
residential units which could be built on the property. Thus, Doms submits that Webber's
appraisal of the damages at $166,050.00 is right on the money.
D.

The trial court should have excluded or disregarded the testimony and appraisal
report of Plaintiffs' appraiser as a sanction against Plaintiffs for violating
discovery rules.
On or about March 10,1989, Doms served Requests for Production of Documents on

all four Plaintiffs (R. 1310-11). Request No. 1 in each of the separate Requests for
Production of Documents served on all four Plaintiffs was to produce all documents or
physical evidence intended to be introduced at trial (Add. 25).
Plaintiffs called two witnesses after Webber testified: Steve Deckert, a land use
planner for Alliance Engineering; and Leroy J. Pia, a real estate appraiser.

During

Deckert's testimony, Plaintiffs introduced and moved to admit Exhibit 98P, a preliminary
sketch prepared by Deckert in August of 1980 for a potential purchaser of Rossi Hills not
involved in this lawsuit. This was the first time Doms had ever seen Exhibit 98P, and Doms
therefore objected and moved to exclude it as a sanction for violation of discovery rules (R.
8062). The trial court admitted Exhibit 98P over Doms' objection and allowed Deckert to
testify in regard to it (R. 8063).
Plaintiffs' next witness was Pia, the real estate appraiser. Before Pia testified, Doms
objected and moved to exclude the testimony of Pia and his appraisal report (Exhibit 91P),
on the grounds that Plaintiffs had just provided Exhibit 91P to Doms that morning of trial,
August 22, 1990. Doms had provided Webber's appraisal report to Plaintiffs on July 20,
1990, almost five weeks earlier, and in return had been provided a three-page document
(Exhibit 100P) purporting to be the appraisal of Pia. However, that morning at trial,
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Plaintiffs gave Doms a 40-50 page appraisal report (Exhibit 91P) dated April 17. 1990.
Doms argued that this was a clear violation of discovery rules, and Pia's testimony and
appraisal report should be excluded by the trial court as a sanction against Plaintiffs. (R.
8139-40, 8165-66). The trial court ruled it would allow the testimony of Pia and admitted
Exhibit 91P with the reservation that the trial court reserved the right to strike the testimony
and the appraisal report (R. 8141, 8166).
The trial court did not strike the testimony or appraisal report of Pia, but rather
entered a finding of fact regarding Pia's appraisal of the value of Rossi Hills in March of
1982 (F. of F. 29). Doms submits that the trial court erred and should have excluded or
disregarded the testimony of Pia and his appraisal report, based upon the following
evidence:
1. Pia testified that Exhibit 91P was not an "appraisal report," but rather was
really his "file memorandum and notes," which was something he would not have
provided to Doms if requested (R. 8162-63).
2. Pia testified that Plaintiffs requested that he not prepare a full written
appraisal report, but he had to have adequate notes (R. 8164).
3. Pia testified that the "normal" procedure would have been for Plaintiffs to
ask for a full appraisal report, but Plaintiffs specifically asked him not to do the
"normal" thing (R. 8164, 8224).
4. Pia testified that Plaintiffs directed him to proceed in that manner in April
of 1990 (four months before trial); didn't tell Pia why; and he didn't question the
Plaintiffs in regard to their direction (R. 8225-26).
5. Pia testified that he had gone over Exhibit 91P with Plaintiffs at least two to
three weeks before the trial (R. 8165, 8227).
6. Pia testified that Plaintiffs had directed him to prepare Exhibit 9 IP in its
final form, with pictures of Rossi Hills in it, the day before Pia testified (R.
8165, 8226).
7. Pia testified he would have prepared a more extensive full appraisal report
except for the specific directions from Plaintiffs (R. 8228).
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E.

The trial court should have disregarded the testimony and appraisal report of
Plaintiffs' appraiser because his opinions were based on assumptions and
conditions not permitted by law.
Notwithstanding the trial court's refusal to sanction Plaintiffs, the trial court should still

have disregarded the testimony and appraisal report of Pia because Pia's valuation of Rossi
Hills in March of 1982 with the encumbrances on the property was based upon assumptions
and conditions not permitted under Utah law and/or Park City ordinances. Doms submits
that the following evidence clearly establishes that Pia's appraisal of the property is
essentially worthless and should have been disregarded by the trial court:
1. Pia based his valuations of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 on an "earlier
rendering" of Exhibit 98P, Deckert's 14-unit rough draft sketch of a proposal for
high-densitv development of Rossi Hills in August of 1980 (Ex. 91P, pp. 30-33;
R. 8229-30).
2. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P has 14 units based on three four-plexes
and one duplex, and that four-plexes could not be built on Rossi Hills in 1982
under Park City zoning ordinances because it was located in an HR-1 zone (R.
8070, 8073).
3. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P disregards the loop road and has a new
twenty-four foot paved road in a different location (R. 8075-76).
4. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P requires one-half of McHenrv Avenue to
be vacated by Park City, as well as one-half of another platted road (R. 8076).
5. Deckert testified that he did not know if there was sufficient total land area
on Rossi Hills to build fourteen units without using one-half of McHenrv
Avenue, since twenty feet would be lost if one-half of McHenry was not vacated
by Park City (R. 8093-95).
6. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P disregards the loop road as it currently
exists, and he did not know whether the easement holders would give permission
to do this (R. 8099).
7. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P was drafted for the highest density possible
under a conditional use review (R. 8100).
8. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P could not have been built in March of 1982
without a zoning change by the Park City Planning Commission, because it is a
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Planned Unit Development which was not permitted in HR-1 zoning in 1982 (R.
8101-02).
9. Deckert testified that Exhibit 98P does not provide parking for any of the
residents of Ontario Avenue whose property abuts Rossi Hills and who have
used the loop road for parking (R. 8103).
10. Deckert testified that the sheds and fences encroaching on Rossi Hills
would have to be moved and rebuilt because the new access road would be
graded three to four feet lower (R. 8106-07).
11. Deckert testified that virtually all the encroachments, including the loop
road, would have to be moved or altered for Exhibit 98P to be developed (R.
8107).
12. Pia testified that two of the main assumptions and limiting conditions he
used (which were different than those used by Webber) were that the loop road
could be disregarded and a new road moved to the west boundary of the
property, and that one-half of McHenry Avenue could be used for development
(R. 8190-91).
13. The valuations of Rossi Hills contained in Pia's appraisal report were based
upon the assumption that the sheds, outbuildings and fences encroaching on
Rossi Hills are illegal and would have to be removed upon request (Ex. 91P, p.
39). Of course, the trial court ultimately ruled these encroachments were
prescriptive easements and thus completely legal.
14. Pia further testified that he was aware of the following in regard to Exhibit
98P, an earlier rendering of which he based all of his valuations of Rossi Hills:
(a) Exhibit 98P includes a lot not part of Rossi Hills: (b) McHenrv Avenue
would have to be vacated by Park City: (c) the loop road would have to be
disregarded and a new road built along the western boundary of the property:
(d) the sheds would have to be lowered or altered from their present position:
(e) the fences would have to be lifted and replaced: (f) the retaining wall at the
south end would have to be moved or changed: (g) the deck on the structure at
the north end would have to be moved or changed (R. 8230-31).
15. Pia testified that Exhibit 98P required that aU of the encumbrances on Rossi
Hills would have to be altered or changed in some form (R. 8231).
16. Pia admitted that Webber's appraisal was the only one submitted to the
trial court which leaves the loop road in place and respects all the easements
and encumbrances in their present location (R. 8232).
17. Pia admitted that he did not have an opinion as to the value of Rossi Hills
with all the easements and encumbrances in place, and that he did not attempt
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to determine the value unless McHenry Avenue was vacated by Park City (R.
8236, 8241).
18. Pia admitted that he did not have an opinion as to the value of Rossi Hills
if the loop road had to be left in its present configuration (R. 8238).
19. Pia admitted that he talked to Ella Sorensen, one of the Ontario Avenue
residents whose property abuts Rossi Hills, and she told Pia she would not
voluntarily remove her shed and fences (R. 8244).
20. Pia admitted that the residents to the south of Rossi Hills have been
adamantly opposed to high-density development in that area since the early
1980's, and they would have opposed any such attempt at development in 1982
(R. 8247).
F.

If rescission is denied, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and
remanded with directions to enter judgment that Poms suffered $166,050>00 in
damages as a result of the encumbrances on Rossi Hills,
It is apparent that the trial court arbitrarily cut the amount of damages found by

Webber as a result of the encumbrances on the property in half, and ruled that Poms had
suffered $83.000.00 in damages rather than $166.050.00 (C. of L. 19; Judgment, H 4). The
judgment of the trial court was arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of discretion because it
is manifestly unjust and was unduly influenced by evidence which should have been
completely disregarded by the trial court. Maybey v. Kay Peterson Const. Co.. 682 P.2d 287
(Utah 1984).
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT POMS' COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST THE ESTATE OF D.C. ANDERSON. AS IT RELATES TO THE
REMEDY OF DAMAGES, IS TIME-BARRED BY THE PROBATE "NONCLAIM"
PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. SS 75-3-801 AND 75-3-803.
A.

Poms' causes of action against the Estate of D.C. Anderson are not "claims" under
the Uniform Probate Code, and therefore need not have been filed against the estate
pursuant to Sections 75-3-801 and 75-3-803.
Sections 75-3-801 and 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code (U.C.A. §§ 75-3-

801 and 803 (1975)), in effect during the times in question, provided that a "claim" against
a decedent's estate must be filed within three months after the date of the first publication
of notice to creditors (Add. 26). Relying on § 75-3-803, commonly referred to as a probate
"nonclaim" statute, the trial court ruled that Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim against
Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson, as the
Counterclaim relates to the remedy of damages, is time-barred by the three-month filing
limitation for claims against an estate (C. of L. 48; Judg. H 14).
U.C.A. § 75-1-201(4) (Add. 26) defines "claims" against an estate as " liabilities of the
decedent... and liabilities of the estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent."
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the predecessors to this section and
§ 75-3-803 in the case of In re Estate of Sharp. 537 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1975). The Court held
that an equitable action against an estate is not a claim within the meaning of the above
statutes, and that a "claim . . . refers to debts or demands against the decedent which might
have been enforced in his lifetime, by personal actions for the recovery of money; and upon
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which only a money judgment could have been rendered." 537 P.2d at 1037 (emphasis
added).22
In the instant case, Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim sought rescission of the
Rossi Hills transaction, which has been clearly defined by the Utah Supreme Court as an
equitable remedy. Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).23
In addition, if this Court denies rescission, Doms' alternative remedy of damages is still
not a "claim" which had to be filed against the estate. The refusal to grant Doms rescission
of the contract does not change the fact that the nature of his action was an action in equity.
Moreover, a "claim" must be one "upon which only a money judgment could have been
rendered." In re Estate of Sharp, supra, at 537 P.2d 1037 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, §§ 75-1-201(4) and 75-3-803 require that for a debt or demand to be
considered a "claim" under these statutes, it must "arise" from a "liability" of the decedent
or his estate. In the instant case, no such "liability" will "arise" unless this Court declares it
to be such by reversing the judgment of the trial court and entering a judgment against the
Estate of D.C. Anderson.
In Point VIII of Plaintiffs' opening brief, Plaintiffs erroneously argue that the Estate
of D.C. Anderson must be paid the full amount due as a "one-half owner" of the trust deed
note without any "deduction, setoff or other charge" from Doms' Second Amended
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In accord Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74, 77 (Utah 1982); In re Estate of Malliet
649 P.2d 18 (Utah 1982); In re Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d 801 (Utah 1986); Forsvth v.
Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980). See also Reed v. Sixth Judicial District Court
341 P.2d 100 (Nev. 1959); Wright v. Universal Tire. Inc.. 577 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. App. 1978),
cert, denied 1979; Bank of California v. Connolly. I l l Cal. Rptr. 468 (Cal. App. 4 Dist.
1974).
23

See also Horton v. Horton. 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1984) (action to avoid a deed is
one in equity); Baker v. Patee, 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984) (action demanding
cancellation of a deed is one in equity).
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Counterclaim. Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on the two very old decisions by the Utah Supreme
Court: Rockhill v. Creer. 189 P. 668 (Utah 1920); and Halloran Judge Trust Co. v. Heath,
258 P. 342 (Utah 1927). In re Estate of Sharp and Bradshaw v. McBride, supra, applying
the relevant provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, have clearly overruled or superseded
Rockhill and Halloran-Judge.
B.

Notwithstanding the application of § 75-3-803 to Poms' remedy of damages. Poms is
still entitled to a set-off for the damages against the purchase price of Rossi Hills.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim against the

Estate of D.C. Anderson is barred by the nonclaim provisions of § 75-3-803, as it relates to
the remedy of damages, Doms is still entitled to a set-off against the purchase price of Rossi
Hills for all damages suffered by Doms. In Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985),
the Utah Supreme Court, relying on Rule 13(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Add.
27) and two of its previous decisions,24 held that "if a defendant had a counterclaim that
otherwise would have been barred by a statute of limitations, the counterclaim could be setoff against the plaintiffs claim, notwithstanding the statute of limitations." 699 P.2d at 1210
(emphasis added).25
C.

The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded with directions to
enter judgment against the Estate of D.C. Anderson.
The trial court erred in its ruling dismissing Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim

against the Estate of D.C. Anderson as it relates to the remedy of damages (C. of L. 48;
Judg. H 14). In addition, if rescission is granted, this remedy cannot be barred by the

24

See Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power Co.. 17 P.2d 281 (Utah 1932); Stewart Livestock
Co. v. Ostler. 144 P.2d 276 (Utah 1943).
25

See also Peoples National Bank v. National Bank of Commerce. 420 P.2d 208 (Wash.
1966); In re Estate of Massie. 353 N.W.2d 735 (Neb. 1984); Pay Less Drug Stores v.
Bechdolt, 155 Cal. Rptr. 58 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 1979).
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nonclaim provisions because rescission is an equitable remedy and clearly not a "claim"
under the Uniform Probate Code.26 The judgment of the trial court should therefore be
reversed and remanded with the directions to enter judgment against the Estate of D.C.
Anderson, regardless of whether that judgment is for rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction
or for damages.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO AWARD
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND APPROPRIATE COSTS TO POMS,
A.

Doms is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs for sustaining his
title to Rossi Hills against Plaintiffs' foreclosure and quiet title actions.
Plaintiffs' foreclosure action in the main case (Civil No. 8339) and quiet title action in

Count 2 of the tax sale case (Civil No. 10066) have assailed and disputed Doms' title to
Rossi Hills, and the attorney's fees and costs incurred by Doms are in regard to sustaining
his title to Rossi Hills against these actions by Plaintiffs. In Forrer v. Sather, 595 P.2d 1306
(Utah 1979), citing its previous decision in Van Cott v. Jacklin, 226 P. 460, 463 (Utah 1924),
the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
This court has further approved as an additional element of damages for
breach of the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment, the recovery of a
reasonable sum as attorney fees that plaintiff has paid or has become legally
obligated to pay, together with the costs, in attempting to sustain the title to the
premises conveyed.
595 P.2d at 308 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs themselves, rather than a third party, are the ones
assailing and disputing Doms' title. Thus, it is a fortiori that Doms is entitled to an award

26

The trial court even acknowledged in open court that rescission would not be subject
to the nonclaim provisions of the Uniform Probate Code (R. 7986-87).
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of reasonable attorney's fees and costs based upon the rationale of Forrer and Van Cott
supra.
B.

Poms is entitled to an award of his out-of-pocket attorney's fees as consequential
damages flowing from Plaintiffs' breach of contract.
In Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme

Court held that attorney's fees may be properly awarded as consequential damages flowing
from a breach of contract. The Court recognized this as a "legitimate theory of damages,"
which "must be based on the prevailing party's actual losses, i.e., its out-of-pocket expenses
for legal counsel." 781 P.2d at 420.
All of Doms' legal fees constitute actual losses to Doms and out-of-pocket expenses
paid by him, and are consequential damages suffered by Doms flowing from Plaintiffs'
breach of contract. Doms is entitled to an award of these out-of-pocket attorney's fees.
C.

Doms is entitled to prejudgment interest on any awards of attorney's fees.
Utah case law holds that it is appropriate to award prejudgment interest on an award

of attorney's fees.27 Therefore, Doms should be awarded prejudgment interest on any
awards of attorney's fees in the instant case.
D.

Doms is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred on this
appeal.
Utah case law holds that when a party entitled to attorney's fees for the trial of an

action prevails on appeal, that party is also entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs

27

See, e ^ , First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feed Yards Inc.. 653 P.2d 591 (Utah
1982); Jorgensen v. John Clav & Co.. 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983); P.A.D.D. v. Gravstone
Pines Homeowners Ass'n.. 789 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990); Vasels v. LoGuidice. 740 P.2d
1375 (Utah App. 1987).
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incurred on the appeal.

Therefore, Doms should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees

and costs in regard to prosecution of this appeal.
E.

Doms is entitled to an award of appropriate costs, including costs of depositions.
The trial court awarded Doms a total of only $101.50 in costs, and only for the

prosecution of his Second Amended Counterclaim (F. of F. 60; C. of L. 56; Judg. H 25).
Doms filed a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements with the trial court requesting
$5,913.81 (R. 5619-23), and an affidavit regarding travel expenses requesting $2,701.22
(Attorney's Fee Ex. 2D). Thus, the costs and expenses claimed by Doms totalled $8,615.03.
Doms submits that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the paltry amount
of $101.50 to Doms for his costs in the instant case. In particular, the depositions taken by
Doms were clearly taken in good faith and were essential for the development and
presentation of the case, and should be taxable as costs. See Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d
771, 774 (Utah 1980); Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512
(Utah App. 1988).
F.

The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded with directions to
award Doms attorney's fees and costs consistent with this Court's decision.
The trial court erred in its ruling that Doms is not entitled to attorney's fees (F. of F.

58; C. of L. 55; Judg. H 23). On remand, the trial court should be directed to determine the
amount of attorney's fees and appropriate costs which should be awarded to Doms. Doms'
counsel, Larry R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, filed affidavits regarding attorney's fees with
the trial court.

Keller's affidavit established that Doms incurred out-of-pocket and

reasonable attorney's fees to him of $70,822.75 as of the date of the affidavit (R. 5663-5716).

28

See, e ^ Management Servs. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah
1980); Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah App. 1992).
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Boorman's affidavit established that Doms incurred additional out-of-pocket and reasonable
attorney's fees for his services of $79,330.00 as of the date of the affidavit (R. 5624-62).
Thus, the total amount of attorney's fees incurred by Doms as of the dates of these
respective affidavits was $150,152.75. On remand, the trial court would need to determine
additional attorney's fees and costs incurred by Doms subsequent to those already claimed
and submitted to the trial court as set forth above.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS.
On December 31, 1991, the trial court held a hearing on attorney's fees and costs,
which included the submission of affidavits and other documentation, the testimony of the
parties, and oral argument by the parties regarding awards of attorney's fees and costs (R.
6360-6540). Plaintiffs' counsel, James A. Mcintosh and Irving H. Biele, submitted affidavits
and other documents requesting a total of $300,659.57 in attorney's fees up to the date of
the hearing (Attorney's Fees Exs. IP, 3P, 4P, 5P, 7P; R. 6408-09). Plaintiffs also requested
costs and disbursements in the total amount of $26,272.44 (Ex. 2 and Ex. 7 attached to
Attorney's Fee Ex. 3P). Thus, Plaintiffs requested a total amount of $326,932.01 as
attorney's fees and costs through December 30, 1991. These exorbitant amounts are
representative of the "stubbornly litigious" posture taken by Plaintiffs throughout the history
of this case. As a comparison, Doms' counsel requested less than one-half the amount
requested by Plaintiffs' counsel (See Point V, supra).
With the exception of amounts awarded pursuant to previous orders of the trial court
regarding discovery sanctions and setting aside the default judgment (See subpoints E and
F, infra), all of the attorney's fees and costs awarded to Plaintiffs by the trial court are based
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on the erroneous legal conclusion that Doms was in default under the trust deed and trust
deed note (See Point II, supra). The trial court entered numerous Findings of Fact
prepared by Plaintiffs, which are not Findings of Fact at all, but are rather Conclusions of
Law. This Court should disregard the erroneous labels attached to these findings, look to
the substance, and review them for legal correctness. Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 433
(Utah 1993). These include Findings of Fact 61, 63, 64(b), and 65-71. In actuality, the trial
court made no findings of fact which support the amounts of attorney's fees awarded to
Plaintiffs, and therefore all of such awards constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial
court. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); Brown v. Richards, 840
P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992); Matter of Estate of Quinn. 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1992).
In addition to the Conclusions of Law erroneously set forth as Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law 51-53 and WI 19-21 of the Judgment are also in error, and all of these
rulings by the trial court should be reversed pursuant to the arguments set forth below.
A.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in Civil No, 8339,
the main case.
Plaintiffs have no statutory claim to attorney's fees, and the trust deed and trust deed

note contain the only possible contractual provisions upon which Plaintiffs can make a claim
for attorney's fees and costs in the main case. See Turtle Management. Inc. v. Haggis
Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d
414, 419 (Utah 1989). An award based upon a contract must be "in accordance with the
terms of the parties' agreement," and "a party is entitled only to those fees attributable to
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the successful vindication of contractual rights within the terms of their agreement." Travner
v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984).29
Plaintiffs have absolutely no legal basis to claim an award of attorney's fees or costs
because they have utterly failed to vindicate any of their contractual rights within the terms
of the trust deed and trust deed note. Doms was excused from performance and never in
default under the trust deed and trust deed note, and Plaintiffs are the losing party on their
complaint for foreclosure.
Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that Doms was in default under the trust deed
and trust deed note, Plaintiffs would still not be entitled to any of the attorney's fees
requested in the affidavits of Plaintiffs' counsel. The Utah Supreme Court has directly ruled
that even if a plaintiff successfully forecloses and is awarded attorney's fees spent in the
foreclosure pursuant to the express provisions of the contract documents, the plaintiff cannot
recover attorney's fees for the defense of a counterclaim. Travner v. Cushing, supra, at 688
P.2d 858, note 6; Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981);
Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168,171 (Utah 1977). Furthermore, if a party fails to submit
sufficient proof which allows the trial court to determine the portion of fees spent in
prosecuting the complaint versus the portion spent in defending against the counterclaim,
no attorney's fees should be awarded. Cox, supra, at 627 P.2d 66.
In the instant case. Plaintiffs' counsel either admitted in their affidavits or in their
testimony at the hearing on attorney's fees that all of their requested fees were incurred
defending against Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim in the main case. (Attorney's Fees
Exs. 3P, 5P; R. 5903-06, 6382-84, 6418, 6433).
29

See also Turtle Management, Inc., supra: Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah

1977).
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Therefore, the trial court's awards of $12,300.00 to Mcintosh and $10,000.00 to Biele,
as attorney's fees for their prosecution of the foreclosure complaint, constitute clear legal
error and must be reversed (See F. of F. 70(a)(iv); 70(b)(iv)).
B.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in Civil No. 10066,
the tax sale case.
Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs in the tax sale case for the

same reasons set forth above in subpoint A in regard to the main case. The only possible
contractual basis upon which Plaintiffs can make a claim for attorney's fees and costs in the
tax sale case are the provisions of the trust deed and trust deed note. Since Doms was
excused from performance and not in default under the trust deed and trust deed note,
Plaintiffs have absolutely no basis upon which to claim attorney's fees or costs.
Furthermore, it would clearly violate basic principles of equity to award Plaintiffs any
attorney's fees or costs in regard to the tax sale case. At a hearing held before the trial
court on March 20, 1990, Plaintiffs, Doms, Domcoy and Summit County (the parties to the
tax sale case) entered into a stipulation in open court at the suggestion of the trial court that
the tax sale would be declared void and Plaintiffs' lien declared valid as evidenced by their
trust deed and trust deed note (R. 7060-72).
The stipulation of the parties was set forth in an Order issued by the trial court (R.
3968-78), which is reflected in Conclusions of Law 42 and 43 and H 16 of the Judgment.
Doms would never have stipulated to the suggestion of the trial court that a simple solution
was to declare the tax sale void and Plaintiffs' lien valid, if Doms had had any idea that the
trial court would subsequently award attorney's fees to Plaintiffs as to Count 1 of the tax sale
case. It is simply unconscionable for Plaintiffs to even request attorney's fees and costs in
regard to the tax sale case.
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In addition, and perhaps the most important fact is that Count 1 was against Summit
County and not against Poms. Poms had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the
manner in which the tax sale was conducted by Summit County. If any party is liable for the
alleged attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiffs in Count 1 of the tax sale case, it is Summit
County, not Poms. Poms cannot be held responsible for any alleged failures of Summit
County to provide Plaintiffs with adequate notice of the tax sale of the property.
It should also be pointed out that Plaintiffs failed completely on Counts 2 and 3 of
their Complaint in the tax sale case. Count 2 was Plaintiffs' action to quiet title to Rossi
Hills, and Count 3 was their action against Summit County, which was dismissed on motion
for summary judgment by Summit County early in the tax sale case (Supp. R. 169-70).
The trial court awarded Plaintiffs $5,245.00 for Mcintosh's attorney's fees in the
"lawsuit to set aside tax sale" (F. of F. 70(a)(i)), and $1,050.00 for Biele's attorney's fees for
exactly the same thing (F. of F. 70(b)(ii)). These rulings by the trial court are clearly in
error and must be reversed.
C.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their Petition for
an Interlocutory Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court,
On or about February 6, 1989, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Permission to File an

Interlocutory Appeal in the Utah Supreme Court, requesting permission to appeal an Order
of the trial court denying Plaintiff Jeanne Scott's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of In Personam
Jurisdiction (Add. 17). Plaintiffs' Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal was denied by the
Utah Supreme Court on March 9. 1989 (Add. 18).
The trial court awarded Plaintiffs $2,730.00 for Mcintosh's attorney's fees incurred in
regard to the Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal (F. of F. 70(a)(ii)). This award by the
trial court constitutes clear legal error and must be reversed. First and foremost. Plaintiffs
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lost on their petition and cannot possibly make a legitimate claim for attorney's fees.
Secondly, Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party in this lawsuit, and have no statutory or
contractual basis upon which to make a claim for attorney's fees for filing this petition.
Next, this petition was filed in defense of Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim, and as
already pointed out in subpoint A, supra. Plaintiffs cannot recover attorney's fees or costs
incurred in defense of Doms' Counterclaim.
Finally, it is the prerogative of the Supreme Court to award fees on matters it decides,
not the trial court.
D,

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their Petition for
an Extraordinary Writ to the Utah Supreme Court.
On or about June 23,1989, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ in the

Utah Supreme Court, in which Plaintiffs sought an extraordinary writ to restrain the trial
court from proceeding with the trial against Jeanne Scott and Ellen Anderson, personally,
on exactly the same in personam jurisdiction grounds argued by Plaintiffs in their earlier
Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal (Add. 19). On July 31. 1989, the Supreme Court filed
an Amended Minute Entry denying Plaintiffs' Petition for an Extraordinary Writ on the
grounds the trial court had jurisdiction over Jeanne Scott and Ellen Anderson because they
were grantors on the warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills and because both were proper
parties to Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim pursuant to Rules 13 and 19. U.R.C.P.
(Add. 20).
For exactly the same reasons as set forth immediately above in regard to Plaintiffs'
Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal, the trial court's awards of attorney's fees to Plaintiffs
for the Petition for an Extraordinary Writ are clearly in error and must be reversed. The
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trial court awarded Plaintiffs $2,160.00 for Mcintosh's fees for the Petition (F. of F.
70(a)(iii)), and $2,740.00 for Biele's fees for the same thing (F. of F. 70(b)(iii)).
E.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs pursuant to their motions for
sanctions in regard to Poms' objections to discovery requests.
In February and March of 1989, Plaintiffs served Doms with Requests for Production

of Documents and Requests for Admissions (R. 1213-15; 1222-24). In March of 1989, Doms
served his responses to these discovery requests (R. 1341-42). Doms made full or partial
objections to many of Plaintiffs' requests on the grounds they were not relevant to the
subject matter of the pending action; not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence; and they constituted harassment, annoyance, oppression and would
create an undue burden or expense.
A typical example of the inappropriate and oppressive nature of Plaintiffs' requests
is Request No. 12 of Plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents, which requested
Doms to attempt to locate thousands of irrelevant documents:
12. All diaries, journals, or other records kept by you from the
period of time commencing January 1, 1978, and continuing to the
date of your deposition, and which refer to, reflect upon, discuss, or
relate to any purchases or sales of property by you, your wife, Michael
R. McCoy, Mr. McCoy's wife, or any partnership, joint venture or
other business relationship between you and Mr. McCoy, or any other
third parties for the years from January 1, 1975, through the date of
your deposition.
On April 21,1989, Plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions against Doms with voluminous
supporting memoranda (R. 1401-1539). Doms filed a memorandum in opposition to
Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, which included numerous exhibits (R. 1574-1674).
On June 22, 1989, the trial court issued a Minute Entry granting Plaintiffs' motion for
sanctions "to the extent that the discovery sought relates to real property transactions (as
opposed to personalty),11 and granting Plaintiffs "reasonable attorney fees . . . to be
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determined at trial" (R. 1739; Add. 28). The trial court subsequently entered an Order
regarding this Minute Entry ruling (R. 2329-33).
Doms was surprised by the ruling of the trial court, because the trial court did not
allow an opportunity for a hearing before awarding attorney's fees and expenses as required
by Rule 37(a)(4), U.R.C.P. (Add. 27). Rule 37 of the Utah Rules is patterned after and
virtually identical to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respected authorities
point out that under Rule 37(a)(4) of the Federal Rules, a court must allow an opportunity
for a hearing before awarding expenses and attorney's fees.30
All of Doms' objections were "substantially justified11 under Rule 37(a)(4), and
therefore Plaintiffs were not entitled to any awards of attorney's fees or expenses. If the
dispute over discovery between the parties is genuine, about which reasonable men could
differ, then sanctions under Rule 37(a)(4) are inappropriate.31 Furthermore, Doms was
in fact the prevailing party, at least in part, in regard to many of Plaintiffs' discovery requests
because Doms' objections to Plaintiffs' requests regarding personal property were sustained
in the trial court's Minute Entry ruling. Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4), Doms is entitled to an
award of attorney's fees and expenses in regard to these objections, and/or the reasonable
expenses incurred by both Plaintiffs and Doms should be apportioned because Plaintiffs'
motion was granted in part and denied in part.
Under Rule 37(a)(4), the trial court is required to make findings and rule on each
discovery request and objection thereto, in order to sufficiently identify the expenses or

30

See 8 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2288
(1970); 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 37.02[10] (1988).
31

See Advisory Committee Note to the 1970 Amendment to Rule 37(a), F.R.C.P.; 8 C.
WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2288 (1970); 4A
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 37.02[10] (1988).
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attorney's fees to which a party is entitled. Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768
P.2d 950, 965-66 (Utah App. 1989). Such findings were never made by the trial court, and
the award of attorney's fees to Plaintiffs ultimately made by the trial court must be reversed
and remanded.
Doms pointed out all of the foregoing case law and authority to the trial court in a
motion for a hearing on the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Plaintiffs (R. 1740-42,
1948-67). Contemporaneously with this motion for a hearing, Doms filed a motion for
clarification of the trial court's Minute Entry ruling of June 22, 1989, and a motion for
extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests (R. 1746-66, 1767-71). Before
Doms even had the opportunity to file his reply memorandum to Plaintiffs' responsive
memoranda, the trial court issued another Minute Entry ruling on August 10,1989, in which
all of Doms' motions were denied and additional attorney's fees were granted to Plaintiffs'
to be determined at trial (R. 1968; Add. 29). This Minute Entry ruling was later issued as
an Order of the trial court (R. 2362-70). Doms submits it was clearly inappropriate for the
trial court to further sanction Doms in regard to his motion for hearing and motion for
clarification (especially since the requested hearing is required by Rule 37(a)(4)), and
therefore Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or expenses in regard to these
motions.
The trial court awarded Plaintiffs $4,750.00 pursuant to the June 22 and August 10,
1989, Minute Entry rulings (F. of F. 70(a)(v)). This award constitutes an abuse of discretion
by the trial court and must be reversed.
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F.

Poms is entitled to a refund of a substantial amount of the attorney's fees and costs
paid to Plaintiffs as a condition of the trial court setting aside the default judgment
The trial court set aside the default judgment against Doms on the conditions that

Doms pay attorney's fees to Plaintiffs pursuant to affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel,
and obtain new counsel (R. 126-27). Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit and a supplemental
affidavit in support of attorney's fees and costs in the total amount of $4,467.60 (R. 29-33,
60-63; Add. 30).
Doms paid the $4,467.60 pursuant to the Order of the trial court to comply with the
conditions of setting aside the default judgment (R. 76-78). The trial court subsequently
ordered that the amount of attorney's fees to which Plaintiffs were entitled would be decided
by the trial court at a final disposition of the case on its merits (R. 245-47; Add. 12).
Plaintiffs are entitled only to those attorney's fees and costs directly incurred in
obtaining the default judgment and the setting aside of the default judgment.32

An

examination of Plaintiffs' affidavit and supplemental affidavit of attorney's fees and costs
clearly reveals that Doms should receive a substantial refund of the $4,467.60 he paid to
have the default judgment set aside. The trial court awarded the full $4,467.60 to Plaintiffs,
thus allowing them to keep the money they had already been paid by Doms (F. of F.
70(b)(i)). This ruling must be reversed and remanded with directions to award Plaintiffs
only these attorney's fees and costs incurred in regard to the default judgment.

32

See, e ^ 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2700 (1983); Annotation, 3 A.L.R. FED. 956 (1970); Nichiro Gvogvo Kaisha
v. Norman. 606 P.2d 401, 403 (Alaska 1980); Weitz v. Yankoskv. 409 P.2d 700, 706-07 (Cal.
1966).
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G.

The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded.
The trial court awarded Plaintiffs a total of $27,185.00 in attorney's fees for the

services of Mcintosh, $13,790.00 in attorney's fees for the services of Biele, and $358.20 in
costs (C. of L. 51-53; Judg. KH 19-21). Plaintiffs are not entitled to any of these awards of
attorney's fees and costs, and these rulings of the trial court should be reversed.
POINT VII
POMS' CAUSE OF ACTION IN HIS COUNTERCLAIMS ALLEGING
BREACH OF THE WARRANTIES AND COVENANTS IN THE WARRANTY DEED IS
NOT BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
A.

The applicable statute of limitations is the six-year limitation contained in U.C.A. §
78-12-23(2).
U.C.A. § 78-12-23(2) provides for a six-year statute of limitations for "an action upon

any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing.'1 The Utah
Supreme Court has established in a consistent line of cases that the statute of limitations
applicable to a cause of action for breach of the warranties and covenants in a warranty
deed pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12 is the six-year period contained in § 78-12-23(2).
Christiansen v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co.. 590 P.2d 1251, 1252 (Utah 1979).33
B.

Poms' original Counterclaim was filed less than six years after Plaintiffs' breach of
the warranties and covenants in the warranty deed.
Doms' original "Answer and Counterclaim" was filed on January 29, 1988 (R. 41-44).

This original Counterclaim contained Doms' cause of action for Plaintiffs' breach of the
warranties and covenants in the warranty deed, and sought rescission of the Rossi Hills
transaction. Plaintiffs' breach of the warranties and covenants in the warranty deed occurred

33

See also Soderberg v. Holt 46 P.2d 428 (Utah 1935); East Canyon Land & Stock Co.
v. Davis & Weber Counties Canal Co., 238 P. 280 (Utah 1925).
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On March 23,1982, the date the warranty deed was delivered (See Point II. B, supra). The
period of time from March 23, 1982, to January 29, 1988, is less than six years.
Unbeknownst to Doms, a default judgment (R. 34-40) was entered against Doms on
January 21, 1988, eight days before Doms' Answer and Counterclaim was filed. However,
the trial court subsequently set aside the default judgment against Doms upon payment by
Doms of all of Plaintiffs' attorney's fees incurred in the action to that date (R. 126-27).
49 CJ.S. Judgments § 306 states the universally accepted rule that M[w]here a judgment
is vacated or set aside by a valid order or judgment, it is entirely destroyed and the rights
of the parties are left as though no such judgment had ever been entered" (emphasis
added). Thus, when the trial court set aside the default judgment against Doms, it was
deemed under the law to have never been entered. Doms' original Counterclaim was
therefore filed within the six-year limitation period, and his cause of action for Plaintiffs'
breach of the warranties and covenants in the warranty deed is not time-barred.
C.

Doms' counterclaims are deemed to "relate back" to June 6,1985, the date Plaintiffs'
Complaint was filed.
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the "relation back" doctrine in regard to

counterclaims in Doxev-Layton Company v. Clark. 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976):
[A] counterclaim which arises out of a transaction alleged in the complaint and
is in existence, at the time the complaint is filed, and is not then barred by a
statute of limitations, will not be barred by a running of the statutory time
thereafter. The statute will be suspended until the counterclaim is filed.
548 P.2d at 906 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
In accord Beehive Security Thrift & Loan v. Hyde. 405 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1965); Moffitt
v. Barr. 837 P.2d 572, 574-75 (Utah App. 1992).
Doms' counterclaims clearly "arise out of the transaction" alleged in Plaintiffs'
Complaint (See Point II, supra). The holding in Doxey-Lavton reflects the rule governing
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compulsory counterclaims under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 13(a) provides
that a counterclaim is compulsory if the counterclaim "arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing parties' claim" (Add. 27). Case law
and authorities have universally given this language a broad realistic interpretation, and held
that any claim that is logically related to another claim that is being sued upon is properly
the basis for a compulsory counterclaim.34
It is clear under Utah law that Doms' counterclaims are deemed to "relate back" to
June 6, 1985, the date Plaintiffs' Complaint to foreclose against Rossi Hills was filed.
Therefore, since the period of time from June 6, 1985, to any of the three counterclaims
filed by Doms in 1988 is far less than six years, Doms' counterclaims are not barred by the
statute of limitations, as erroneously argued in Point II of Plaintiffs' opening brief.
D.

The "relation back" doctrine applies to Ellen Anderson and Jeanne Scott.
Plaintiffs also erroneously argue that the "relation back" doctrine does not apply to

Ellen Anderson and Jeanne Scott because they were first added as involuntary Plaintiffs to
this action in Doms' Amended Counterclaim, which was filed June 15, 1988. The Utah
Supreme Court has stated that generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P. (Add. 27), which provides that
amendments to pleadings relate back to the date of the original pleading, will not apply to
an amendment which adds new parties to those in the original pleading. Doxey-Layton,
supra, at 548 P.2d 906. However, the Court goes on to explain the exception to this general
rule:
There is an exception to this rule. The exception operates where there is a
relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties have
34

See, e ^ 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 13.13 (2d ed. 1983); 6 C. WRIGHT, A.

MILLER

& M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1410 (2d ed. 1990); Todaro

v. Gardner. 285 P.2d 839, 842 (Utah 1955).
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an identity of interest; so it can be assumed or proved the relation back is not
prejudicial. The rationale underpinning this exception is one which obstructs a
mechanical use of a statute of limitations; to prevent adjudication of a claim.
Such is particularly valid where, as here, the parties in interest were sufficiently
alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from an early
stage.
548 P.2d at 906 (emphasis added).
The Court subsequently defined "identity of interest" as used in the above context to
mean that parties are so closely related that "notice of the action against one serves to
provide notice of the action to the other." Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d
214, 217 (Utah 1984).35 In the instant case, Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan Scott are the original Plaintiffs. Ellen Anderson,
personally, and Jeanne Scott were added as parties in Doms' Amended Counterclaim, and
these two parties clearly have an "identity of interest" with the original two Plaintiffs. All
four of the Plaintiffs executed the warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills and therefore became
personally liable to Doms for their breach of the warranties and covenants in the warranty
deed. Furthermore, Ellen Anderson personally owned an interest in Rossi Hills at the time
of the sale, and is the Personal Representative of D.C. Anderson's estate, and in that
capacity is an original Plaintiff. Ellen Anderson was the wife of the late D.C. Anderson and
Jeanne Scott is the wife of Dan Scott.
Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 761 P.2d 581
(Utah App. 1988), and Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., supra. These two cases are
factually inapposite to the facts of the instant case, as both involve third-party complaints
for indemnification rather than counterclaims; there was no "identity of interest" between the

35

See ajso Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981); Ringwood v. Foreign Auto
Works. Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Utah App. 1990).
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original parties and the added parties; and the claims involving the added parties were not
comparable in theory or damages to those of the original parties.
Plaintiffs also mistakenly rely on Schiavone v. Fortune. 477 U.S. 21 (1986). Schiavone
mechanically applied a four-factor test for applying "relation back" under Rule 15(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This four-factor test is set forth in a lengthy second
sentence to Rule 15(c). 477 U.S. at 24, note 5. This lengthy second sentence contained in
the Federal Rules has not been adopted as part of Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules. Thus, the
technical test applied under the Federal Rules is not applicable in Utah. The Utah Supreme
Court has made it clear that it has rejected this mechanical application to prevent
adjudication of a claim. Doxey-Layton, supra, at 548 P.2d 906.
Finally, even if the statute of limitations were held by this Court to apply to Ellen
Anderson and Jeanne Scott, this ruling would not affect in any way Doms' right to rescission
and return of all money paid under the contract; or, in the alternative, his right to damages.
The judgment would simply be against Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan Scott, rather than against all four of the Plaintiffs.
E.

Doms claims in his Second Amended Counterclaim are entitled to be set-off against
Plaintiffs* claims in their Complaint notwithstanding the statute of limitations.
As already covered in Point IV. B of this brief, supra, Doms' claims against Plaintiffs,

whether Doms prevails on rescission or his alternative remedy of damages, are entitled to
be set-off against Plaintiffs' claims in their Complaint regardless of whether Doms' Counterclaim is barred by the statute of limitations. See Jacobsen v. Bunker, supra, at 699 P.2d
1210.
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POINT vm
IF RESCISSION IS DENIED. THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION OF
REMEDIES DOES NOT PRECLUDE POMS' REMEDY OF DAMAGES.
A.

Poms' remedy of damages is clearly allowed by the applicable Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Under Utah law, a party has not been required to "elect remedies" as erroneously

claimed by Plaintiffs since at least the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on
January 1, 1950 (See Add. 27). Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a party may demand judgment
for the relief to which he is entitled, and that "[r]elief in the alternative or of several
different types may be demanded." Rule 8(e)(2) further provides that "[a] party may also
state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether
based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both."
Furthermore, Rule 18(a) provides that a party "may join either as independent or as
alternate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an
opposing party." Finally, Rule 54(c)(1) provides that "every final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings."
B,

Poms' remedy of damages is clearly allowed by Utah case law interpreting the
applicable Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The argument now advanced by Plaintiffs in Point III of their opening brief was

rejected by the Utah Supreme Court 31 years ago in Smoot v. Lund, 369 P.2d 933 (Utah
1962). In Smoot the Court held that a party is not required to elect which remedy he
wishes to proceed on during the trial of the case. The Court cited Rules 18(a) and 8(e)(2),
U.R.C.P., and held that ft[t]hey show a clear purpose to eliminate rigidity of rules and
technical objections as to the form or nomenclature for claims for relief." 369 P.2d at 935.
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That same year, the Court also held as follows in Rosander v. Larsen, 376 P.2d 146 (Utah
1962):
Rule 8(e) of our Rules of Civil Procedure permits either party to plead in the
alternative, either in one count or defense, or in separate counts or defenses.
To require a party to make an election between the alternative counts or
defenses, particularly at the pretrial stage of the proceedings, would be to
emasculate the rule and render it meaningless.
376 P.2d at 146 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).36
As pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in Roval Resources, supra, (cited by
Plaintiffs on page 22 of their opening brief), the doctrine of election of remedies does not
prevent recourse to any particular remedy, but operates only "to prevent double redress for
a single wrong." 603 P.2d at 796.
POINT IX
PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO ATTACK THE VALIDITY OF THE
WARRANTY DEED CONVEYING ROSSI HILLS FROM DOMCOY TO POMS,
WHICH IS A VALID DEED VESTING TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN POMS,
A.

Plaintiffs lack standing and cannot collaterally attack the warranty deed from
Domcoy to Poms,
Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (the closely held corporation formed by Doms and McCoy

in 1981 primarily to develop real property), conveyed Rossi Hills to Doms by warranty deed
dated August 26, 1988 (Ex. 17P; Add. 16). In Point IV of their opening brief, Plaintiffs
attack this conveyance based upon an erroneous interpretation of certain provisions of the
former Utah Business Corporation Act. However, Plaintiffs cannot be heard to attack the
validity of this conveyance because they are strangers to the deed and lack standing.

In accord Royal Resources. Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah
1979); Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 671 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983); Robert
Langston. Ltd. v. McOuarrie. 741 P.2d 554, 556 (Utah App. 1987), cert denied. 765 P.2d
1277 (Utah 1987).
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Under Utah law, even a grantor cannot attack or impeach his own deed unless there
is fraud, duress, mistake, or the like attributable to the grantee.

Barlow Society v.

Commercial Security Bank. 723 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah 1986); Desert Centers. Inc. v. Glen
Canvon. Inc.. 356 P.2d 286, 287 (Utah 1960). A deed which is voidable for some defect
cannot be collaterally attacked by a stranger to the deed. This is the general rule of law
accepted throughout the country.37
Furthermore, other jurisdictions have construed their statutes regarding disposition of
corporate assets (similar to former U.C.A. § 16-10-74, relied upon by Plaintiffs), and held
that only stockholders and creditors of a corporation have standing to object to a transfer
of corporate assets.38
B.

Domcov had clear power and authority to convey Rossi Hills to Poms under Utah
statutory and case law.
Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' lack of standing to attack the warranty deed conveying

Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms, provisions of the former Utah Business Corporation Act,

See, £&, 26 CJ.S. Deeds § 69; 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 188; Saltzman v. Ahern. 306
So.2d 537, 539 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1975); Eugene Pioneer Cemetery Ass'n v. Spencer Butte
Lodge No. 9. 363 P.2d 1083,1100 (Ore. 1961); Sailer v. Mercer County. 26 N.W.2d 137, 139
(N.D. 1947); Tillaux v. Tillaux. 47 P. 691, 692 (Cal. 1897); La Mar v. La Mar. 28 P.2d 63,
65 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1933); Faus v. Pacific Electrical Railway Co.. 303 P.2d 814 (Cal. App.
2 Dist. 1956); Huntoon v. Southern Trust & Commerce Bank. 290 P. 86 (Cal. App. 4 Dist.
1930); Book v. Book. 208 P. 474, 476 (Colo. 1922); Meiners v. Texas Osage Cooperative
Royalty Pool. 309 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Civ.App. 1958); Chronos Land Co. v. Crichton. 91 So.
408 (La. 1922); Gulf Land & Development Co. v. McRaney. 197 So.2d 212 (Miss. 1967).
38

See, e ^ , Gunther v. Thompson. 296 P. 611, 612 (Cal. 1931); Solorza v. Park Water
Co.. 195 P.2d 523, 527 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1948); Johnson v. Elliot. 218 P.2d 703, 707-08
(Mont. 1950); Greene v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.. 100 F.2d 34, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1938)
(interpreting Delaware law); St. Louis Railroad v. Terre Haute Railroad. 145 U.S. 393, 403
(1892) (interpreting Illinois law). See also Hatch v. Lucky Bill Min. Co.. 71 P. 865, 866
(Utah 1903) (stockholder may ratify or repudiate voidable act of a corporation); Houston
v. Utah Lake Land. Water & Power Co.. 187 P. 174, 177 (Utah 1919) (directors of a
dissolved corporation are trustees for the stockholders and creditors).
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regarding the authority of a dissolved corporation to protect its rights and wind up its affairs,
in effect at that time, clearly provided Domcoy with the power and authority to make this
conveyance to Doms. See U.C.A. §§ 16-10-100 and 16-10-101 (1984) (Add. 31).39
Doms and McCoy, as tenants in common, conveyed Rossi Hills to Domcoy by warranty
deed dated August 20, 1983 (Ex. 16P; Add. 8). The two corporate officers of Domcoy at
that time were McCoy as president and Doms as secretary/treasurer; and the directors were
Doms and his wife, and McCoy and his wife (Exs. 3IP, 32P). In March of 1985. McCoy and
his wife irrevocably tendered all their voting rights in their shares of Domcoy stock to Doms
and resigned from the corporation (R. 7187, 7189, 7517-18; Ex. 78D; Add. 9). Prior to this,
Doms' wife, who was never involved in the business of Domcoy, had also resigned from
Domcoy (R. 7189). Doms became the only officer and director of Domcoy and still is the
only officer and director to this date (R. 7189-91, 7519-20). Domcoy became the "alter ego"
of Doms, and was merely the "bare legal title holder" of Rossi Hills for Doms, who was the
equitable owner. See Belnap v. Blain. 575 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1978); Barlow Society v.
Commercial Security Bank. 723 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah 1986).
On December 31, 1986, Doms allowed Domcoy to be involuntarily dissolved by the
Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code for failure to file annual reports
because Doms was the only remaining officer and director of Domcoy, and Domcoy
therefore no longer had the minimum number of officers and directors required by Utah law
and the Certificate of Incorporation of Domcoy (Ex. 7P; R. 3115).

See also Falconaero Enterprise, Inc. v. Valley Investment Co., 395 P.2d 915, 916 (Utah
1964) (dissolution of a corporation does not preclude it from maintaining a quiet title action
under §§ 16-10-100 and 16-10-101); Johnson v. National Public Service Insurance Co., 536
P.2d 138, 141 (Utah 1975) (Crockett, J., concurring) (officers of a defunct corporation can
wind up its affairs by making necessary transfers of corporate property).
67

By August of 1988, when Domcov deeded Rossi Hills to Poms, Domcov was no longer
conducting any business except "winding up" its affairs as a dissolved corporation (R. 3117,
3187). Domcoy's conveyance of Rossi Hills to Doms was done solely to protect the
remedies, rights and claims of Domcoy and Doms with respect to Rossi Hills, and also to
,!

wind up" the affairs of Domcoy (R. 3117, 3187).
In Point IV of their opening brief, Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on former U.C.A. § 16-10-

74 (1961) (Add. 31). The "corporate authority" called for in § 16-10-74 for the disposition
of corporation assets was satisfied in the conveyance of Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms.
Domcoy had no board of directors which could adopt a resolution regarding the transfer of
Rossi Hills, and Doms was the only shareholder entitled to vote because McCoy and his wife
had irrevocably tendered their voting rights in their shares of Domcov stock to Doms in
March of 1985. Therefore, any attempt to comply with the technical statutory requirements
of § 16-10-74 would have been an exercise in futility, and is not required under Utah law.40
Furthermore, Doms had the requisite corporate authority to execute the warranty deed
conveying Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms pursuant to the By-Laws of Domcoy and the
First Meeting of the Board of Directors of Domcoy (Exs. 32P, 38P; R. 7185, 7202).
Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on Houston v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 187 P.
174 (Utah 1919), and Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 P.2d 117 (Utah App. 1992). These cases are
clearly factually inapposite to the instant case. In Houston, the president of the company
acted unilaterally "not to wind up the affairs of the company, but to enlarge and extend its

40

See, e ^ Lockhart v. Equitable Realty Co.. 657 P.2d 1333, 1335-36 (Utah 1983)
(mortgagee does not have to go through "idle and fruitless11 procedure of foreclosure when
the security has been lost).
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field of operation." 187 P. at 176. The company had a functioning board of directors, but
the president continued to do business as a going concern.
In Fair, the company also had a board of directors and shareholders entitled to vote
regarding approval of the transaction in question. Furthermore, Fair did not involve a
dissolved corporation that was winding up its affairs.
C.

The warranty deed from Domcov to Poms is a valid conveyance vesting title to Rossi
Hills in Poms.
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the warranty deed transferring Rossi Hills

from Domcoy to Doms is a valid deed which transferred title to the property to Doms, and
the trial court correctly entered a Conclusion of Law to this effect (C. of L. 44). Moreover,
by Utah statute and case law, the warranty deed from Domcoy to Doms is presumed to be
valid, and this presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. U.C.A. § 57-4a-4 (Add. 32); Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d
398, 399 (Utah 1986); Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632, 635 (Utah 1984).
D.

McCoy had no ownership interest in Rossi Hills when the sheriffs sale pursuant to
the default judgment against McCoy was conducted, and Plaintiffs acquired no
ownership interest in the property from the sheriffs sale.
Plaintiffs also make the erroneous argument in Point IV of their opening brief that

Doms could only assert a one-half interest in Rossi Hills because Plaintiffs had reacquired
McCoy's one-half interest in the property at the sheriffs sale conducted pursuant to the
default judgment entered against McCoy.
Plaintiffs' argument obviously fails for the simple reason that McCoy had no ownership
interest whatsoever in Rossi Hills at the time the sheriffs sale was conducted. The sheriffs
sale only sold whatever right, title and interest McCoy had in Rossi Hills, if any, and this fact
is clearly reflected in the "Corrected Sheriff's Deed" acquired by Plaintiffs after the sheriffs
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sale (Add. 33). The sheriffs sale of McCoy's non-existent interest in Rossi Hills was held
on December 12, 1988, and the original sheriffs deed and corrected sheriffs deed bear the
date of June 26, 1989. McCoy clearly had no ownership interest whatsoever in Rossi Hills
in December of 1988 or at any time thereafter, and therefore Plaintiffs' argument that Doms
could only assert a one-half interest in Rossi Hills is clearly erroneous.
POINT X
DOMS IS PROSECUTING HIS COUNTERCLAIM AS THE REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST, AND ROSSI HILLS WAS NOT PURCHASED
AS PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY BY DOMS AND MCCOY AS A PARTNERSHIP,
A.

Doms is prosecuting his Second Amended Counterclaim as the real party in interest
Plaintiffs filed their foreclosure complaint in June of 1985 against Doms and McCoy

in their capacity as individuals and sought judgment against each of them personally.
Plaintiffs have obtained a default judgment against McCoy and reduced it to a deficiency
judgment for the full amount of their claim. Plaintiffs continue to seek a judgment against
Doms individually for the full amount of their claim.
Doms has counterclaimed in his individual capacity against Plaintiffs to rescind the
Rossi Hills transaction or, in the alternative, to recover damages.

McCoy has been

"defaulted out" of this lawsuit, and Doms is the only party left in this lawsuit who can assert
a counterclaim against Plaintiffs. Furthermore, Doms is the sole owner and fee simple title
holder of Rossi Hills pursuant to the warranty deed conveying the property from Domcoy
to Doms on August 26, 1988 (See Point DC, supra). Therefore, Doms is clearly the real
party in interest under Rule 17(a), U.R.C.P. (Add. 27), to prosecute his Second Amended
Counterclaim against Plaintiffs. In fact, Doms is the only party in interest.
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B.

Doms and McCoy did not purchase Rossi Hills as a partnership under the facts and
the law, and Rossi Hills was never partnership property.
Plaintiffs erroneously argue in Point V of their opening brief that Doms and McCoy

were a partnership and acquired Rossi Hills as partnership property. Plaintiffs' argument
is based solely on a reference by Doms to McCoy as his "partner" while Doms was testifying
at trial (R. 7628). This reference by Doms was simply a layman's term for his business
relationship with McCoy. Doms clarified this reference by testifying there was never a
formal partnership agreement creating a partnership between Doms and McCoy, and he and
McCoy were never formal partners (R. 7204, 7628).
The facts of the instant case clearly establish that Doms and McCoy did not purchase
Rossi Hills as a partnership. None of the documents of transfer of Rossi Hills (the warranty
deed, trust deed and trust deed note) or preliminary transfer documents (earnest money
agreement, buyer's statement, seller's statement, title insurance and commitment for title
insurance) contain any reference to Doms and McCoy as a partnership or mention a
partnership name of any kind. Doms and McCoy purchased Rossi Hills as individual tenants
in common, not as a partnership (Exs. IP, 2P).
Furthermore. Plaintiffs did not sue Doms and McCoy as a partnership, and did not
obtain or ever attempt to obtain a judgment against Doms and McCoy as a partnership.
The fact that Doms and McCoy acquired Rossi Hills in March of 1982 as tenants in
common does not establish a partnership between Doms and McCoy under Utah law (See
U.C.A. § 48-1-4(2); Add. 34). In fact, Rossi Hills was not acquired with partnership funds,
but rather with the individual funds of Doms and McCoy (See Exs. 21P, 22P). Moreover,
Rossi Hills was not acquired in a partnership name.

Rossi Hills was simply never

partnership property of Doms and McCoy (See U.C.A. § 48-1-5; Add. 34).
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Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on Kemp v. Murray. 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984). Kemp has
no application to the instant case because Doms and McCoy were not a partnership when
they acquired Rossi Hills, and Doms is not counterclaiming against Plaintiffs as a partner
of McCoy.
Even assuming, arguendo, there was ever a partnership between Doms and McCoy,
any such alleged partnership was clearly terminated in May of 1982, and the trial court so
stated in open court (R. 7629-30).
POINT XI
DOMS IS PROSECUTING HIS COUNTERCLAIM AS AN
"IMMEDIATE GRANTEE" UNDER THE WARRANTY DEED
FROM PLAINTIFFS. NOT AS A "REMOTE GRANTEE."
In Point VI of their opening brief, Plaintiffs erroneously argue that Doms is
counterclaiming against Plaintiffs as a "remote grantee," and therefore cannot maintain his
Second Amended Counterclaim against Plaintiffs because the covenant against encumbrances does not "run with the land." This argument is clearly without merit for the simple reason
that Doms is counterclaiming against Plaintiffs as an "original" or "immediate grantee," not
as a "remote grantee."
Doms' cause of action for breach of the covenants in the warranty deed arises from
the original warranty deed executed by Plaintiffs dated March 10, 1982, not from the
subsequent deeds conveying the property to Domcoy and then from Domcoy back to Doms.
Doms is being sued by Plaintiffs as an immediate grantee, and in turn Doms is counterclaiming against Plaintiffs as an immediate grantee.
Moreover, Doms has always remained the true owner of Rossi Hills. Domcoy merely
held the bare legal title for the benefit of Doms, who has always been the equitable title
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holder. Belnap v. Blain. 575 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1978); Barlow Society v. Commercial
Security Bank. 723 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah 1986).
Plaintiffs make the nonsensical argument that Doms should have sued Domcoy, which
in turn should have sued Doms, who then could sue Plaintiffs. In other words. Plaintiffs
argue that Doms should have been required to sue himself twice before he could maintain
an action against Plaintiffs. A grantee cannot take through himself and become a remote
grantee. A remote grantee refers to a third-person who takes through the original or
immediate grantee.
In addition, even assuming, arguendo, that Doms could somehow be considered a
remote grantee, this would not provide grounds for dismissal of Doms' Second Amended
Counterclaim. As already established in Point I of this brief, supra. Plaintiffs also breached
the covenant of general warranty of title when they delivered the warranty deed to Rossi
Hills in March of 1982. Utah case law clearly holds that the covenant of general warranty
of title runs with the land, and thus a remote grantee can bring an action on this covenant.
East Canvon Land & Stock Co. v. Davis & Weber Counties Canal Co.. 238 P. 280, 281
(Utah 1925); Van Cott v. Jacklin. 226 P. 460 (Utah 1924).
Finally, Doms' cause of action for misrepresentation in his Second Amended
Counterclaim, and his requested remedy of rescission of the Rossi Hills transaction or, in the
alternative, for damages, is not dependent upon the covenants in the warranty deed and
therefore is not affected by Doms' status as either an immediate or a remote grantee under
the warranty deed.
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POINT XII
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY RULED THAT JEANNE SCOTT AND
ELLEN ANDERSON ARE PROPERLY JOINED AS INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFFS
BECAUSE THEY ARE NECESSARY PARTIES UNDER RULE 19(a), U.R.C.P.
After hearing and considering the arguments of Plaintiffs and Doms regarding the
issue of whether or not Jeanne Scott and Ellen Anderson should be joined as involuntary
Plaintiffs, the trial court issued an Order on July 5, 1988 (R. 248-50), joining them because
they are necessary parties under Rule 19, U.R.C.P. (Add. 27).
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ in the Utah Supreme
Court on or about June 23, 1989, in which they requested that the Court issue an
extraordinary writ restraining and prohibiting the trial court and the judges thereof from
proceeding any further in the trial, and to compel the trial court to dismiss Ellen Anderson
and Jeanne Scott from the lawsuit (Add. 19). The Utah Supreme Court, in an Amended
Minute Entry dated July 31, 1989 (Add. 20), issued the following ruling:
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied because the district court has
jurisdiction over both petitioners inasmuch as they were grantors on the deed,
and both are proper parties to the counterclaim for rescission under U.R.C.P.
# 13 and 19 . . . (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has already ruled on the issue now raised in Points VI. A
and IX of Plaintiffs' opening brief. Therefore, Doms respectfully submits that it would be
inappropriate for this Court to substitute a different judgment for that of the Utah Supreme
Court in regard to this issue, as the matter is now stare decisis.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments set forth in this brief, Doms requests that this Court
reverse the judgment of the trial court and rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. The
judgment of rescission should revest title in the Plaintiffs, who held title to Rossi Hills prior
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to the sale, and order the return of all money received by Plaintiffs pursuant to the Rossi
Hills transaction, plus prejudgment interest on all such amounts.
If rescission is denied, the trial court should be directed to enter a judgment that
Doms must pay the purchase price of the property, with a set-off to Doms for all amounts
received by Plaintiffs toward the purchase price and for any damages suffered by Doms as
a result of Plaintiffs' breach of the warranties and covenants in the warranty deed. Doms
is further entitled to prejudgment interest on all amounts received by Plaintiffs from the date
each amount was received, and prejudgment interest on the damages for the encumbrances
from the date the warranty deed was delivered.
On remand, the trial court should be directed to determine the amount of attorney's
fees and appropriate costs which should be awarded to Doms as the prevailing party in this
lawsuit. The judgment of the trial court awarding attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiffs
should be reversed in its entirety; and on remand the trial court should be directed to
determine the amount of attorney's fees overpaid to Plaintiffs in regard to the default
judgment, which should be refunded to Doms.
DATED this £7~

day of

/^^fee^^

, 1993.

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
and Cross-Appellant Eugene E. Doms
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Addendum 16

Warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills from
Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. to Doms, dated August
26, 1988

Addendum 17

Title page and signature page of Plaintiff Jeanne
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,
Plaintiffs

:
:
:
:
:
:

vs.
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,
Defendants

SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
NO

;

Fit'ED""

:
:I

<•'-:. 2 : 1592

:
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ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
:
representative of the Estate of :
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
:
personally, DAN SCOTT and
:
JEANNE SCOTT,
s
Third-party Plaintiffs

:
::

vs.

Civil No. 8339

(Judge John A. Rokich)

SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
:
Third-party Defendant
CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED ON NEXT 3PAGE
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,

:
:
:
:

Plaintiffs

:

vs.

:

SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate :
and politic of the State of
:
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
:
official capacity as Summit
::
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
:
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah
:
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
::
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a
j
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
:
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
s
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1,
j
2, 3, 4, and 5,
:
Defendants

Civil No. 10066
(Judge John A. Rokich)

:

Trial in the above-entitled matter came before the Court April
17, 18, and 19, 1990, and August 21, 22, 23, and 24, 1990.

An

evidentiary hearing dealing with the issues of attorney fees and
costs was held on December 31, 1991. At all times, Plaintiffs were
represented by James A. Mcintosh, Esq., and Irving H. Biele, Esq..
Defendant Eugene E. Doms was represented by Larry R. Keller, Esq.,
and Craig L. Boorman, Esq..

Third-Party Defendant, Summit County

Title Company, was represented by Brant H. Wall, Esq..

After

hearing the oral testimony of witnesses, reviewing such documentary
evidence as was admitted, memoranda filed by counsel herein,
considering the oral argument of counsel, and good cause appearing,
the Court having heretofore on September 9, 1991, signed certain

"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and "Judgment;" the
parties having filed certain motions to amend the said Findings,
Conclusions, and Judgment; the Court thereafter on May 6, 1992,
having signed certain documents entitled "Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law," "Amended Judgment," and heaving further
signed those certain documents entitled "Supplement to Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law," and "Supplement to Judgment;" which
supplemental documents pertain primarily to the issue of attorney
fees and Court costs; the Court desiring to consolidate the said
amended and supplemental pleadings; hereby enters its "Second
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" as follows:
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs

in this

case, as grantors, conveyed

to

Defendant Eugene E. Doms and one Michael R. McCoy, pursuant to a
form Warranty deed upon which the word "Special" was typed, Lots
in Block 58 and 59, Park City Survey, State of Utah, and more
particularly described in Plaintiffs1 Exhibit IP as follows:
PARCEL NO. 1:

All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58,
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat
thereof, as filed and of record in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.

PARCEL NO. 2:

All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof,
as filed and of record in the office of the
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom
any portion located within the railroad rights
of way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326,
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373,
records of Summit County, Utah.

PARCEL NO. 3:

All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed
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and of record in the office of the Summit
County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of
way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326,
and Entry No. 13 610 in Book H at Page 373,
records of Summit County, Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five
feet of the following described Lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Records.
The property so described shall be referred to hereafter as
the "Rossie Hills Property."
2.

The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated

November

12, 1981

(see Defendant's Exhibit 63D) , is a valid

contract

for

sale

the

of

the

Rossie

Hills

Property,

and

specifically states that the conveyance of said property is to be
by "Warranty Deed."
3.

All subsequent documents of sale involving the parties

in this action leading up to the transfer of the Rossie Hills
Property by the aforementioned Warranty Deed referred to the
documents of transfer as a "Warranty Deed."
4.

The aforementioned Warranty Deed, executed by all four

of the Plaintiffs in this matter as grantors did not have the word
"Special" typed at the top of the document at the time the grantors
executed said Deed nor was it on the Deed when said Deed was
delivered to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982.
5.

Said Warranty Deed did not contain any of the language

which could lead the Court to the conclusion that it may have been
a "Special Warranty Deed," even if such were officially recognized
-4-
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under Utah law,
6.

Said Warranty deed contained no exceptions or limiting

language with regard to certain encumbrances and easements which
shall be hereafter discussed in these Findings.
7.
McCoy

Access to the Rossie Hills Property at the *time Doms and

purchased

the

property

was via

a

graded

right-of-way

extending in a northeasterly direction from the old rail right-ofway south of Block 59 as shown in Defendant's Exhibit 77D.
8.

After accessing the Rossie Hills property, the roadway

continued to Lot 21 of Block 58, made a loop through what was
designated as McHenry Avenue and Lots 24 and 25. This roadway will
hereafter be designated as the loop road.

(See Defendant's Exhibit

77D.)
9.

The loop road which is approximately 10-15 feet wide has

been in use for in excess of 40 years.
10.

Said

loop

road

has

been used

openly,

notoriously,

continuously, and adversely by the residents who reside on Ontario
Avenue and whose rear property borders, or intrudes upon the Rossie
Hills property, for a period in excess of 40 years as of the date
of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery of the Warranty Deed by
grantors to Defendant doms.

Such use was for ingress and egress

to the rear of their property, and for parking.
11.

Along the westerly boundaries of the lots in Block 58 are

encroachments such as sheds, fences and decks owned and used by
adjoining property owners to the west.
77D.)
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(See Defendant's Exhibit

12.

The encroachments protrude from 12-16 feet onto the

Rossie Hills Property.
13.
bordered

These
by

encroachments,

said

including

fences, had been used

the

backyard

areas

openly, notoriously,

continuously and adversely for a period in excess of twenty years
as of March 23, 1982, by the aforementioned property owners, and
such use continues through present time.
14.

At the time of the delivery of the Deed to the Rossie

Hills Property, Plaintiffs had knowledge of the aforementioned
encroachments, either directly or through the knowledge of their
agent, Mike Sloan.
15.
aforesaid

Plaintiffs made no effort to remove or extinguish the
encumbrances prior to the delivery

of the Deed to

Defendant Doms, or at any time thereafter.
16.

Plaintiffs made no effort to quiet title to the Rossie

Hills Property and cause McHenry Avenue to be vacated; therefore,
Plaintiffs made no effort to mitigate Defendant's damages as such
damages related to these aforementioned encumbrances.
17.

The purchase price for the rossie Hills Property was the

amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($276,750.00).
18.

(See Defendant's Exhibit 69D.)

The Plaintiffs received the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars

($10,000.00) as earnest money in the aforementioned transaction,
and a down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($72,500.00), leaving a balance due on the purchase price of One
Hundred

Ninety-Four

Thousand

($194,250.00).
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Two

Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

19.

In consideration for the transfer of the Rossie Hills

property by Warranty Deed, Defendant Doms and one Michael R. McCoy
executed a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982.
(See Plaintiffs1 Exhibits 2P and 3P.) Said Trust Deed Note was in
the amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 'Hundred Fifty
Dollars (!$194,250.00) and called for interest payments monthly up
to and including January 10,1 985. The Note also provided that the
entire unpaid principal, together with interest, was due on January
25, 1985.
20.

The amount of each monthly payment was to be Two Thousand

Two Hundred Sixty-Six and 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25).
21.

Said Trust Deed Note provided that "each payment shall

be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the
reduction of principal."
22.

Plaintiffs received the sum of Seventy-Two Thousand Five

Hundred Twenty and 25/100 Dollars ($72,520.25) as monthly payments
pursuant to the aforementioned Trust Deed Note.

(See Plaintiffs1

Exhibit 6P.)
23.

The property conveyed to Eugene E. Doms and Michael R.

McCoy was located in a platted subdivision.
24.

The Rossie Hills Property as platted showed that the lots

in Block 58 and 59 were accessible by McHenry Avenue.

(See

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 99P.)
25.

The recorded plat of the Rossie Hills Property was not

a true reflection of the actual physical layout of the land because
of the contour and fact that McHenry Avenue was never constructed
as a roadway.
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26.

The Rossie Hills Property was purchased for residential

development.
27.

At the time the Rossie Hills property was purchased, it

was zoned HR-1, which allowed historical uses and allowed single,
duplex and tri-plex dwellings to be constructed uponfcthe property.
28.

The utilization of all of the Rossie Hills Property is

affected by the contour of the land, the loop road, encroachments
and McHenry Avenue being undeveloped.
29.

Plaintiffs1 appraiser, Mr. Pia, concluded that as of

March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills Property subject to
the loop road and encroachments was around Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00).
30.

Defendant Doms1 appraiser, Mr. Webber, concluded that as

of March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills property was One
Hundred

Sixty-Six

Thousand

Dollars

($166,000.00)

if

the

encumbrances and loop road can be relocated and One Hundred Ten
Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($110,700.00) if the loop road and
encumbrances cannot be relocated.
31.

McHenry Avenue had not been vacated by Park City or by

a judicial determination.
32.

Plaintiffs did not or could not have conveyed good and

marketable title to any part of McHenry Avenue at the time of the
execution of the warranty Deed to Doms and McCoy.
33.

Defendant Doms met with Mike Sloan, a real estate agent,

in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and purchase of the Rossie
Hills Property.
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34.

Defendant Doms also met with Dewey Anderson, one of the

sellers of the Rossie Hills Property, once before Doms and McCoy
purchased the property.
35.

Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the property was

a prime piece of development property and its highest and best use
would be as an integrated development with the two adjoining
parcels referred to as Block 62 and the Slipper parcel.
36.

Defendant Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the

Slipper parcel in October of 1982.
37.

The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to

further the integrated development of the three parcels and to
equalize their position with the developers of the Slipper parcel
and Block 62.
38.

In October of 1982, Doms engaged Mr. Gerald H. Kinghorn,

an attorney, for the specific purpose of closing the purchase of
the Slipper parcel and continuing the negotiations with the owners
of Block 62 for the purpose of developing the three parcels as an
integrated development.
39.

Prior to Doms1 purchase of the rossie Hills Property,

Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the development of the
three parcels of property prepared by the architect, Mr. Richard
Kohler.
40.
the

Doms knew or should have known at the time he purchased

Rossie

Hills

Property

and

the

Slipper

parcel

that the

integrated development of the three parcels had failed because of
the problems with the Rossie Hills property and the inability of
the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel.
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41.

Doms walked the Rossie Hills property with Mr. Sloan in

the fall of 1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds on the
property.
42.

Mr. Sloan informed Defendant doms that the encroachments

would not affect development and an access road to* the property
would be in the same place as the loop road.
43.

Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachments for

the first time sometime between October 22, 1981, and November 7,
1981, and had further notice during 1982 and up and through 1984.
44.

Doms did not give notice of his intent to rescind until

January of 1985, and said notice was by way of a settlement offer
in lieu of making the One Hundred Ninety Four Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty Dollar ($194,250.00) payment due on January 25, 1985.

Said

settlement offer in January of 1985 was an offer made to Plaintiffs
through Defendant Doms1 attorney, Gerald H. Kinghorn, in which
Defendant Doms offered to deed back the property to Plaintiffs in
return for Plaintiffs1 cancellation of the aforementioned Trust
Deed Note.
45.

Plaintiffs did not respond to said settlement offer, but

rather filed a Complaint to foreclose on the property in June of
1985.
46.
develop

Doms1 purchase of Slipper parcel, the negotiations to
the three parcels

as an

integrated

development, the

subsequent negotiations about credits and defining the problems
with the Rossie Hills property, affirm the fact that Doms had
personal knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than
October of 1982.

-10-

006883

47.

It was not until Plaintiffs1 action to foreclose was

filed that Defendant Doms filed his Amended Counterclaim in June
of 1988 seeking to rescind the Warranty Deed.
48.

Defendant Doms failed to file his claim for damages

against the Estate of D.C. Anderson within three months after the
date of the first publication of Notice to Creditors as provided
in Section 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
49.

The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment signed

on September 9, 1991, were filed in the office of the Summit County
Clerk on October 22, 1991, which the court finds is the date of
Entry.
50.

The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment were not

"final" because there were several issues to be decided which the
Court had not included in the said documents, which consisted of
several items including determination of attorney fees and costs.
51.

The Court does not believe it should interfere with the

agreements entered into by the client and the attorney for services
to be rendered when the attorneys, as in this case, have fully
apprised the clients of the fees and costs at the outset of the
case.
52.

The attorneys for plaintiffs and defendant have kept

detailed records of the time spent in the prosecution of this case
and have billed regularly so that the client was always aware of
what was transpiring in the case.
53.

The Courtfs decision as to fees and costs is not to be

construed as negating the client's obligation to pay the attorneys
in accordance with the terms of the attorney-client agreement.
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54.

The Court finds that the "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer

to Purchase" which was signed by some of the parties in November
1981 was merged into the later Warranty Deed dated March 10, 1982.
Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979).
(a)

The said Warranty Deed did not provide for payment

of attorney fees in an action based upon breach of warranties
contained in the said Deed.
55.

The Court finds that purchasers of real estate are not

entitled to attorney fees absent an express agreement providing
therefore, unless the purchaser commences a separate action against
third parties to remove encumbrances.

George A. Lowe Co. v.

Simmons Warehouse Co., 39 Utah 395, 117 Pac. 874 (1911).
(a)

Doms has not commenced a separate action against

third parties to remove encumbrances.
56.

The Court finds the plaintiffs1 complaint in foreclosure

as well as all other actions by the plaintiffs were not instituted
or prosecuted in bad faith.
57.

The Counsel

for plaintiffs and Doms aggressively

and

zealously presented their cases and neither party acted in bad
faith.
58.

The Court finds that Doms is not entitled to attorney

59.

The defendant Doms is not entitled to any prejudgment

fees.

interest on the $83,000.00 damages.
60.

Doms

is

entitled

to

the

following

costs

for

the

prosecution of his Second Amended Counterclaim:
(a)

Service of process on Jeanne Scott

$ 12.00

(b)

Service of process on Ellen Anderson

$ 12.75
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61.

(c)

Service of trial subpoena: Mike Sloan

$ 24.75

(d)

Witness fees: Elden and Ella Sorensen

$ 34.00

(e)

Recording fee for corrected Sheriff's
Deed

$ 18.00

(f)

The said costs awarded to Doms total-

$101.50

The issue of plaintiffs being entitled to attorney fees

and costs can be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs because the
provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed provided
that all costs and expenses of collection including reasonable
attorney fees can be charged against the maker.
62.

The Court finds that counsel

for the plaintiffs and

defendant have expended many hours in the prosecution of this case
and their time sheets so reflect.
63.

The Court finds that hourly rates charged by counsel for

plaintiffs and defendant were reasonable.
64.

The

Court

finds

that

Plaintiffs1

counsel, James

A.

Mcintosh, at page 12 of his affidavit dated December 6, 1991,
states, "Most of the services rendered were in connection with the
Second Amended Counterclaim."
(a)

The

time

spent

on collection

of the

Note

and

foreclosure action by plaintiffs1 counsel was nominal in comparison
to all the hours expended in this case.
(b)

The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to

recover attorney fees for the time spent on the collection of the
Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed foreclosure action but not for
any time spent in defending against any of the causes of action in
the Second Amended Counterclaim.
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65.
fees

for

The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney
legal

services

incurred

in the prosecution

of the

collection of the Note foreclosure action, the motion to set aside
default,

to

compel

sanctions,

setting

aside

the

tax

sale,

intermediate appeal and petition for extraordinary writ to the Utah
Supreme Court,
66.

In addressing the issue of these fees, the Court will

take into consideration the effect of the attorney fees awarded the
plaintiffs by Judge Pat B. Brian in the amount of $4,467.60 as a
condition of setting aside the Default Judgment against Doms.
67.

The Court will also make an award to plaintiffs based

upon Judge J. Dennis Frederick's ruling that plaintiffs were
entitled to a reasonable fee for bringing a motion to compel and
for sanctions before the court.
68.

The criteria for the Courtfs decision awarding attorney

fees is set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985
(Utah 1988).
69.

The Court understands the amount in controversy can be

a factor in determining a reasonable fee, but the Court is not
putting much reliance on this factor.
70.

The Court finds the plaintiffs should be awarded attorney

fees as follows:
(a)

FOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL, JAMES A, MCINTOSH, ESQ,:
(i)

Lawsuit to set aside tax sale

$ 5,245.00

(ii)

Petition for intermediate appeal

$ 2,730.00

(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ

$ 2,160.00

(iv)

For the foreclosure complaint

$12,300.00

(v)

For the motion to compel and for
-14-
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sanctions as per Judge Frederick's
minute entries
$ 4,750.00
(vi)
(b)

The total amount to be awarded for
Mr. Mcintosh's fees is
$27,185.00

FOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ,:
(i)

Motion to set aside default
(This amount has already been
paid by Doms)

$ 4,467.00

(ii)

Lawsuit to set aside tax sale

$ 1,050.00

(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ
and mandamus

$ 2,740.00

(iv)

For the foreclosure complaint

$10,000.00

(v)

The total amount to be awarded
for Mr. Biele's fees is

71.

The

Court

finds

the plaintiffs

$13,790.00
are

entitled

to

following costs:
(a)

Summit County Clerk —

(b)

Richie Zabriskie —

filing Complaint $ 50.00

fee for service

of Third-Party Summons and Complaint
(c)

Summit County Clerk —

filing fee for

Complaint in Civil No. 10066
(d)

Richie Zabriskie —

$ 16.50

$ 75.00

fee for service

of process in Civil No. 10066 on Domcoy
Enterprises Inc.
(e)

Utah Supreme Court —

$ 24.70
docketing fee

for filing Petition for Intermediate
Appeal
(f)

$125.00

Utah Supreme Court —

filing fee for

Petition for Extraordinary Writ of
Prohibition

$ 50.00
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(g)

Summit County Clerk —

fee for

certification of order
(h)

Steve Deckert —

$

witness fee for

attending trial
(i)

LeRoy J. Pia —

$ 30.00
witness fee

to attend trial
(j)

$ 50.00

The total amount of the said costs
to be awarded to the plaintiffs is

72.

3.50

$358.20

The Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982, provides for

payment of interest in the amount of fourteen percent (14%) per
annum prior to default, eighteen percent (18%) per annum after
default.
SECOND AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Deed which transferred the Rossie Hills property was

a Warranty Deed under Utah law and conveyed with it all of the
statutory warranties and covenants contained in U.C.A. Section 571-12.
2.
said

The loop road, sheds, fences, backyard areas bordered by

fences,

and

decks

are

encroachments

and

constitute

encumbrances upon the property.
3.

Said encumbrances existed on the Rossie Hills property

on the date of the delivery of the Deed, which was March 23, 1982.
4.

Said encumbrances constitute a breach of the statutory

covenants contained in the Warranty Deed pursuant to U.C.A. Section
57-1-12.
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5.

The

aforesaid

statutory

covenants

contained

in the

Warranty Deed were breached upon the delivery of the Warranty Deed
to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982.
6.

The Warranty

Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed

prepared at the same time do not constitute a single contract.
7.
is:

The Court believes that the law applicable to this case

The acceptance of the Deed completes the execution of the

contract, and the Deed become final and conclusive evidence of the
contract under which it is executed (84 A.L.R. 1009).
8.

The Court concludes that the Utah case of Reese Howell

Companv v. Brown. 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, 689 (1916), sets forth
the controlling law which must be applied in the instant case
regarding the issue as to whether or not the Warranty Deed, Note
and Trust Deed constitutes a single contract.
9.

The fact that a Trust Deed and Note were executed at the

same time does not make them part of the contract to purchase the
property. The Trust Deed and Note are documents executed to secure
the payment of the property, and have no bearing upon whether the
property is free and clear of encumbrances.
10.

Defendant Doms1 remedy in this case is for a breach of

the statutory covenants of warranty.
11.

The utilization of the Rossie Hills Property is adversely

affected by the encroachments and loop road to the extent that the
value of the property is diminished.
12.

Defendant Doms has been damaged by virtue of Plaintiffs1

breach.
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Defendant Doms1 damages should be measured as of the date

13.

of the breach, which is March 23, 1982, the date of the delivery
of the Deed.
14.

Said

damages

should

be

measured

with

all

of

the

encumbrances in place and as they existed on March 23, 1982.
15.

The proper measure of damages under Utah law is the

difference in the value of the property without any encumbrances
minus the value of the property with the encumbrances.
16.

The loop road does have a beneficial value for the

development of the Rossie Hills Property.
17.

Under Utah

law, it was the Plaintiffs1

burden and

obligation to mitigate the damages suffered by Defendant doms
because Plaintiffs were in breach of the statutory covenants
contained in the Deed at the time the Deed was delivered.
18.

Plaintiffs had the obligation of quieting title to the

Rossie Hills property and causing McHenry Avenue to be vacated; and
if Plaintiffs had done so, Defendant Doms1 damages would have been
mitigated.
19.

As a result of the encumbrances existing on the Rossie

Hills Property on March 23, 1982, Defendant Doms has suffered
damages in the sum of Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00).
20.
Hundred

Defendant Doms is entitled to an offset against the Two
Seventy=Six

Thousand

Seven

Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

($276,750.00) purchase price of the property, in the amount of
Eighty-Two

Thousand

Five Hundred

Dollars

($82,500.00), which

represents the earnest money payment of Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000.00) and the down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five
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Hundred Dollars ($72,500.00).
21.

The remaining balance due after said offset of Eighty-

Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($82,500.00) is One Hundred
Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) , which
represents the principal balance of the Trust Deed Note as of the
date of the execution of said Note and the Trust Deed.
22.
offset

Defendant Doms is further entitled to an additional
of

Eighty-Three

Thousand

Dollars

($83,000.00),

which

represents the damages suffered by Defendant Doms as a result of
the encumbrances on the property as set forth above.
23.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid balance under the Trust

Deed Note and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date
of the delivery of the Warranty Deed.
24.

From April 0, 1982 through January 10, 1985, monthly

interest payments under the Trust Deed Note were received by
Plaintiffs on an unpaid principal balance of One Hundred NinetyFour Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), rather than
One

Hundred

Eleven

Thousand

Two

Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

($111,250.00), which the court has concluded was the unpaid balance
due under the Trust Deed Note at that time.
25.

under the terms of the Trust Deed Note, the amount

actually due in monthly interest payments on the un paid principal
balance of one Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars
(111,250.00) was Forty-One Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Three and
44/100 Dollars ($41,533.44).
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26.

Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in

the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100
Dollars ($72,520.25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an
additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and
81/100

Dollars

($30,986.81), which

represents

the

difference

between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) and the interest which was
actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period.
27.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due

under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred SixtyThree and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263.19), as of January 25, 1985, the
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust
Deed Note.
28.

Inasmuch as Defendant Doms1 damages were not determined

and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages, Plaintiffs1
action for a judgment of foreclosure is premature.
29.

Without

the

necessity

of

refiling

this

action

to

foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require Plaintiffs to give
Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall have
the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the Trust
Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney fees,
as determined ny the Court, within 90 days from receipt of the
Notice of Default.

The giving of the Notice of Default shall not

take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can be
served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney.

Service on the

Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the
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Defendants last known address.
30.

The Court recognizes that there are two options by which

to foreclose a note and trust deed, administratively or judicially.
Due to the circumstances in this case, the failure of Plaintiffs
to ascertain damages prior to proceeding with the foreclosure
action, Defendant Doms should be given 90 days1 notice to satisfy
the Note before Plaintiffs can proceed with the foreclosure action.
31.

Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the unpaid balance

of Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three and 19/100 Dollars
($80,263.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid principal
balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note.

The

interest rate to be used in determining the amount due Plaintiffs
as interest on said unpaid principal balance shall be fourteen
percent (14%) per annum.
32.

If Defendant Doms fails to pay the balance due and owing

after notice, Plaintiffs shall have Judgment of foreclosure upon
filing an affidavit that Defendant Doms has failed to pay.

The

Plaintiffs will have the sole option at their discretion to a
Judgment

of

foreclosure

based

either

on

the

administrative

foreclosure proceedings set forth in Sections 57-1-23 et. seg.,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judicial foreclosure
proceedings provided in Sections 78-37-1 et. seg. .
33.

In regard to the issue of whether or not Defendant Doms

was entitled to rescind the contract, the Court concludes that
Defendant Doms was bound to take remedial action after the Fall of
1981 which the Court determined to be the date he was made aware
of the encroachments and loop road, and which was prior to the
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purchase of the Slipper parcel.
34.

It was not necessary for Defendant Doms to obtain a legal

opinion that the loop road was a prescriptive easement or that the
shed and fences had a legal basis for being on the Rossie Hills
Property before he could make his tender to rescind.*
35.

Once

Defendant

Doms

knew

of

the

road

and

the

encumbrances, he should have taken action within a reasonable time
to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind the transaction.
36.

The Court concludes that the case of Eaeter v. West and

North Properties, 758 P.2d 361 (Ore. App. 1988), is not applicable
to this case in that Eaeter stands for the proposition, among
others, that an unmaintained dirt road that showed little use and
brush and trees had to be removed to drive on it was not so open
or notorious that purchasers would be chargeable with knowledge of
its existence.
37.

Eaeter is readily distinguishable from the facts of the

instant case because there is not question that the road in this
case has been used and was being used.
38.

The Eaeter case is applicable to the instant case in the

sense that it stands for the proposition that the person seeking
to rescind the contract must do so promptly after obtaining
knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for rescind so long
as he acts within a reasonable time.
39.

Defendant Doms did not act within a reasonable time after

he obtained knowledge that the loop road and the encroachments were
upon the Rossie Hills Property.
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40.

The

Court

unreasonable

concludes

amount

of

time

that
to

Defendant

seek

Doms waited

an

rescission; therefore,

rescission is not the appropriate remedy in this case and is barred
by the doctrine of laches.
41.
the

Defendant Doms presented insufficient evidence to carry

burden

of

proof

that

Plaintiffs

committed

fraud

and

misrepresentation in this matter.
42.

With

regard

to

Civil

No.

10066,

and

Count

I

of

Plaintiffs1 Complaint contained therein, pursuant to Stipulation
of the parties and a previous Order of the court, the May 27, 1987,
Tax Sale of the Rossie Hills Property by Summit County should be
declared to be null and void.
43.

The foregoing Conclusion of Law shall be deemed not to

affect the Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982, in any adverse manner
by the said tax sale. The rights, title, liens and interest of the
Plaintiffs and Defendant Eugene E. Doms and Domcoy Enterprises,
Inc. , a Utah corporation, shall not be deemed to be affected by the
said tax sale.

The Court's previous Order invalidating the tax

sale does not in and of itself either validate or invalidate any
subsequent deeds issued regarding the Rossie Hill Property.
44.

The Warranty Deed dated August 26, 1988, in which Domcoy

Enterprises, Inc., as grantor, conveyed the Rossie Hills Property
to Defendant Doms, as grantee, is a valid Deed which transferred
legal title to Defendant Doms.
45.

In regard to Count II of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil

No. 10066, title to the Rossie Hills Property should be quieted in
Defendant Doms, subject to Plaintiffs1
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right to foreclose as

previously set forth in these Conclusions of Law.
46.

In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs' Complaint in Civil

NO. 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the
Court on Motion of Summit County.
47.

In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third-Party Complaint against

Third-Party Defendant Summit County Title Company in Civil No.
8339, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by
the Court on Motion of said parties.
48.

Defendant

doms1

Second

Amended

Counterclaim

seeking

damages against Plaintiff Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative
of the Estate of D.C. Anderson is barred by the three-month filing
period limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section
75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, as said section relates
to the issues of damages.
49.

This Court has in personam

jurisdiction over Plaintiff

Jeanne Scott pursuant to a ruling by the Utah Supreme Court
contained in an Amended Minute Entry denying Plaintiffs1 Petition
for an Extraordinary Writ under Rule 65B(B)4, Supreme Court Case
No. 890269. In said Amended Minute Entry, dated July 31, 1989, the
Utah Supreme Court denied said Petition for an Extraordinary Writ,
and ruled that this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff Jeanne
Scott because she was a grantor on the Warranty Deed, and is a
proper party to Defendant Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim under
Rules 13 and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
50.

Plaintiffs1 remaining objections to the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment dated September 9, 1991, are
denied.
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51.

The

plaintiffs

should

be

awarded

attorney

fees of

$27,185.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, James A.
Mcintosh, Esq.
52.

The

plaintiffs

should

be

awarded

attorney

fees of

$13,790.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs' counsel, Irving H.
Biele, Esq.
53.

The plaintiffs should be awarded $358.20 for costs which

they have incurred in these proceedings.
54.

The plaintiffs should be awarded interest of fourteen

percent (14%) per annum on all principal amounts the court has
determined were due and owing on the Trust Deed Note dated March
10, 1982, both before and after default.
55.

The defendant Doms should not be awarded any attorney

fees for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 83 39
or Civil No. 10066.
56.

The defendant Doms should not be awarded any prejudgment

interest on the $83,000.00 damages described in the original
Judgment dated September 9, 1991.
57.

The defendant Doms should be awarded $101.50 for costs

for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim.
DATED this /6 day of June 1992.
BY THE COURT:

<
HONORABLE JOHN A.
9JL

A-

-©^strict Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of May, 1992, a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand delivered to the following:
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

JAMES A. MCINTOSH
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ADDENDUM 2

IRVING H. BIELE, - 2- — No. 0317
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
3 33 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
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JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — No. 2194
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,
Plaintiffs

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT

:

;

vs.

FILED

:

MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,
Defendants

:J
:!

SS w > 4

*- "

» ' ' £.

Cierk i; ^jraxit wur.ty .

:
,

ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
representative of the Estate of
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,
Third-party Plaintiffs

:
:
::
:
:

y«!-'-./

- — »

Civil No. 8339

:
J:

VS.

(Judge John A. Rokich)

SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a :
Utah corporation,
:
Third-party Defendant

J

:

CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,

:
:
:
:

Plaintiffs

j

vs.

:

SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate :
and politic of the State of
:
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
:
official capacity as Summit
::
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
:
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah
:
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
::
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a
s
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
:
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
;
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1,
j
2, 3, 4, and 5,
:
Defendants

Civil No. 10066
(Judge John A. Rokich)

:

Based upon the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, entered contemporaneously herein, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

In regard to Civil No. 8339 and Count II of Plaintiffs1

Complaint in Civil No. 10066, title to the property which is the
subject of the above-entitled matters is quieted in Defendant
Eugene E. Doms, subject to the right of Plaintiffs, Ellen Anderson,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan
Scott, to foreclose their Trust Deed against said property as
hereinafter set forth in this Judgment.

Said property is more

particularly described as follows:
PARCEL NO. 1:

All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58,
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat
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thereof, as filed and of record in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2:

All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof,
as filed and of record in the office of the
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom
any portion located within the railroad rights
of way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No. 817 6 in Book C at Page
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326,
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373,
records of Summit County, Utah.

PARCEL NO. 3:

All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed
and of record in the office of the Summit
County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of
way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No. 817 6 in Book C at Page
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326,
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373,
records of Summit County, Utah.

Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five
feet of the following described Lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Records.
2.

Plaintiffs1 Complaint for foreclosure in Civil No. 8339

is premature, in as much as Defendant Doms1

damages were not

determined and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages.
3.
his

Defendant Doms is awarded Judgment in Civil No. 8339 on

Second

Amended

Counterclaim

for

damages

for

breach

of

warranties and covenants against encumbrances contained in the
Warranty Deed conveying the Rossie Hills property, pursuant to
U.C.A. Section 57-1-12,
4.

Defendant Doms is awarded damages for said breach of the

warranties and covenants against encumbrances in the amount of
Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00).
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5.

The original principal balance due from Defendant Doms

to Plaintiffs Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan Scott, on the Trust Deed Note and
Trust Deed held by said Plaintiffs was One Hundred Ninety-Four
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250,00), as of the date
of the execution of said Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed.
6.

Said amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two

Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) due under said Trust Deed Note
and Trust Deed shall be offset by the Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars
($83,000.00) which the Court has awarded Defendant Doms as damages
for breach of the warranties and covenants against encumbrances.
7.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due

from Defendant Doms to said Plaintiffs under the Trust Deed Note
and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery
of the Warranty Deed.
8.

Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in

the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100
Dollars ($72,520.25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an
additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and
81/100

Dollars

($30,986.81), which

represents

the

difference

between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) and the interest which was
actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period.
9.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due

under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-
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Three and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263.19), as of January 25, 1985, the
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust
Deed Note.
10.

Without

the

necessity

of

refiling

this

action

to

foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require said Plaintiffs
to give Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall
have the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the
Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney
fees, as determined by the Court, within 90 days form receipt of
the Notice of Default.

The giving of the Notice of Default shall

not take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can
be served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney.

Service on the

Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the
Defendant's last known address.
11.

Said Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the unpaid

balance of Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three and 19/100
Dollars ($80,2 63.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid
principal balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note.
The

interest rate to be used

in determining the amount due

Plaintiffs as interest on said unpaid principal balance shall be
fourteen percent (14%) per annum.
12.

If Defendant Doms fails to pay the balance due and owing

after notice, said Plaintiffs shall have Judgment of foreclosure
upon filing an affidavit that Defendant Doms has failed to pay.
The Plaintiffs will have the sole option at their discretion to a
Judgment

of

foreclosure

based

either

on

the

administrative

foreclosure proceedings set forth in Sections 57-1-23 et. seg.,
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judicial foreclosure
proceedings provided in Sections 78-37-1 et. seg.
13.

Defendant

Doms

is

not

entitled

to

.
the

remedy

of

rescission of the transaction conveying the aforementioned property
because the remedy of rescission is barred by the doctrine of
laches.
14.

Defendant

Doms1

Second

Amended

Counterclaim,

as it

relates to the remedy of damages, is dismissed as against Plaintiff
Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C.
Anderson, as said claim is barred by the three-month filing period
limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section 75-3803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
15.

Defendant Doms1 causes of action relating to fraud and

misrepresentation

in Civil No. 83 39

are dismissed, the Court

finding no cause therefore.
16.
No.

In regard to Count I of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil

10066, and pursuant to Stipulation of the parties and a

previous Order of the Court, the May 27, 1987, tax sale of the
Rossie Hills property by Summit County is declared to be null and
void.
17.
No.

In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil

10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the

Court on Motion of Defendant Summit County.
18.

In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third Party-Complaint against

Third-Party Defendant Summit County title Company in Civil No.
8339, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by
the Court on Motion of said parties.
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19.
fees

The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $27,185.00 in attorney

for services rendered

by plaintiffs1

counsel, James A.

Mcintosh, Esq.
20.

The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $13,790.00 in attorney

fees for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, Irving H. Biele,
Esq.
21.

The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $358.20 for costs which

they have incurred in these proceedings.
22.

The plaintiffs are hereby awarded interest at the rate

of fourteen percent (14%) per annum on all principal amounts which
this court has determined were due and owing by the defendant Doms
pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982,
both before and after default in payment by the said defendant.
23.

The defendant Doms is not entitled to any attorney fees

for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 83 3 9 or
Civil No. 10066.
24.

The defendant Eugene E. Doms is not entitled to any

prejudgment interest on the $83,000.00 damages.
25.

The defendant Doms is hereby awarded $101.50 for costs

for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim.
DATED this /(-

day of June 1992.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH -*:
-District Court Judge

\ * . \ COUNTY/*/

SJSSTSSKJ
LNNPAGE

16

imfi90

6*

"

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of May, 1992, a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT
was hand delivered to the following:
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

JAMES A. MCINTOSH
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RFO*
1}EE_

Recorded at Request of
at

lUMMJICX). TITLE
v „ »

$ J 7* 00

M. Fee Paid JL

r* rage ,C/..Z.

!/

c\ •fCORDEt

INDEXED

by

Pa*e
Ref.:
,
,
2850 Ocean Park Boulevard, Suic^ 300
/ M . McCoy
Aririrps* Santa tenica, California 90405
(SPECIAL)
Dep. Book

Mail tax notice f n

Grantee

WARRANTY DEED
DeWAYNE C. ANDERSON aka D.C. ANDERSON aka DEWEY D.C. ANDERSON and EIIEN R.
ANDERSON, his wife, and DAN SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT , his wife,
grantors
Park City, Utah
, County of
Sunmit
, State of Utah, hereby
of
C O N V E Y and W A R R A N T to
EUGENE E. DQMS and MICHAEL R. McCOY, as tenants in canton

grantee
for the sum of
— DOLLARS,

0f

Santa Monica, California
TEN AND NO/100
(and other good and valuable considerations)
the following described tract of land in
Sunmit
State of Utah:

Count,),
INDEXED:
C M -N10?v: . ^ > ~ —
(

:

.

SEE ADDENDUM ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART HEREOF:

r •

.

. 7 J:-=

^T TO THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR THE YEAR 1982 AND THEREAFTER, AND
ANY SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS NOW DUE OR TO BECOME DUE.
EXCEPTING ALL OIL, GAS AND/OR OTHER MINERALS WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY RESERVED.

WITNESS, the hand

of said grantor

March
Signed in the Presence of

, this
, A. D. 19 82

10th

D ^ SCOTT

day of

y

«.

pCOTT (Jeanne)
y /, „ /
Qe^lAYNE C . ANDERSON a k a D . C . ANDERSON a k a
DEWEY
D . C . ANDhK&ui
T
/ ( ( ( u / . \ ( . ill H(«
*™y n (' * ? J l
EUiEN P . ANDERSON

STATE OF UTAH,
County of SunmL
March
On the
fium^^/fa*
, A. D. 19 82
_
Mel JWOTWWC C. ANDERSON , aka D.C. ANDERSON , aka
personally apjb£are<
DEWEY D.OJ ANl iCN'ana EtjJEN W. ANDERSON, h i s w i f e ,
the^Sfn^S^tPf^the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that t n e v executed the
same.
\\
a L s ,, n »
j
u

—fA&icJs-y
Notary Public.
My commission expires.

9-28-82
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/
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,
and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to the
amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.
' PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, according
to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described
in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book
C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and
Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County,
Utah.
' PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to the
Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office of
the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion
located within the County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described
in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book
C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and
Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County,
Utah.
*' Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water lines
over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five feet of the following
described Lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey according
to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in the office of the Summit
County Records.
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TRUST DEED
With Assignment of Rents
THIS TRUST DEED, made this . .!?.!•!>.
between

day of

!****.

, 19...??.

?^"?$L.^...!r!?^
... as TRUSTOR,

whose address is

2850 0cean

Park

B l v d . , S u i t e 300, Santa Monica, C a l i f . , 90405

(Stratt and number)

(City)

3£*5?..S9!^

(SUU)

, as TRUSTEE,' and

D.C.:..W0EPSCN a s to an unuivklaLi c m - h a l f i n t a r a a t and QrStf 9CCOT aa t o an
«*y^...^..M««t

§as

BENEFICIARY,

WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in
County, State of Utah:

is
1**
{

VBStZL NO. 1:

$™*t

. . . . . .

A l l o f Lota 1 7 , 1 3 , 1 9 , 2 0 , 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 2 6 , 2 7 , 2 3 , 2 9 , 3 0 , 3 1
anU 3 2 , ULock 5 2 , lla£k City Survey, according to tha

p U t thereof, aa filad and of record in tha offioe of the
itorrlt Country i;acor»jttr.
PFulCX IK>. 2: ;U cf icze 3.7 ar^. 13, .'lock 3P, ?ar* City '\ir»' ', »r-rn!iftg
t.. ch* -n> • '••' »3iU. ••••*r.-oi,f :n r l 1-V Vi } <*' - *jnrr I- ^he
- • f ~ *•" <*-<: "u:—-4t: ''o..~>r *l • w V * - >\vr*».ti^; t-'^r^ftrja
any portion looatad vdthin tha railroad rights of way as
caocribo'l in tlicnc certain docunants rooordad as Sttry NO.
317f» in Deck C at Pug* 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book n at
Page 326, and Entry Mo. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, reoorda
of 8nnnit County, Utah.
PJURCEL NO, 3i

All of l o t IB, Block 59, Park City Surety, according t o tha
taandad Plat tharaof, aa f i l e d and of raoocd in tha offloa of
tho Surodt County Raoortar, adapting tharefran any portion
located vdthin tha railroad riguta of way aa IIBM.MJI Men in
those certain docunanta DM ran lad aa Btatry No. 8176 i n Book C
a t Page 401, fctry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry
No. 13610 i n Book H at Page 373, reoorda of Sunslt county, Utah.

Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof,
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro194,250.00
, .
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $
, made by
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as herein provided.

TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED TRUSTOR AGREES
1 To keep said properly in Cood condition and repair not to remove or demolish an\ building thereon, to
complete or restore promptly and in «oo<| and workmanlike manner anv buildup win, I, mav he constructed
damaged or destroyed thereon, to complv with all law> »•••vcnani.*. ami n ^ t r u l i o n , .ill,-, tin- N.II.1 properlx. not
to commitor permit waMr tin reof. not to commit, suffer ur permit a m act upon said properly m violation ..( law. tr
do all other arts which from the character or use of said property ma\ he reasonably iuvcs»arv. the specific
enumerations herein not excluding the general. and. if tin- loan M I tired hereby or anv pari I hereof is being oh
lamed for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on sari property Trustor luriher agrees
(a) To commence construction promptly and Us pursue same with re.wmaMe diligence \»> completion
in accordance with plans and |«cifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b)

To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times durum conslmclion

Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed l»v Knicficiarv. selling forth fads SIIMMIIIK a default
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph. »* authorized to accept as true and conclusive all latts and state
ments therein, and to act thereon hereunder.
2. To provide and maintain insurance, of such Ivpe or types and amounts as limeiici.irv may require on
the improvemenl.s now existing or hereafter erect*"*! or placed on said propcriv Sm h iiiMir.iiio- -ball be tarried
in companies approved bv Iteneiici.trv with loss payable clau.es o> l.ivor o| .oid MI l.-rm .«». epi.ibl, i,. Iteoelu tarv
In event of loss. Trustor shall give iniuiedi.iie notice lo Item-In i.irv who ioi\ make pro..I ot |..ss .mil e.u b insurance
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed lo make p.ivmciil lor <au h Ins-, dire* ilv i.. It. uelici.iry
instead of lo Trustor and liciichciarv i«untly. and Ibe insurant c pro* i n U . or anv part thereol. mav be applied
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction ot the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair ot
the property damaged
3. To deliver to, pay for and maintain with llenefnuirv until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full,
such evidence of title as lieueficiary mav require, including abstract* ot title or polities ••! tub- insurance and
any extensions or renewals thereof «,r supplements thereto
4. T o appear in and defend any action or proceeding pur|>orting to aflect Ibe security hereof, the title to
said property, or the rights or |x»wers of Beneficiary or Trustee, and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to
also appear in or defend anv such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee
^fijp To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including
all iissessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or
used in connection with said property; to pay, when due. all encumbrances, charges. an-J liens with interest,
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs.
fees, and expenses of this Trust.
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may
deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase, contest, or compromise any
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees.
7. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee,
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repay*
inent thereof shall be secured hereby.
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT:
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option
to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property,
•re hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees,
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require.
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby.
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any easement or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, ull or any part of said property. The grantee in
any reconveyance may bo described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties,
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable If Trustor shall default as aforesaid.
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same.
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be. or be construed to
be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option.
11.

Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary

may

at any

time without

notice, either

in

by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of
gerson,
eneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, leas
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine.
12.
profits
damage
default

The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents, issues, and
or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking 6r
of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any
or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice

Iff The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate aa
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other
or subsequent default.
14. Time is of the essence hereof Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness ••cured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due
and payable at the option of Beneficiary In the event of such default. Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or
parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documenU evidencing
expenditures secured hereby.

15. After the lapse of such tL
as may then be required by law following
recordation of said notice of
default, and notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required *, law, Trustee, without demand
on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of
sale. The person conducting the sale may. for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to
time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale, provided, if the sale is postponed
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the
Deed of any matters or facta shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed;
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persona
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place.
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be
fixed by the court.
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to ail the powers, duties, authority
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless
brought by Trustee.
20.

This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah

21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth.
Signature of Trustor

VXTZT1F

. rOMB

MICHAEL R. VtOJl
(If Trustor an Individual)
STATE OF UTAH,
COUNTY O F & r a i t •*•
On the

JWtft

day of

'larch

, A.D. 19...??., personally

appeared before me
HMOEM? .... LJCHB an£ HICtihEL R. rioOW
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that ^ he..Y. executed the

Notary Public residing at:
g ^ j ^ a t y # fJtah

My C o m ^ i o n Expires:

(If Trustor a Corporation)
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
On the

day of

appeared before me

, A.D. 19

, personally

, who being by me duly sworn,

says that he is the
of
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authonly of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution
of its board of directors) and said
to me that said corporation executed the same.

acknowledged

Notary Public residing at:
My Commission Expires:

REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full)
TO:

TRUSTEE.

The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness securea
by the within Trust Deed. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust
Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and directed, on payment
to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above
mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you
herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvev, without warranty, to the parties
designated by the terms of said Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder.
Dated

, 19 ... .

Mail reconveyance to
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ADDENDUM 6

TRUST DEED
OO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE:

NOTE

When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered

'to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

I

194,250.00

p

. ^ . . . ? i t y ? .Utah

March 10,

1S>

82

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of
D.C. ANDERSON as to an undivided one-half interest and DAN SCOTT as to an
undivided 1/2 interest

together with interest from date at the rate of *P^.^'™?.
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:

per cent (™.:9...%)

per annum on

TWD THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY SIX AND 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25) towards
interest only on the 10th day of April, 1982, and a like amount to interest
on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter to and including January
10, 1985.
The entire unpaid principal, together with interest is due on January 25, 1985.
/
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any
suchl installment not paid when due shall
si bear interest thereafter at the rate of..?r.~A~?:.
per
cent (.18.J1%) per annum until paid.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

BLANK

NO.

813

© O E M »»TG. C O . — 321s so. aeoo EAST — S A L T L A K E C I T Y

ADDENDUM 7

VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY
ESCROW DEPARTMENT
P.O. BOX 450 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110
(801)481-5396

April 6, 1990

Nygard, Coke & Vincent
Irving H. Biele
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103-1215
Re:

Contract # 001-00624

Dear Mr. Biele:
Enclosed is a History of the payments received on the
above contract in 1982, 1983, and 1984, and a History showing
no payments were received in 1985.
I have verified at the bottom of each of the Histories
that they are a true and correct statement of the payments we
received.
If you need anything further, please contact me.
Very truly yours,

)yceK,raig
Assistant Vice President
jc
Enclosures

u r i i o m rrrrrMTQAi n c n n e i r I M C I I D A M P C rnDDADATinKi
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|RESS
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ER OR PAYEE.

ise-yAMOERSON.—AN0..45AJJ-SCaT-T

RESS

.*g^...S.T....MAE.YS...DE...SL...C....U.TAE

:RIPTION: NOTE....JL. REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
:UMENT DATED...,

Ps .B&j 3fc.?4, AL -»*. o ~
-

.8M.Q.6.

3.5^'
_

OTHER
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i ± ? . _
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<9.L .. O R I S . AMT. $.. . ^ . ' B ^ B A L

, l ^ ^ ^ O . 0 0 ^ ^ 18 . 0 %

Raid f o

3-10-

„ 6

In monthly pvmts commencing 4-10-82 in*the amount of $2,266.25 as interst or
ipal. Interest,. etc., payable.?£SJrt ^ ^ ^ ^
ction

.

35
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Dote Received by VALLEY BANK A l / o TRUST COMPANY
^M^SJ2
"$145V82"SilveF*King Bank # 7 3 - 0 2 / - d ^ ^ / P r o s P e c t o r D e v c 9 - |

Fee

a n d

_-jtes£**\9.

$1,060.22 V3ST

DIT PROCEEDS TO#lQ:

Sheridan Wyom.

82801 Dan S c o t t

ER INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:
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(We) hereby acknowledge receipt of all documents described above and of all %umt collected thereon by the VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, and
f release said bank from all further liability for said collection.

THE VALLEY BANKS
ESCROW INTEREST INCOME STATEMENT
ESCROW « 0524 / ORDER S 10-Q0S24
THE VALLEY BANKS
P.O. BOX 450
TRUST DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH

84:

ELLEN ANDERSON
DAN SCOTT
2134 ST MARYS DRIVE
SLC UTAH 341 OB

FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF EACH INSTALLMENT RECEIVED ON YOUR ESCROW
FOR THE YEAR tee&,
THIS REPORT WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH DETAILS OF
INTEREST INCOME FOR THE YEAR.
lASE KEEP THIS FOR YOUR RECORDS.
NOTE:

IF YOU HAVE SOLD/PURCHASED THIS ESCROW DURING THE PAST YEAR, PLEASE
INCLUDE ONLY THOSE PAYMENTS WHICH YOU ACTUALLY RECEIVED OR PAID.

CURRENT YEAR PAYMENTS:
-•1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

-OUE12/10
01/10
02/10
03/10
04/10
05/10
06/10
07/10
08/10
09/10
10/10

-PAH— -AFIDUNT
-INTEREST— -RESERVES— ••PENALTIES-- -PRINCIPAL- -NEW PRINC.- -NEW UNPAID0.00
0.00
03/08
2266,25
2266.25
COO
194250.00
0.00
0.00
2266.25
COO
2266.25
0,00
04/27
coo 1**250.00
0.00
0.00
04/27
2266.25
2266.25
194250.00
0.00
coo
0.00
0.00
0,00
O.CO
2266.25
07/08
2266.25
194250.00
0.00
0.00
07/08
2266.25
2264.25
coo
ceo 194250.00
0,00
0,00
0.00
0.00
08/16
194250.00
2266.25
0,00
194250.00
0.00
06/16
2266.25
2266.25
0.00
coo
0.00
194250,00
2266.25
0.00
10/24
2266.25
o.oo
coo
0.00
194250,00
0.00
0.00
0.00
10/24
2266.25
2266.25
0.00
0,00
2266.25
2266.25
12/15
coo 1-4250,00
coo
0.00
0,00
0.00
2266.25
2266.25
12/15
o.o-:: 194250.00

TOTALS:

24928.75

24928.75

0.00

0.00

COO

TOTAL INTEREST INCOME FOR THE YEAR: 245

I certify that the above l i s t i
of payments is a true and corr
statement.
^

THE VALLEY BAhKS
ESCROW

HISTORY

PRINT

ESCROW » 06.24 / ORDER « 10-00624 A3 OF 12/31784% '
2,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

SELLER INFORRATIOH:
LAST HATE*..,ANDERSON
FIRST NAPE...ELLEN
ADDRESS-1....DAN SCOTT
ADDRESS-2....2134 ST KARYS DRIVE
CITY ST ZIP..SLC UTAH 34108

3. BUYER INFORMATION;
1 . LAST NAHE....DGRS

2.
3.
4.
5.

FIRST NAME...EUGENE E
ADDRESS-1....MICHAEL R MCCOY
ABDRESS-2....PG BOX 3-614
CITY 3T E P . .MISSION VIEJQ CA 92690

fEE INFORMATION:
.AST NAME

PERSON

-FIRST NADEELLEN

ADDRESS—
DAN SCOTT
2134 3T MARTS DRIVE
SLC UTAH MlOa

IVER KING BANK
ffiCK » ' S : 1:26786 2:32424 3:32428 4 J 3 2 4 3 2 5:37174 6:37178
ftT CHECKING ACCT
ECK * ' S : 1:26787 2:32425 3:32429 4:32433 5:37175 6:37179
INK OF COWERCE
4 SOUTH RAIN
SHERIDAN UY 62801
iECK u ' S : 1:26738 2:32426 3:32430 4:32434 5:37176 6:37180
iCROWFSES
iECX tt'S: 1:26789 2:32427 3:32431 4:32435 5:37177 6:37131

ACCOUNT NUHBER-

PRQ3PECT0R3»73022233
144.31
0.00
7:3910? 8:40999 9:43649 10:49426 11:49430
27 117545 ANDERSON
1055.22
0.00
7:39110 8:41000 9:43650 10:49427 11:49421
*0-0608-7
1055.22
0.00

4.
5.
6.
7.

0,00

COO

100. t'V

3.
9.
10.
•1.

INITIAL ART... 194250.30
1A .0000
INTEREST RATE.
UNPD INT 8EP..Y
y>
P+I AMOUNT....
££6o.O

50.00

7:39111 6:41001 9:43-651 10:49428 11:49432
300018131
11.00
0.00
7:39112 8:41002 9:43652 10:49429 11:49433
TOTAL;

iTRACT INFORMATION:
IDNTRACT D A T E . . . 0 3 / 1 0 / 8 2
[NT BEGIN DATE..03/10/82
W BEGIN DATE..04/10/82

•PWT A?!OUNT- -PENALTY-— •?. EXCESS—
ADVISORY)
0.00
0.00

2266.25

PENALTY C0SE..0
BEGIN YR BAL.. 194250.00
BEGIN YR UNPD*
0.00
ESCROW CODE...0

1 2 . NEXT DUE DATE..11/10/33
1 3 . NEXT LATE DATE.OO/00/00
14. I I " PAID THRU,. 10/10/35

(RENT YEAF: PAYMENTS:
RJEi -i?AID» -AMOUNT
-INTEREST— •-RESERVES— •-PEMALTIES- -PRINCIPLE- -NEU PRINC.- -NEW UNF'AID0.00
0.00
194250,00
0.00
0.00
,/10 01/26
2266.25
2266.25
194250.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2266.25
22.66-.25
0.00
!/10 04/16
0.00
0.00
194250.00
0.00
./10 04/16
226-6.25
0.00
194250.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1/10 04/16
2266.25
2266.25
0.00
0.00
194250.00
0.00
J/10 06/21
0.00
226-6.25
22.6-6.25
0.00
0.00
194250.00
0.00
1/10 06/21
2266.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
;/10 07/16
0.00
2266.25
2266.25
194250.00
0,00
0.00
194250.00
0.00
0.00
2266.25
2266.25
• 1 0 08/15
0,00
0.00
0.00
194250.00
0.00
2266.25
710 10/01
2266.25
194250.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
i/10 12/31
2266.25
226.6.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
194250.00
0.00
0.00
2266.25
2266.25
710 12/31
TOTALS:

24928.75

ITROL INFORMATION:
1. LOCKED
,N
2. EXPLANATION..
SETUP DATE...12/03/82
LAST CHANGE..05/30/85
LAST COUPON..02/10/85
PRINTED ON...02/10/84

24928.75

0.00

0.00

3 , EXF'IRE DATE..01/10/85
4 . EXPIRE CODE..00
a • rLAGS*»»»+•»*

£• NOTZS-1
7» NQ7ES-2**»»*4

0.00

I certify that the above listing of
payments is a true and correct statemen
Vice President

ESCROW « 0ec4 / ORDER « 10-00*24 AS OF i2/ai/85*»
2. SELLER INFORMATION£
1. LAST NATE....ANDERSON
2. FIRST HARE.*.ELLEN
3. A0DRESB-1....MN SCOTT
4. ADDRES3-2....2134 ST PIA3YS DRIVE
5. CITY ST IIF..SLC UTAH B410B

2- BUYER INFORPKTIGN:
1, LAST MAPIE....D0I1S
w'» HuL»hiS33~l»»»niAUnHcL "ft t.UuUl
r^i?y

:

'AYEE INFQRItATIQH:
-LAST HARE
ANDERSON

FIRST NAHEELL54

-PUT AFflUNT<ADVISORY)

DAN SCOTT
2134 ST RARYS DRIVE

tf*d4J

err irra'J 4 £ « A I S

SILVER KIHC BANK
VB&T CHECKING ACCT
BANK OF CQHMERCE

144*£1
•» . ^ r c «•*»•»

4 SOUTH BAIN
SHERIDAN WY S28C1

ESCROW FEES

*0-0<S0S-7
M.:;0

300012131

^3*»^

CONTRACT DATE...03/10/52
INT BEGIN DATE..03/10/82
PUT BEGIN DATS..04/10/52

4. INITIAL ART... 194250.00
5. INTEREST RATE,
16,0000
6. UNPD INT 3Er.,T
7. P+I AiDUNT...,
2913,75

i*

tr,r:

c/%

-•\

,vju
W> * V

V

3> PENALTY CDDS.,0
9. BEGIN YR BAL..
10. SESIN YR UNPD,
1 1 . ESCROW C0DB...0

inon4

2URREH7 YEAR PAYnSHTS:

0CKEI)...,...H
2. EXPLANATION.,
SETUP DATE...12/03/32
LAST CHANGE..06/21/84
LAST COUPON..03/10/86
PRINTED ON...02/22/25

0.00
0.00
5.00

.•' * ITL * £w"** * • • • • •

I certify that there were no payments received
in 19£

g, Assistant//ice President

••»£•

--•*

'*\i1' ^Ar"'« **UC'P

***••"* 'Q*

ADDENDUM 8

j

~ZHL^Z

Eniry No
REO(JcST OF
FEE

WTJEN RECOFDED, J1AIL T O :

RECORDED

^ L /

1

Li)rfl/4

?W//f

W&T&N5TA7&7mf_

$£?

MICHAEL R MC COY and EUGENE E. DOMS

hereby CONVEY

—. at

^*y

£

, grantors
,State of Utah,

and WARRANT

to

DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC
. grantee

of

Salt Lake

for the sum of

, County of Salt Lake

fState

TEN

of Utah,

DOLLARS,

the following described tract of land in Summit County, State of Utah,
to-vit:
PARCEL NO, 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey,
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in
the office of the-Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting
therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of way
as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No,
817C in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page
326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit
County, Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in
the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described in
those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at
Page 401, Entry No, 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No.
13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water
lines over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the
following described lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder.
WITNESS the hand

of said grantor

Signal ill th<fltfr>s^ac* of

, this^pday of 0^^\
/^

JOCK
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
County of *5 -L •
)
.
On the 1o
dayv of ^ ^ } " ~ i
personally appeared before* me £*-w>~^£-"

,19$ 1

/^

X

opn

ClO^CJO

<** Vvvw

..^*0L9.A?

the signer^ pf.. the ..above, instrument,/*bo duly acknowledged tg
that vhd»A executed the same. .
/ J S—-N. A > *< * ' "*

My commission expires • U^T"<^gtf

Notary—Ptrt5Tj)c.
•'. /• \ .
Residing in
«5^<~-£' ,> L>H—

tj

%

7>

DEED

Salt Lake

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT^'

ALAN SP8JGG3. SUMMIT CO. R£COA0

Space Above for Recorder's Use

W A R R A N T Y

of

2
|

mert V v

STATE OF UTAH

)

County cf Summit

)

I. AJcn Spriga3. County Recorder in and for Summit County. State of Utah,
do heieby certify thai the attachod aoffloregoing « a full, truo and ccxrect copy
of ilial certain ^ 4 ^ ^ J £ T
/^>U^A

which anpoars of record in my office In Book ^

being Entry Uz.^?-//e

7 <^

. Page

J>S^<3-

£\2-

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, t have hcrounto cat my hand and offered my
officii S3al. this / ^ - ^ A f a y of CCc^^yc-*.*?-/?
f ?

,<£, M«- ^- fry* - &*fZZjSuniin.i County Recorder

(]

ADDENDUM 9

March 15, 1985

Mr. Eugene E. Doms
Domcoy Enterprises Inc.
23276 South Pointe Dr.
Suite 204
Laguna Hills, CA 92653
Dear Gene,
Pursuant to our discussion and verbal agreement, I hereby irrevocably tender to
you all voting rights for all my shares of stock in Domcoy Enterprises Inc, a Utah
corporation. I willingly take this measure to ratify the indemnification
agreement I exercised in your favor in the lawsuit commonly known as Park City
Investors I v. Cen Corp., et al (or Park Avenue Central).
This revocation of my voting rights is to allow you to freely make those business
decisions necessary to insure the continuity and viability of Domcoy as a
business entity in light of my current legal and business situation.
This agreement will continue until you and I mutually agree to the return of my
stock voting rights.
Very Truly Yours,

cc: Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq.

March 15, 1985

Mr. Eugene E. Doms
23276 South Pointe Dr.
Suite 204
Laguna Hills, CA 92653
Dear Gene,
In order to show my support of the business decisions of my husband, Michael
R. McCoy, and per his request, I irrevocably tender my stock voting rights to
you under the same terms as outlined in Michael's letter of March 15, 1985 in
regards to this matter.

Very Truly Yours,

Marguerite McCoy
cc: Gerald H. Klnghorn
attch.
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M I C H A E L R. McCOY
TAX ANO REAL ESTATE ATTORNEY
8 8 0 2 9 OOnOTHV OHWE • SUTE 102 • AGOUM H U S . CA 91301

Eugene E. Doms
PO Box 3614
Mission V i e j o , CA 92690
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ADDENDUM 10

Edward S. Sweeney (3168) and
J. Peter Mulhern (3667), of
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1666
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
representative of the estate of
D. C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT,
Plaintiffs,

COMPLAINT

Civil No.

? 3 3 C{

v.

"«**M

FILED-

EUGENE E. DOMS and MICHAEL R.
McCOY,
Defendants.

Clark at Summit Counil
Offouty Ctar* —

=-T

P l a i n t i f f s complain of Defendants and f o r cause of action a l l e g e :
1.
State of Utah.

P l a i n t i f f , E l l e n Anderson, is a resident of Salt Lake County,
Ellen Anderson became Personal Representative of the estate

of D.C. Anderson by court order dated November 30, 1982.
2.

P l a i n t i f f , Dan S c o t t , is a resident of Sheridan County,

State of Wyoming.
3.

Defendants are both residents of Orange County, State of

California.
4.

On or about March 10, 1982, defendants executed a Note

pursuant t o which they promised t o pay "D.C. Anderson as t o an undivided
one-half i n t e r e s t , and Dan Scott as t o an undivided one-half
$194,250.00.

interest"

A t r u e and correct copy of that Note is attached hereto as

OOOOOi

Exhibit "A".

The outstanding principal balance on that Note is

$194,250.00 which principal balance is currently due and owing.

Defendants

have f a i l e d and refused to pay p l a i n t i f f s that amount.
5.

In addition to the principal due and owing under the Note

attached hereto as Exhibit "A", interest payments of $2,266.25 per month
for the months of November, 1984, December, 1984 and January, 1985 are now
past due.

Defendants have f a i l e d and refused to make those interest

payments to p l a i n t i f f s .

Defendants are therefore indebted to p l a i n t i f f s in

the amount of $6,798.75 for past due interest payments.

Defendants total

indebtedness to p l a i n t i f f s for the principal amount due under the Note
together with past due interest payments is therefore $201,048.75.
6.

The Note attached hereto as Exhibit "A" provides that a l l

past due payments under that Note shall bear interest at the rate of
eighteen percent (18%) per annum.
7.

The Note attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is secured by a Trust

Deed dated March 10, 1982.

A true and correct copy of that Trust Deed is

attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

The Trust Deed attached hereto as Exhibit

"B" covers the property in Summit County, State of Utah, which is f u l l y
described as follows:
PARCEL NO. 1:
All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to
the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2:
All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, according
to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom
any portion located within the railroad rights of way as
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No.

"2" 000002

8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records
of Summit County, Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3:
All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to the
Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in the'office
of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of way as
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No.
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records
of Summit County, Utah.
TOGETHER WITH AN EASEMENT FOR UTILITIES, INCLUDING SEWER AND
WATER LINES OVER THE SOUTHERLY FIVE FEET AND NORTHERLY FIVE
FEET OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LOTS.
All of Lot 14, and the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park
City Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed
and of record in the office of the Summit County Records.

8.

Plaintiffs have elected to foreclose the Trust Deed Note and

Trust Deed attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B" as a note and mortgage
pursuant to paragraph 16 of the Trust Deed and the Utah Code.
9.

Other than the above captioned matter, plaintiffs have

commenced no action to collect the sums owing from defendants.
10.

The Trust Deed and Note attached hereto provide that if the

Note is collected by an attorney defendants will pay all costs of
collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
11.

Plaintiffs have had to retain an attorney and incur

attorneys fees to collect the sums due from defendants.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:
1.

For a judgment against defendants, jointly and severally, in

the sum of $201,048.75, together with interest thereon at 18% per annum
from January 25, 1985 until paid.

"3" 00000.*

2.

For costs i n c l u d i n g reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s .

3.

For a determination that p l a i n t i f f s ' i n t e r e s t i n the subject

property is superior t o the claims of a l l defendants.
4.

For d e c l a r a t i o n that the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed

attached hereto as E x h i b i t s "A" and "B" are t o be t r e a t e d as a note and
mortgage and f o r an order a u t h o r i z i n g and d i r e c t i n g t h a t they be
immediately foreclosed and that the subject p r o p e r t y , or so much thereof as
may be necessary, be sold as provided by law t o s a t i s f y the amounts prayed
f o r , i n c l u d i n g costs and a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s .
5.

For a judgment f o r any deficiency which may remain owing by

defendants t o p l a i n t i f f s a f t e r the property is sold and the proceeds duly
applied t o the costs of s a l e , a t t o r n e y ' s fees, costs of t h i s a c t i o n , and
the p r i n c i p a l and i n t e r e s t remaining unpaid on the Note attached hereto as
Exhibit

"A".
6.

For an order t h a t a l l persons claiming an i n t e r e s t i n the

subject property have the r i g h t , upon producing s a t i s f a c t o r y proof of
i n t e r e s t , t o redeem the property w i t h i n the time provided by law f o r such
redemption, and that a f t e r the e x p i r a t i o n of the period of redemption as
provided by law, defendants and a l l persons claiming by, through, or under
them are forever barred and foreclosed of a l l r i g h t , t i t l e , and i n t e r e s t

in

and t o the subject p r o p e r t y .
7.

For such f u r t h e r r e l i e f as the Court deems j u s t .

DATED t h i s £k

day of C ^ ^ z ^

1985.

BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH

T7PETER MULHEftN

-4-
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P l a i n t i f f s 1 Address:
Ellen Anderson
2134 St. Mary's Drive
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84108
Dan Scott

Box 297
Dayton, Wyoming

82836
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Exhibit "A"

TRUST DEED NOTE
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE:

When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered

to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

$

i?i*250.00^

P ^ Ci^( JJt^
MarchJ.0,

l%

82

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of
D.C. ANDERSCN as to an undivided one-half interest and DAN SCOTT as to an
undivided 1/2 interest
.....9^..H^!™.J3^
together with interest from date at the rate of .??5S15?i
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:

(|. 194,250.00 ^
per cent (*7.!.P..%) per annum on

TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY SIX AND 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25) towards
interest only on the 10th day of April, 1982, and a lite arount to interest
on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter to and including January
10, 1985.
The entire unpaid principal, together with interest is due on January 25, 1985.
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate aiJES£32£!L
per
cent (.18—0.%) per annum until paid.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at ia
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and sevtnlly, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

• L A N K NO.

8 1 3 O O*M rro. co. — u t i »o i«oo BAST — SALT UAK« CITY
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" c / o "Dave"* Bennett * -"Tiiist "Sep...
3rdjSouthL. West Tenple
SIC, Utah

84111
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TRUST DEED

Exhibit "B"

With Assignment of Rents
THIS TRUST DEED, made this ...iPth
between

day of

March.

% 1 9 _82

S*2ro..E^pQ^..c^
, as TRUSTOR,

whose address is

2850 Ot»ari P ^ k
( S t n * t and number)

_

(City)

.SUM^...CQCkTC

(State)

t as

TRUSTEE,' and

B*G*..flNBEESKM.m
un4iviaed..i/2..i^terest.

, as BENEFICIARY,

WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in
County, State of Utah:

Sunmit

PARCEL NO. 1: A l l of Lots 1 7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , 2 0 , 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 2 6 , 2 7 , 2 8 , 2 9 , 3 0 , 3 1
and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according t o the amended
p l a t thereof, a s f i l e d and o f record i n the o f f i c e o f the
SurmtLt County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2 : A l l of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, according
t o the amended p l a t thereof, a s f i l e d and of record i n the
o f f i c e o f the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom
any portion located within the railroad r i g h t s o f way a s
described i n those c e r t a i n documents recorded a s Entry No.
8176 i n Book C a t Page 401, Entry No. 13316 i n Book H a t
Page 326, and a i t r y No. 13610 i n Book H a t Page 373, records
of Summit County, Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3 : A l l o f Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according t o t h e
Amended Plat thereof, a s f i l e d and o f record i n the o f f i c e o f
the Sunmit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion
located within the railroad r i g h t s o f way a s described i n
those certain documents recorded a s Entry No. 8176 i n Book C
a t Page 401, Bitry No. 13316 i n Book H a t Page 326, and Entry
No. 13610 i n Book H a t Page 373, records o f Summit County, Utah.
TOGETHER KETH AN EASEMENT FOR UTILITIES, INCLUDING SEWER AND WATER LINES OVER
THE SOUTHERLY FIVE IEET AND NCKIHERLSf FIVE FEET OFTOEFOLLOWING DESCRIBED LOTS.
A l l o f Lot 1 4 , the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey according
t o the amended p l a t thereof a s f i l e d and of record i n the o f f i c e of the Sunmit
County Records.
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof,
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ 19.4,250.00
, made by
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of
each agreement of* Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as herein provided.
•NOTE: Trustee must be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savings
and loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah.
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complete or restore promptly and in .
and workmanlike manner any building which may he
.ructed.
damaged or destroyed thereon; to coo.
with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said pi..srty; noi
to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or permit any act upon said property in,.vio1.itJu*(pf law; tn
do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary, tne specific
enumerations herein not excluding the general; and. if the loan sveured hereby or any part thereof u being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property, Trustor further agrees:
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence Ui completion
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b)

To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during construction.

Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, u authorized to accept as true and conclusive all fact* and state*
menu therein, and to act thereon hereunder.
2. To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amount* an Beneficiary may require, on
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said |»n»periy. Such insurance »hall l>c carried
in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable clause* in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary.
In event of loss. Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make proof of loss, and each insurance
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment for such lt»«. directly to llrncficiary
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, may be applied
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair ol
the property damaged.
3. To deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full,
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracu ot title or policies of title insurance and
»ny extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto.
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee.
5. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessment affecting said property, including
all assessmenu upon water company stock and all rents, assessmenu and /charges for water, appurtenant to or
used in connection with said property; to pay, when due. all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest,
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay aU costa.
fees, and expenses of this Trust.
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may
deem necessary to protect the security hereof. Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in ex*
ercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in iu absolute discretion it may deem
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees.
7. To pay immediately and without demand ail sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee,
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10Tc) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured hereby.
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT:
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option
to commence, appear in and prosecute tn iu own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, righta
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property,
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom all iu expenses, including attorney's fees,
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignmenU of any
compensation, award, damages, and righu of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require.
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of iU fees and pre*
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby.
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any ease*
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of said property. The grantee in
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any
matters or facU shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all
rents, issues, royalties, and profiU of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per*
formance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such renU. issues, royalties,
and profiU earned prior to default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid.
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all renU. royalties, issues, and profiU. Failure or
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same.
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be. or be construed to
be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option.
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in
person, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of
Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in iU own name sue for or
otherwise collect said renU. issues, and profiU. including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine.
12.
profits,
damage
default

The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the col I eel on of such rents, issues, and
or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or
of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any
or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice.

13. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other
or subsequent default.
14. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due
and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such default. Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or
parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documenU evidencing
expenditures secured hereby.
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15. After the lapse of such time a n.
-hen be required by law following the recordation of said
tee of
default, and notice of default and notice of SA.^ having been given as then required by law, Trustee! without demand
on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the lime and place designated in »aid notice of sale, either as
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of
sale. The person conducting the sale may. for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to
time until it shall be completed and. in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the
U I M manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con*
veying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the
Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed;
(3) ail sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (S) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place.
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be
fixed by the court
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From
the tune the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
18. This Trust D^d shall apply to. inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
devisees, adminstrators. executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless
brought by Trustee.
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth.

(If Trustor an Individual)
STATE OF UTAH.
COUNTY OFSunnat *»«
On the

1.0th

.., AJ). 19...??., personally

S$K&. R. M3CCY

appeared before me
the signer(s) of the abo;
same.

acknowledged to me that £..he.X executed the

My Commission Expires:
9-28-82

S a l t lake City, Utah

(If Trustor a Corporation)
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
On the
appeared before me

day of

, A.D. 19

-

, personally

, who being by me duly sworn,

says that he is the
of
,
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution
of its board of directors) and said
to me that said corporation executed the same.

acknowledged

Notary Public residing at:
My Commission Expires:
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ADDENDUM 11

GERALD H. KINGHORN A 1825
Attorney for Defendants
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 3 64-86 44
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of D. C. ANDERSON and DAN
SCOTT,

ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs,

C i v i l No.

8339
a:

vs.

F 11 ± v

MICHAEL R. McCOY, and
EUGENE E. DOMS,
Defendants.

w.srv _i o.'i" T

^.."Minrvi

Eugene E. Doms hereby answers the Complaint of the^PIaintiffs on file herein and for Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs
alleges as follows:
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
Defendant

Eugene

E.

Doms

admits, denies

and

alleges

as

allegations

of

follows:
1.

The

paragraphs

Answering

Defendant

denies

the

1, 2 and 3 on the grounds and for the reasons that

with respect to the allegations of paragraphs 1 and 2 The Answering Defendant is without knowledge as to the truth or falsity and
therefore denies the same; with respect to the allegations of
paragraph 3 the Answering Defendant believes that the Defendant
Michael R. McCoy is not a resident of Orange County, State of
California.

_1
n n o n i /*s

"
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2.

The

Answering

Defendant

admits

the

allegations

of

paragraph 4 and alleges that the note was in consideration for a
certain purchase of real property described more specifically in
paragraph

7 of Plaintiff's

Complaint

as

an

integral part

and

consideration for the purchase and sale transaction wherein the
Plaintiffs

sold

to

the

Defendant

the

real

property

described

therein.
3.

The

Answering

Defendant

denies

the

allegation

in

paragraph 5 on the grounds and for the reasons that the Answering
Defendant is entitled to rescission of the transaction for the
reasons stated in the Defendants Counterclaim.
4.
paragraph

The

Answering

6 and

7 and

Defendant
denies

admits

the

the balance

of

allegations
the

of

allegations

contained therein.
COUNTERCLAIM
For the Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs the Counterclaim
of Eugene E. Doms alleges as follows:
1.

That the parties are the holders of a certain trust

deed note executed in connection with the purchase by the Defendants of certain real property in Park City, Utah, described more
specifically in paragraph 7 of the Plaintiff's Complaint.
2.

That the parties entered

into the transaction

on or

about November 12, 1981 and that in consideration of the trust
deed

note which

is attached

to the Plaintiff's

Complaint

the

Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest executed a certain
general warranty deed in favor of the Defendants warranting title

_o_

000042

in

the

grantors

thereof

with

the

implied

warranty

and

covenant against encumbrances on the property.
3.

That the grantors violated the warranty against encum-

brances in the execution and delivery of the warranty deed in
exchange for the trust deed note by virtue of certain prescriptive easements which prevented the warranty deed from passing
clear title to the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms.
4.
against

Because

of

encumbrances

the
the

violation

of

the

Counterclaimant

implied
is

warranty

entitled

to

rescission of the sales transaction and the return of all sums
paid upon a tender by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs of title
to the property described

in paragraph

7 of the Plaintiffs1

Complaint.
5.

Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms alleges that the Court

should rescind the transaction entered by the parties, vest title
in the Plaintiffs as the grantors or successors in interest to
the grantors under that certain warranty deed executed by them
and grant judgement in favor of the Counterclaimant and against
the Plaintiffs in the amount of all sums paid by the Counterclaimant to the Plaintiffs in a specific amount to the proven
upon trial of the matter.
Wherefore the Answering Defendant and Counterclaimant Eugene
E. Doms prays that the Plaintiff's takgL^nothing by the Complaint
and that the Court award Judgment as set/forth/ abo^e.

000043

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM was mailed, postage prepaid, on
the

^ ^

day of January, 1988, to the following:

E. Russell Vetter
BIEHLE, HASLAM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

-4-
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ADDENDUM 12

NO.

FILED

LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant Doms
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

, er* M ium<r t ^ouniy

#K'

BY

^i
Deputy Clark

THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal
Representative of the Estate
Of C D . ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON personally, DAN
SCOTT and JEAN SCOTT,

ORDER REGARDING
PROVISIONAL ATTORNEY'S
FEES

Plaintiffs,

MICHAEL R. MCCOY and
EUGENE E. DOMS,
Case No. 8339
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
-ooOoo-

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on
Defendant Doms' objection to the Order proposed by Plaintiff
setting aside Default Judgment and the award of attorney's
fees in the matter.

Plaintiff was represented by Irving H.

Biehle, Esq. and Defendant Doms was represented by Larry R.
Keller, Esq.

SVJT*-*
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After hearing argument of counsel and receiving pleadings
and memoranda of counsel on the issue as to whether or not it
was appropriate for the Court to have awarded all of the
attorney's fees incurred by counsel from the on set of the
case to the date of setting aside the Default Judgment, the
Court orders that the matter shall be taken under advisement
and considered anew once the case itself is finally disposed
of on the merits.
Furthermore, the Court denies Defendant Doms? Motion to
impound the sum of $4,467.00 paid by Defendant Doms' to
Plaintiffs' counsel as a condition of setting aside the
Default Judgment on June 1, 1988. The court finds that
because this sum has already been paid, that it would be
inappropriate for the Court to now impound it as requested by
Defendant Doms' counsel, but once again orders that whether or
not it was appropriate for the Court to award that sum as
attorney's fees for setting aside the Default Judgment is an
issue which will be reserved until the final disposition of
the case on its merits.
DATED t h i s

5

clay o f

y, ,,/> SI*,
7'/

,

1988.

//

BY THE COURT:

U

HtfN. PAT B. BRIJ
Third D i s t r i c t Court

-

2

-

non'MR

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order, first class postage prepaid, this

day

of June, 1988 to Irving H. Biehle, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 50
West Broadway, Fourth Floor, Salt Lake City, UT

84101.

jMjon djuaofa

-
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ADDENDUM 13

NO

LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

i

J

a

Cierx JT ounmiT Counry

Deputv Cierir

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OoOoo
ELLEN ANDERSON, Personal Representative of the Estate
Of D.C. ANDERSON & DAN SCOTT,
and JEAN SCOTT, his wife, and
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,

AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE E.
DOMS,

Civil No.

8339

Defendants.
-ooOooCOMES NOW Defendant, Eugene E. Doms, by and through his
attorney, Larry R. Keller, and amends the Counterclaim
previously filed in the above-entitled matter as follows:
COUNTERCLAIM
For cause of action alleged, Defendant Eugene E. Doms
counterclaims against Plaintiffs as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiffs jointly and severally are the

holders of a certain trust deed note executed in connection

000102

with the purchase by the Defendant Doms of certain real
property in Park City, Utah described more specifically in
Paragraph No. 7 of the Plaintiffs1 Complaint.
2.

That the parties entered into the transaction on or

about November 12, 1981 and that in consideration of the trust
deed note which is attached to the Plaintiffs' Complaint the
Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest executed a
certain general warranty deed in favor of the Defendants
warranting title in the grantors thereof with the implied
warranty and covenant against encumbrances on the property.
3.

That the grantors violated the warranty against

encumbrances in the execution and delivery of the warranty
deed in exchange for the trust deed note by virtue of certain
prescriptive easements which prevented the warranty deed from
passing clear title to the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms.
4.

Due to the violation of the implied warranty against

encumbrances and a violation of the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated Section 57-1-12

as amplified by Utah Supreme Court

decisions such as Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124
(Utah 1984), the Counterclaimant is entitled to rescission of
the sales transaction and contract and the return of all sums
paid together with interest upon a tender by the Defendants to
the Plaintiffs of title to the property more particularly
described in Paragraph No. 7 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint.
5.

Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms alleges that no

default ever occurred and the Court should rescind the
transaction and contract entered into by the parties, vest
- 2 -

title in the Plaintiffs as the grantors or successors in
interest to the grantors under that certain warranty deed
executed by them, and grant judgment in favor of the
Counterclaimant and against the Plaintiffs in the amount of
all sums paid by the Counterclaimant to the Plaintiffs
pursuant to said contract in a specific amount to be proven
upon trial of the matter which should include interest, costs
and attorneyfs fees of pursuing this rescission action.
6.

Defendant Doms purchased the property which is the

subject of this lawsuit with the intent of developing said
property and earning a profit from such development.
7.

The failure of the Plaintiff to deliver clear title

prevented Defendant Doms from developing the subject property
as planned and he is damaged thereby in an amount to be
determined at trial, together with interest, costs and
attorneyT s fees.
WHEREFORE, the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms prays that
Plaintiffs take nothing by the Complaint filed against him in
the above-entitled matter and that the Court award Judgment
against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, rescinding the
contract and conveyance in the above-entitled matter and
ordering Plaintiffs to repay all sums paid to them under the
contract and conveyance including interest at the contract or
legal rate, costs, and attorney's fees required to pursue this
rescission action.

- 3 -

nnnt04

FURTHER, Counterclaimant prays the Court award him
damages for lost profits, interest thereon, costs and
attorney's fees for this inability to develop the property
which was caused by Plaintiffs' failure to deliver clear
title.
DATED this

day of June, 1988.

,LER,
Attorney/ for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Amended Counterclaim, first class postage
prepaid, this /j

day of June, 1988 to: E. Russell Vetter,

Biehle, Haslam and Hatch, 50 West Broadway, Fifth Floor, Salt
Lake City, UT

84101.

- 4 -
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ADDENDUM 14

NO,

FILED

LARRY R. KELLER #178 5
Attorney for Defendant Doms
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

^terx 2T ourr.miT County

™

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of~D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON personally, DAN
SCOTT and JEAN SCOTT,

SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL R. McCOY, and
EUGENE E. DOMS,

Civil No. 8339
Judae Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
ooOoo
COMES NOW Defendant Eugene E. Doms, by and through his counsel, Larry R. Keller, Esq., and files this Second Amended
Counterclaim amending the previously filed Amended Counterclaim
in the above-entitled matter as follows:
COUNTERCLAIM
For cause of action alleged, Defendant Eugene E. Doms
Counterclaims against Plaintiffs as follows:

1
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

That the Plaintiffs jointly and severally are the

holders of a certain Trust Deed Note executed in connection with
the purchase by Defendant Doms of certain real property in Park
City, Summit County, Utah.
2.

That the parties entered into a transaction for the

transfer of the parcel of real property more specifically
described in Plaintiffs1 Complaint on or about November 12, 1981
and that in consideration of the Trust Deed Note, a copy of which
is attached to Plaintiffs1 Complaint, the Plaintiffs or their
predecessors in interest, executed a certain Warranty Deed in
favor of the Defendants warranting title in the Grantors thereof
with the implied warranty and covenant against encumbrances on
the property provided by law.
3.

That the Grantors violated the warranty against

encumbrances in the execution and delivery of the Warranty Deed
in exchange for the Trust Deed Note by virtue of certain
prescriptive easements which prevented the Warranty Deed from
passing clear title to the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms.
4.

Due to the violation of the implied warranty against

encumbrances and a violation of the provisions of U.C.A. § 57-1-12
as amplified by Utah Supreme Court decisions such as Bergstrom v.
Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984), the Counterclaimant is

2
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entitled to rescission of the sales transaction and contract and
the return of all sums paid, together with interest,* upon a
tender by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs of title to the property more particularly described in Paragraph No. 7 of the
Plaintiffs' Complaint.
5.

As a result of the failure to grant clear title to the

property which is the subject of this lawsuit through the Warranty
Deed, Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms alleges that no default ever
occurred with regard to payments due under the Trust Deed Note,
and the Court should rescind the transaction and contract entered
into by the parties, vest title in the Plaintiffs as the Grantors
or successors in interest to the Grantors under that certain
Warranty Deed executed by them, and grant judgment in favor of
the Counterclaimant and against the Plaintiffs in the amount of
all sums paid by the Counterclaimant to the Plaintiffs pursuant
to said contract in a specific amount to be proven upon trial of
the matter which should include interest, costs and attorney's
fees pursuing this rescission action.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
6.

Defendant Doms realleges and incorporates by reference

all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 5 above as
though set out in full herein.
7.

Defendant Eugene E. Doms purchased the property which is

3
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the subject of this lawsuit with the intent of developing said
property and earning a profit from such development.*
8.

The failure to the Plaintiffs to deliver clear title

prevented Defendant Doms from developing the subject property as
planned, and he is damaged thereby in an amount to be determined
at trial, together with interest, costs and attorney's fees.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
9.

Defendant Doms realleges and incorporates by reference

all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 above as
though set out in full herein.
10.

Defendnat Eugene E. Doms discovered on June 23, 1988,

through his attorney, that a fraud was perpetrated upon him by
the Plaintiffs in this matter, in that Plaintiffs transferred
title to Defendant Doms through a "Special Warranty Deed" in
violation of the express contract and agreement that title should
be transferred by virtue of a warranty deed without the denomination "Special" in the deed.
11.

Plaintiffs therefore breached their contract with

Defendant Doms at the time they typed in the word "Special" in
the form Warranty Deed in violation of the Earnest Money Agreement
which represented the contract between the parties in the aboveentitled matter.
12.

As a result of said breach of contract, Defendant Doms

4
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is entitled to a complete rescission of the contract, or in the
alternative, payment of all sums which are damages as a result of
Plaintiffs1 breach of contract, which include all sums paid by
Defendant Doms on said contract to Plaintiffs, plus interest,
costs and attorney's fees relating thereto.
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimant prays that Plaintiffs take
nothing by the Complaint filed against him the above-entitled
matter, and that the Court award him judgment against Plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, rescinding the contract and conveyance in
the above-entitled matter, and ordering Plaintiffs to repay all
sums paid to them under the contract and conveyance, including
interest at the contract or legal rate, costs and attorney's fees
required to pursue this recission action.
FURTHER, Counterclaimant prays the Court award him damages
for lost profits, interest thereon, costs and attorney's fees for
his inability to develop the property which was caused by
Plaintiffs1 failure to deliver clear title.
FURTHER, Counterclaimant prays the Court award him all damages caused as a result of Plaintiffs' fraud and breach of
contract in not supplying Defendant Doms with a general warranty
deed as required by the original contract between the parties.
DATED this

&(H day of June, 1988.

00G241

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true, correct copy of the
foregoing Second Amended Counterclaim, first class postage prepaid, this 2^Hh day of June, 1988, to:
Irving H. Biele, Esq.
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for Ellen Anderson as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of D.C. Anderson and
Dan S c o t t

6
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ADDENDUM 15

2%2^

G r a n t s DOMCOY ENTERPRISES. IMC.

c/o Larry R. Xmllmx
257 E. 200 S.,

Suite 340, BGBC 10

88 AUG 3 0 AH 10: Ob

Salt Lake City. Utah 84111

A L A N Si'RIGGS mm
SUMMIT C0UN1 T R E C O R D E R

qurucuoH WBD
SUMMIT COUNTY, A Body Corporate and Politic, organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at Coalville, County
of Sumit. State of Utah, grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to
DOMCOY
Grantee
Salt Lake XTEyTTJEaTT
_for good and
of
valuable consideration, the interest of Summit County as acquired under that
certain tax sale in Book 1982 page 216
t and subsequent Auditors stamp
recorded as antry I 273536
in Book 436 paee 779
in and to the
following described tract of• land in SusaUt County* State of Utah:
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lota 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to
the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office of
the Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lot* J7 and 19, BLock 59. Park City Survey,
according to the amended plat thereof, a* filed and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion
located within the railroad righta of way ee deacrlbed in thoae certain
documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 In Book C at Page 401, Entry No.
13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373.
records of Summit County, Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according
to the Amended Plat thereof, aa filed and of record In the office of
the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion, located
within the railroad rights of way aa deacrlbed in those certain
documents recorded aa Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry
No. 13316 In Book N at Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book N at
Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water lines
over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the following
deacrlbed lota.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot IS, Block 58, Park City Survey
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder.

The officer who signs this deed hereby certifies thst this instrument snd
the tranafer represented hereby wss duly authorised under a resolution duly
adopted by the Board of County Commiaalonera of the grantor at a lawful meeting
duly held and attended by a quorum.
Therefore, In accordance with title 59-2-1363 of the Utah Code and In
witness hereof, the grantor Itaa cauaed ita corporate name and acal to be here
unto affixed by ita duly authorised County Clerk thie ^ W ' b a r offli//.it<J
A.D., 1 ? W .

W

SUrtilT COUNTY
By Douglas R. Geary

SiimmirCounty Clerk1
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SUMMIT

)
) ss.
)

500*

w

QKjJ^p.Qink

491^405

A.D., pereonally appeared before me
.
On the .J</ d0T Of tt<< *^,tJ't
loJ*
><.uj*> Douglas R. Caary who being bj me duly sworn, did say that he, the said Douglae £.«>>
f7#*
R. Gca*?- is the Clerk of Summit County, snd that the within and foregoing instrument -*•*'
was signed in behalf of said county by authority of a resolution of its Board of
Commissioners, and Douglas R. Geary duly acknowledged to me that said county executed
the same and that the seal affixed is the sesl of the said county.

V*.
L.

My Commission Expires

Notant'^ublic
Residing at: l*S~

f* + ~rt*

ADDENDUM 16

"2%300
Recorded at Request of
at

M.

Fee Paid $

by

68 AUG 3 0 AHlQ:Qli

.

Dep.Book

Mail tax n o t i c e

^ ALAN SPHSG6S
R«fKMITIlMIJ RECORDER

Page

t o : G r a n t e e c / o Larry R. K e l l e r , 2
S u i t e 3 4 0 , Box 1 0 , S a l t Lake C

W A R R A N T Y

D E E D

DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC.
grantor
of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby
CONVEYS and WARRANTS to
EUGENE E. DOMS
grantee
of Mission Viejo, California
for the sum of
TEN and 00/100
DOLLARS,
the following described tract of land in Summit County,
State of Utah:
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey,
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record
in the office of the Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting
therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of
way as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry
No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records
of Summit County, Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record
in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of way as
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No.
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page
326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of
Summit County, Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water
lines over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the
following described lots:
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in
the office of the Summit County recorder.
WITNESS the hand of said grantor, thistf_ day of &^&?L_,

1988.

Signed in the presence of:
Jean M. Henry

DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, I N C . , a

Mission Viejo National Bank

Corpo^fation by/: p

Mission Viejo, CA 92691
STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
) SS.

COUNTY OF

ORANGE

EU(£?NE 4.. DOMsf Secretary/"
Treasurer and Authorized Officer

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this26th^
day of
August
r ^3^f b v
Eugene E. Poms
,
Secretary/Treasurer and Authorized Officer of Domcoy Enterprises,
Inc.

JEAN M HENRY

%

NOTARY PUBUC-CALirORNIA *

ORANGt COUNT*
2
My Comm £ i p April 21 19M X

My C o m m i s s i o n E x p i r e s 4-27-92

\ / /

y

\

U

(

— -j^trrz—n

)Z
1 >

'i/'

-=*•—=•

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing

JJ.
s

) /

--r-<

/.»

^

'/

j^~

jea^M. H£rfr7~

in

°^ n 8_ e

c

? u n t y j ,CA.:

eoo»
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ADDENDUM 17

J A M E S A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — No.
2194
J A M E S A. M C I N T O S H & A S S O C I A T E S P.C.

A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Attorneys for Petitioner Jeanne Scott
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

8ET0FE3

8 1989

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
*JEANNE SCOTT
Plaintiffs and
Petitioner

NONRESIDENT JEANNE SCOTT'S
PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
DENYING HER MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF IN
PERSONAM JURISDICTION

*JEANNE SCOTT IS THE ONLY
PLAINTIFF TO THIS APPEAL
vs.
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,
Defendants

Trial Court No. 8339
(Summit County)

litigate the original lawsuit in the Utah courts, as well as also
litigating

the third-party

action

against

Summit

County

Title

Company.
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION
Jeanne

Scott

submits

the

granting

of

her

appeal

will

materially advance the termination of the litigation, because the
case would be finally dismissed on the merits as to her, without
causing an innocent nonresident to expend substantial time and
funds in litigating a case, when the court has no jurisdiction over
her.
DATED this 6th day of February, 1989.
Respectfully Submitted:
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.

\Ui:

•C?"

/ JAMES A. MCINTOSH
( /Attorneys for P e t i t i o n e r Jeanne Scott

-23-

ADDENDUM 18

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

C T '.*3 t 51989

March 9, 1989
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South-10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Jeanne Scott, Ellen Anderson,
as personal representative of
the Estate of D.C. Anderson,
Ellen Anderson, personally, and
Dan Scott,
Plaintiffs and Appellant,
v.
Michael R. McCoy and Eugene
E. Doms,
Defendants and Appellees.
Ellen Anderson as personal
representative of the Estate of
D.C. Anderson, Ellen Anderson
personally, Dan Scott and
Jeanne Scott,
Third-party Plaintiffs
and Appellant,
v.
Summit County Title Company, a
Utah corporation,
Third-party Defendant
and Appellee.

No. 890042

THIS DAY, Petition for an interlocutory appeal having been
heretofore considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in the
premises, it is ordered that an interlocutory appeal be, and the same
is, denied.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

ADDENDUM 19

IRVING H. BIELE, A0317, of
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Petitioners
Ellen Anderson as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of D. C. Anderson and Dan Scott
333 North 3 00 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
J A M E S A. M C I N T O S H ,

umsunp^'m

2194

JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioners
Jeanne Scott, Personally
Ellen Anderson, Personally
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE
OF D. C. ANDERSON
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
DAN SCOTT, Personally
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
ELLEN ANDERSON, Personally,
Involuntary Plaintiff and
Petitioner,

PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY
WRIT UNDER RULE 65B(b)2 AND
65B(b)4 (TANTAMOUNT TO
PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS)
Case No.

JEANNE SCOTT, Personally,
Involuntary Plaintiff and
Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGES OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE
OF UTAH,
Respondent,

could be dismissed on routine motions relating to the statute of
limitations, waiver and estoppel•

Judicial economy requires that

the courts enforce the laws and rules that create economy of an
action rather than ignoring the same causing citizens and the court
extensive time and expense before these matters can be brought to
the attention of the Utah Supreme Court.

Continuation of the

discovery in this matter under the present pleadings will require
depositions and discovery in several states which is only a small
example

of the costs

involved.

(See Petitioner

Points and

Authorities, Point 2.)
WHEREFORE, your Petitioners and each of them pray that this
Court issue its Writ directed to the Respondent Court and the
Judges thereof, restraining and prohibiting the Court and the
Judges from proceeding further in the trial of the aforesaid action
against these Petitioners without dismissal from this action of
those persons who are now named as Involuntary Plaintiffs or
mandating that they be so dismissed.
DATED this 23rd day of June, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
NYGAARO, COKE & VINCENT

/SL^

BIEZE ^
^X
rney for Petitioners Ellen
Anderson as Personal Representative
and Dan Scott
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.

JAME^'A. M C I N T O S f c ^ ' J?
Attorney for Petitioners Jeanne
Scott and Ellen Anderson, Personally
-16-

ADDENDUM 20

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

State of Utah

\

County of Salt Lake J

I, GEOFFREY J. BUTLER, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, do

hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the j&agStfew£ rendered

Anderson v. Judges of T h i r d D i s t r i c t

No. 890269

in the foregoing entitled action, now of record and on file in my office.

In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand

and affixed the seal of said Supreme Court this

the

day of

11th

Ap.r.i-1

A. D. 19..&Q..

Geof Xj:<fty...J.*...Ru.tler.
Clerk, Supreme Court

Deputy Clerk

332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84114

July 31, 1989
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Brant H. Wall
9 Exchange Place, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
FILE

Ellen Anderson, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of D.C. Anderson, Dan Scott,
Ellen Anderson, and Jeanne
Scott,
Petitioners,
v.
Judges of the Third Judicial
District Court of the State
of Utah,
Respondents.

Petition for Extraordinary
Writ Under Rule 65B(b)4
(Tantamount to Prohibition
of Mandamus)

No. 890269

Amended Minute Entry
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied because the
district court has jurisdiction over both petitioners inasmuch as they
were grantors on the deed, and both are proper parties to the
counterclaim for recission under U.R.C.P. # 13 and 19. Further, under
district court ruling, petitioner Scott still has opportunity to move
for dismissal atleast as to one issue, and district court has not yet
ruled on statute of limitations defense of petitioners to counterclaim.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL -DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate
Of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON, personally, DAN
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT,
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CASE NO.

83 39

NC.

Plaintiffs,

FILED

vs.

MAY

MICHAEL R. MCCOY and
EUGENE E. DOMS,

21990

C a r * of Summit County

BY

Defendants.

Z...ia?h~
Dapulv C'eric

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate
of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON, personally, DAN
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Third Party Defendant.

This

case

was

tried

Summit County Courthouse in

on

April

17,

Coalville,

0 0 4 JP!>7

18, 19, 1990, at the

Utah.

The

plaintiffs
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were
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represented by James A. Mcintosh and Irving H. Biele.

defendant Doms

was

party

defendant

heard

the

evidence,

represented

was

by

represented

testimony

of

read

Memorandums

the

Larry

R.

Keller.

by Brant H. Wall.

witnesses,

admitted

filed

The

Third

The Court
documentary

herein,

heard

oral

argument, and took the matter under advisement.
The Court now being fully advised, makes its ruling.
The Court finds as follows:
1.

Defendant

Doms

met

with

Mike

Sloan,

a real estate

agent, in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and

purchase

of

the Rossie Hills property.
2.
seller

Defendant
of

the

Doms

also

property,

met

with

Dewey

Anderson,

the

once before Doms and McCoy purchased

the property.
3.

Both

Sloan

and Anderson represented that the property

was a prime piece of development property and
best

use

would

be

as

its

highest

and

an integrated development with the two

adjoining parcels referred

to

as

block

62

and

the

Slipper

Parcels.
4.

The plaintiffs

conveyed

the

property

to

defendants

Doms and McCoy on March 10, 1982.
5.

Defendants Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in

Slipper parcel in October of 1982.

nn A ? .'.^

the
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6.
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The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and

further

the

McCoy

to

integrated development of the three parcels and to

equalize their position

with

the

developers

1982

Doms

engaged

of

the

Slipper

parcel and block 62.
7.

In October

attorney,

for

of

the

of

block

Kinghorn,

an

specific purpose of closing the purchase of

the Slipper parcel and
owners

Mr.

continuing

62

for

the

the

negotiations

with

the

purpose of developing the three

parcels as an integrated development.
8.

Prior

property, Doms
development
architect:
9.

of

to
was

Doms7

purchase

shown

the

a

three

of

the

preliminary

site

plan

for

the

parcels of property prepared by the

Mr. Kohler

Doms

knew

or

should

have

known

purchased the Anderson parcel and the Slipper
integrated

Anderson parcel of

development

at

the

parcel

time
that

he
the

of the three parcels had failed because

of the problems with the Anderson parcel and

the

inability

of

the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel.
10.
the

Doms walked the Anderson property

fall

of

1981

with

Mr.

Sloan

in

and knew that there were roads and sheds on

the property.

0041S0
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11.

Doms

for the

first

November

7,
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had

actual

time

notice

sometime
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of the easement encroachment

between

October

22,

1981

and

1981 and had further notice during 1982 and up and

through 1984.
12.

Doms

did

not

give

notice

of

his intent to rescind

until January of 1985.
13.

Doms'

purchase of the Slipper parcel, the negotiations

to develop the three parcels as an integrated
subsequent
with

the

personal

development,

the

negotiations about credits and defining the problems
Anderson

parcel,

knowledge

affirm

the

fact

that

Doms

had

of the road and encroachments no later than

October of 1982.
The

issue presented to the Court for decision is whether or

not laches should apply in this matter.
The

Court

has

found

that

Doms knew of the loop road and

the encroachments as early as the fall
aware

of

the

encroachments

of

1981

and

Therefore, Doms was bound to take

action

time.

that

It

purchase the Anderson parcel and
parcel

without

viewing

made

and road prior to the purchase of

the Slipper parcel.
after

was

the

remedial

is unbelievable that Doms would
an

interest

property

and

in

the

determining

Anderson couldn't conclude the integration of the three

(\n A \ o ;

Slipper
why

parcels

Y

for

development .

pr i)b] ems IA

The court believes

-

parcel
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PAGi

credits

that

woul .

. . .cated

In

each

problems that nt^v L» encountered as a result of

the

tiirro.i

nevertheless,
in hopes

of

parcel,

purchased ;...
integrating

the

merest

three

- lipper parcel

parcels

~:;d making

his

in
The Court ,
Do;

c

opinion that ^

obtai;

opinion

p r - ~ "*
fo

"J-

necessar %

.~

"cna

-,--*----

si: 1 =1! :i an I fe
being

\nderson

tende:

--s-Lnd.

Once

property before :,- could make ., Doms

knew

*•*

€ ii'ic/i.iiiiLij.hi, a n c e f j i ,

4jL e

reasona.:;] e

time to notify the sellers of his intent to rescinc -

- "•-.; .

claim for damages.
I Hnit". c'i,.11 III11;11n,;:l";:, I. 11id, t E a e t e r v . y e s t a n d N o r t h P r o p e r t i e s ,
P.2d

361

(Ore, App. 1988), is the applicable law to be applied

to the facts in this case,
a UK11,1 it]

u'LttH" i, ",.

ODen

or

Eaeter stands for

Ll'iij L an u, niiidintained d i r t

u s e and b r u s h anc ' : ;.-so

; 58

not

knowledge oi i t s

•- . r

- . u u b uiidL

the

road t h a t showed l:i t t l e

moved t o d r i v e c
-chaser

existence.

Il II I I "! i QO

propositi on,

ANDERSON V. McCOY

This

case
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readily distinguishable on the facts because

there is no question that the road in this case
and

was

being

used.

The

aerial

has

been

used

photograph of the Anderson

parcel clearly defines the loop road so that there could

be

no

question that the road has been and is still in use.
The Egeter case is also cited for the rule that
seeking

to

rescind

the

contract

must

do

the

so promptly after

obtaining knowledge of the facts constituting

the

rescission.

required

However,

the

buyer

is

not

immediately to rescind so long as he acts

person

within

grounds

a

to

for
act

reasonable

time.
The Court does not
acted

agree

with

Doms'

contention

that

he

within a reasonable time after he obtained knowledge that

that Loop Road and the

encroachments

were

upon

the

Anderson

property.
Doms knew of the Loop Road and
1981

encroachments

early

as

and no later than October of 1982, and yet he did not take

any action to rescind until January of 1985,
way

as

of

a

settlement

offer

in

lieu

and

that

was

by

of making the $194,000

payment due on January 25, 1985.
It

was

that Doms

not until plaintiffs7 action to foreclose was filed
filed

his

Amended

Counterclaim

seeking to rescind the warranty deed.

in

June

of

1988

ANDERSON V. McCOY
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f

amount

of ti me to seek rescission, therefore, rescission is not

the appropriate remedy

the- :: supports the . .•

;-.::; -. ^-.

• e ^ , -• ,-:i \ •,

appropriate remedy

' \ \ Ch^-

^ \l^<d^<S^

JOHN A) ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I
of the

hereby

certify

t h a t I mailed a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy

f o r e g o i n g . Memorandum

Decision,

to

the

following,

this
M dav of -Apr&i 1 9 9 0 A YY\eUt^ RdeAta, Qru^fr
fit&ok's
a
U
Satf <ZeJfe QJhsUk %:
°
Irving H. Biele
Attorney for Plaintiffs
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
James A. Mcintosh
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs
1399 South 700 East, Suite 14
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Brant H. Wall
Attorney for Third Party Defendant
9 Exchange Place, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Larry R. Keller
Attorney for Defendant Doms
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq.
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Franklin P. Anderson
Deputy Summit County Attorney
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
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257 Tower, Suite 340
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Telephone:
(801) 532-7282

tJr*
Deputy Cieik

I II Till': 'I'll I Kll J U D I C I A L
SUMMIT

COUNTY,

r

1URT

' "

STATE

-00000-•
E L L E N A N D E R S O N , as P e r s o n a l
Representative of the Estate
Of D . C . ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and J E A N N E S C O T T ,

T R I A L B R I E F REG;ISSUE OF LACHES

v.
M I C H A E L R. M C C O Y
EUGENE E. DOMS,

AND

Defendants.

E L L E N A N D E R S O N , as P e r s o n a l
Representative of the Estate
Of D . C . A N D E R S O N , D A N S C O T T ,
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally,
and J E A N N E S C O T T ,
Third Party

Civil
Judge

No.
John

i
Rokich

Plaintiffs,

v.
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE
a Utah corporation,
Third Party

COMPANY,

Defendant.

CONSOI, inAI Kll IIM'Mlli. rONT'INUm

on

UN III

I l',"ii,'l

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D.C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
official capacity as Summit
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC-, a
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5,

Civil No. 10066
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
-ooOoo-

COMES NOW Defendant Eugene E. Doms, through his attorney,
Larry R. Keller, and submits the following Trial Brief with
regard to the issue of laches, as follows:
I.
FACTS
During the trial of the above-entitled matter held on April
17, 18, and 19, 1990, at the County Courthouse in Coalville,
Utah, the following facts were adduced:
1.

Defendant Eugene E. Doms testified that he observed the

2

np Road

property only from its parameters and never viewed
C

- ..... I J I fl I K I;?

upon the property.
1

Although Mike Sloan testified that

wdl

--" : * he

Eugene

t

say what month, what day, what time of day, or any of the other
detail^

Ircumstances regarding that alleged event (See Point

I

).
3.

Mike Sloan, real estate agent for the Plaintiffs In this

case, represented to Mi
t

Anderson parcel

Doms that the highest and best use of

wn

, be to combine i t with the two other

parcels of property on the top of Rossie Hill for purposes of a
three-parcel development.
4

The property was transferred from Plaintii ip +-o Defen-

dant Doms by Warranty Deed dated March 1 0,
5.

Defendant Doms tost if ::i eel

J 982

t::l: la !
:::

11

e

station business in southern California and had numerous other
business and financial interests besides the purchase and developmenl
6

Defendant Doms testified that he had contact with Craig

Masters of Park City, Utah, on several occasions.
h

I" i i I i in,,'""!:MI Il | l r

I h i s t t"« r s " i-",r- ' ' " p i " i n o "i p< ; i 11

the remaining two parcels

He testified

i illi : iii'iiiiy I I K J

p r i i I 11 •

property, which will be referred
3

! f

y o

'

herein as the "Investors Ltd." parcel and "Slipper" parcel.
7.

Defendant Doms testified that in the weeks and months

subsequent to March 10, 1982, when the property was purchased, he
had preliminary discussions with Mike Sloan and Mr. Masters
regarding the purchase of the Slipper parcel.
8.

Defendant Doms testified he desired to purchase the

Slipper parcel to minimize the number of players with regard to
the three-parcel development, and to be in a better or "more
equal" position with regard to obtaining profits from the development .
9.

Defendant Doms testified that he believed during this

period of time that the three-parcel development proposed by Mr.
Sloan at the time he sold the Anderson parcel was a viable
possibility, and that several units could be built on the Anderson parcel to contribute to the overall three-parcel development.
10.

In approximately October of 1982, Defendant Doms

retained Gerald H. Kinghorn for the specific purposes of closing
the deal with regard to Mr. Doms' purchase of the Slipper parcel,
and continuing negotiations with the owners of the Investors,
Ltd. parcel for purposes of creating the three-parcel development
originally envisioned by Mr. Doms based upon the representations
of Mike Sloan.

(Mr. Kinghorn was at that time representing Mr.

Doms in other matters).
4

005104

1]

Geralc

Kinghorn testified at the trial that he met

C

I I

5

between October
negotl ate a

:. <:

summer

an effor; to

- m o venture agreement which would be acceptable to

a..... rhe parties.
Plaintiffs1 Exhibits "" and 82 are two drafts of

12.

proposed joint venture agreements which would have put together
the three-parcel development,
13.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that

negotiations broke down
Terry Cole

Mr

result ox tj

usition taken by

.-:-,• -.. Colorado speaking on behalf of Inves-

tor's Ltd.
overa2

- summei of 1983,

»r:-

LUHL

nformed Mi: Kinghorn that the percentage of the
IU

ue xeceived by Mr. Doms was much smaller than

Kinghorn and Mr

Anderson parcel

noms wanted

i*» *-n *

undevelopable

ff

act that much m the

casements

encum-

brance
1

1 others representing the Investors

TA

"^

group represented to Mr, Kinghorn that "they had been through all
this before
15.

irevious owners.11

ShortI

in :,;>* summer

the particular meeting described above,
v

*

Kinghorn testified *v :\ s: walked the

L
owners had told

Kinghorn they believed constituted easements

0051U5

or encumbrances on the Anderson parcel.
16.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that although the Loop Road

appeared to be located on the Anderson parcel, he was uncertain
because he did not know the exact boundaries of the property.
17.

Mr. Kinghorn testified he immediately contacted Mr.

Doms in California and informed him that a road and some buildings appeared to exist on the Anderson parcel, and might constitute easements and encumbrances on the property.
18.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that Mr. Doms instructed him to

immediately take whatever steps were necessary to determine
whether or not the Loop Road and other buildings and encroachments did in fact constitute legal easements and encumbrances.
This testimony was consistent with the testimony of Mr. Doms.
19.

Mr. Kinghorn testified in August of 1983, he retained a

surveyor by the name of Bing Christensen to locate and stake the
boundaries of the Anderson parcel.
20.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that Mr. Christensen*s efforts

were unsatisfactory and did not assist in establishing the
boundaries of the property or the location of the possible
physical encroachments which Mr. Kinghorn suspected would be on
the property based upon the information he had received from the
representatives of the Investors, Ltd. group.
21.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that although Mr. Christensen
6

005106

claime<

- > have placed stakes on the property to determine the

I: u n t i l i f i i'f","""-'; 111" II 11 « p i o p e r l ^ '; i:,i f T o r

I In

ii i \ n / i ri«••* "I i t "HI i 11 I I i i

;pii n g

of 1984, 1 le walked the property and was unable to locate the
stakes, and therefore was unable to determine the boundaries of
LI n.Jl K U M J .1 I Ii III i I I | ni i 11 II " i 1 i.< «,s ,

,-2„

: .-5 arid Mr, Kinghor^ ^oth testified that in the

spring

they contacted A

-

• Engineering and asked for
i,

including

a:; : survey; and subsequently commissioned Alliance

Engineering

^ survey.
ely

1984

meeting with Edward :

concerns

Mar cl: i 1 3,

weeney, he first expressed his

Sweeney that

and buildings which

app^
and encumbrances
and

the property,

associate

Mi

Sweeney was an attorney

. of Biele, Haslain & Hatch and was
i i a s b s t::l: lex I d 3 -

ceased) and Ellen Anderson, who was the personal representative
Oo. .

estate, and Dan Scott.
e

Engineering completed their land survey and prepared the document
admitted

Defendantf s Exhibit
survey clea

sealed

7
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and

Mr. Doms (as they both testified) for the very first time that
the Loop Road and other physical encroachments were located on
the Anderson parcel.
26.

Mr. Kinghorn and Mr. Doms both testified that Mr. Doms

then instructed Mr. Kinghorn to do further investigation and
determine whether or not these encroachments constituted prescriptive easements.
27.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that shortly thereafter he

personally talked to several long-time residents of Park City
regarding the use of the Loop Road by abutting property owners.
He testified several of these people told him that Elden and Ella
Sorensen, who resided on property abutting the Anderson parcel,
had always used the Loop Road for access to their property since
they first moved there, which was sometime in 1941.
28.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that about this time he was also

in contact with the Park City Planning Department, and was
informed that all developments in Park City must recognize and
protect lawful prescriptive easements which exist upon the
property.
29.

Mr. Kinghorn then testified that for the first time, he

formed a legal conclusion that the Loop Road and other encroachments constituted prescriptive easements upon the Anderson
parcel, and he shortly thereafter reported his legal conclusion

8
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to Mr. Doms.
30.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that shortly thereafter, on or

about December 5, 1984, he had a telephone conversation with
attorney Edward S. Sweeney and informed Mr. Sweeney during this
conversation that the Loop Road and other encroachments were, in
his legal opinion, prescriptive easements on the Anderson parcel
and constituted a serious problem which needed to be resolved.
31.

Mr. Kinghorn also testified that he informed Mr.

Sweeney at that time that he would talk with his client Mr. Doms,
in order to obtain authority to make some kind of a proposal.
32.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that in January of 1985, he

contacted Mr. Doms and told him for the first time that the Loop
Road and other encroachments on the property were, in his legal
opinion, prescriptive easements on the Anderson parcel, and the
development proposal originally presented to Mr. Doms by Mike
Sloan would not be possible.
33.

Mr. Doms testified that he accepted Mr. Kinghorn?s

legal opinion and conclusion, which he had heard for the first
time in January of 1985, and instructed Mr. Kinghorn to attempt
to negotiate a resolution to the problem that would avoid litigation.
34.

Mr. Doms and Mr. Kinghorn both testified that in early

January of 1985, Mr. Doms authorized Mr. Kinghorn to offer to
9
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deed the Anderson parcel back to the Andersons and the Scotts in
exchange for a cancellation of the Trust Deed Note.
35.

Mr. Doms and Mr. Kinghorn also testified that Mr. Doms

instructed Mr. Kinghorn not to demand the return of the monies
which had already been paid, in order to avoid expensive and
time-consuming litigation.
36.

Mr. Doms and Mr. Kinghorn both testified that Mr. Doms

at that time further instructed Mr. Kinghorn to inform opposing
counsel that Mr. Doms would not make the principal payment due on
January 25, 1985, in the amount of $194,250.00.
37.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that on or about January 17,

1985, he had a lengthy meeting with Mr. Sweeney in his law
office.

At this meeting, Mr. Kinghorn showed Mr. Sweeney the

Alliance Engineering land survey of the Anderson parcel, which
clearly showed the encumbrances located upon the Anderson parcel.
38.

Mr. Kinghorn testified he told Mr. Sweeney at this

meeting the names of the people he had talked to in Park City
regarding the use of the Loop Road by the Sorensens for over 40
years as access to their property; and that, in his legal opinion, the Loop Road constituted a prescriptive easement on the
property under Utah law.
39.

Mr. Kinghorn testified he also told Mr. Sweeney at that

time that the existence of the Loop Road on the Anderson parcel
10

005110

as a prescriptive easement constituted a violation of the covenant against encumbrances in the Warranty Deed dated March 10,
1982, pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12.
40.

Mr. Kinghorn further informed Mr. Sweeney that the Park

City Planning Department required that all developments recognize
and protect prescriptive easements; and that therefore, Mr. Doms
desired to tender the property back to the grantors whom Mr.
Sweeney represented.
41.

Mr. Kinghorn testified he further informed Mr. Sweeney

that if the Plaintiffs accepted the tender and took the property
back, Mr. Doms would request that the Trust Deed Note be cancelled; and that further, Mr. Doms would allow them to keep all
monies already paid under the contract.
42.

A discussion ensued regarding the payment of the

principal due on March 25, 1985; and Mr. Kinghorn testified Mr.
Sweeney said he would have to talk to his clients and not to
worry about making the payment until he got back to Mr. Kinghorn.
43.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that on March 18, 1985, he met

with Mr. Sweeney and a Mr. Peter Mulhern at Mr. Kinghornfs law
office to further discuss the matter.
44.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that he reiterated to Mr.

Mulhern and Mr. Sweeney at that time all of the statements he had
made to Mr. Sweeney at the January 17, 1985 meeting.
11

005Xii

45.

Mr. Kinghorn testified he again made the offer that Mr.

Doms, in an attempt to avoid litigation in this matter, would
deed the property back to the Andersons and the Scotts in exchange for their cancellation of the Trust Deed Note; and they
could keep all payments already received under the Note.
46.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that Mr. Mulhern stated that he

and/or Mr. Sweeney would get back to him; and they assured him
that Mr. Doms would not be expected to make the payment due
January 25, 1985 until they got back to Mr. Kinghorn.
47.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that the next thing he heard

regarding the matter occurred in July of 1985 when Mr. Doms
called him from California and told him that Mr. McCoy in Santa
Monica, California, had received a Summons and Complaint regarding the instant lawsuit and asked Mr. Kinghorn to get further
information about the matter.
48.

The Court then ruled from the bench upon request from

counsel for Defendant Doms that anything which occurred after the
time of the filing of the lawsuit was not to play a part in the
Court's decision with regard to the issue of laches presented by
Plaintiffs, and no further testimony was adduced from Mr. Doms or
Mr. Kinghorn about events subsequent to June of 1985.

12
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II.
MIKE SLOAN'S REPRESENTATIONS ARE NOT BELIEVABLE.

Mike Sloan was called to the stand by Plaintiffs and admitted that he represented the grantors on the deed and the Plaintiffs in the instant case in his discussions with Mr. Doms
regarding purchase of the Anderson parcel.

Although Mr. Sloan

testified that he "believed" that he walked the Anderson parcel
and the Loop Road with Mr. Doms, he could not remember when this
occurred.

He could remember almost no details of this situation

other than the fact that he remembered telling Mr. Doms that
there were some sheds and fence lines which encroached on the
parcel of property he was attempting to sell to Mr. Doms.

He

further testified that he informed Mr. Doms that the boundary of
this property went through the back yard of Elden and Ella
Sorensen, and part of their backyard was on the Anderson parcel.
DEFENDANT DOMS MAINTAINS THAT THIS TESTIMONY IS INHERENTLY
INCREDIBLE AND UNBELIEVABLE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
1.

Mr. Sloan admitted that he had been partners with

grantor and seller Dewey Anderson in at least one joint venture
project.
2.

Mr. Sloan admitted that he was assisting Mr. Anderson in

attempting to sell the property and that he stood to make a
13
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substantial commission from the property; and further, he was
still owed 50% of that commission.
3.

Mr. Sloan admitted that it was possible that he was

mistaken about walking the Loop Road and making the representations to Mr. Doms.
4.

Mr. Sloan's lack of memory of so many details, including

whether or not there was snow on the ground; what month it was;
what day it was; and other details, make it difficult for anyone
to believe that he can remember the specific details of having
walked the property and discussing the encumbrances and encroachments upon the property with Defendant Doms.
5.

Mr. Sloan admitted that he had walked the property with

several others, including at least two developer-investor type
people, and it is clear that he could have easily been confused
attempting to recall something that happened nine years earlier.
6.

In his deposition, which has been published by Order of

the Court and so can be considered as evidence by this Court, Mr.
Sloan did not testify that he had told Mr. Doms that the property
line for the Anderson parcel went through the Sorensensf, and
perhaps other peoples' back yards.
7.

In fact, Mr. Sloan admitted on pages 57-58 of his

deposition that the fact that the roadway existed did not give
him or anyone else he talked with a reason for concern regarding
14
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the property.
8.

Mr. Sloan further testified in his deposition that he

did not think that it was appropriate or necessary to talk with
Mr. Doms or Mr. McCoy about those existing roadways for any
reason; yet he now says in Court he did talk with Mr. Doms about
them.

(See Sloan Deposition, pg. 58, In. 25; pg. 59, Ins.

1,2,3).
9.

Mr. Sloan admitted in his testimony that he thought he

would have taken Mr. Doms to a knoll which had an "exceptionally
nice view of the old town of Park City."
stated on page 62:

In his deposition he

"And as a salesperson I wouldn't miss that

opportunity."
10.

In his deposition, Mr. Sloan was asked whether or not

he remembered what representations he had made to Mr. Doms
concerning the Anderson parcel.
I don't."
11.

He answered, "Specifically, no,

(Sloan Deposition, pg. 42, Ins. 13-18).
Yet at trial Mr. Sloan testified he told Mr. Doms that

certain sheds and backyards encroached upon the Anderson parcel.
However, he admitted he had never seen a survey map showing the
boundaries of the Anderson parcel, and that he had relied only
upon an architectural scheme drawing.

In fact, he wasn't even

sure of what he had looked at to determine the boundaries.
Defendant Eugene E. Doms testified categorically and without
15
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question that he did not walk the property with Mr. Sloan; that
he would only have driven around the property; and that he would
not have purchased the property if he had been told about the
encroachments on the property.
Mr. Doms also testified that he would not have wanted to buy
a piece of property for purposes of development where it would
have been obvious that lawsuits would probably be necessary to
establish the boundary lines to the property.
Mr. Doms further testified he relied upon the representations of Mr. Sloan and the warranties against encumbrances
contained in the Warranty Deed he received from the sellers to
reach the conclusion that the property was not encumbered in any
way.

Mr. Doms testified this was the first time he had purchased

a piece of property for development.
Defendant Doms submits that the testimony of Mike Sloan is
simply inherently unbelievable!

Certainly no potential buyer of

a piece of property, let alone a buyer of a piece of raw ground
who intended to develop it, would ever purchase the property
unconditionally if he had been told by the sellers' agent prior
to the sale (as claimed by Mr. Sloan) that the property had
numerous encroachments, including sheds, roadways, etc.

Further-

more, if any potential buyer had been informed that the property
line ran through someone's backyard, it is simply inherently
16
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unbelievable and inconceivable that such person would go ahead
with the purchase of the property without at least making a
condition that the seller would have to make certain that any
such problems were taken care of before the sale would be consummated!
Surely, the Court cannot believe this inherently unbelievable testimony of Mike Sloan; and Defendant Doms requests the
Court to remember that it is the burden of Plaintiffs who are
asserting the affirmative defense of laches to establish that
such representations had been made to Mr, Doms*
Certainly the Court can also see as a simple matter of logic
that any salesperson attempting to sell a piece of real estate
and obtain a healthy commission for the sale would not present
specific information to the buyer regarding encroachments upon
the property!

Defendant Doms submits that Plaintiffs have failed

to sustain their burden of proof and overcome his testimony that
he specifically did not walk the property with Mr* Sloan and had
not been informed of the encroachments upon the property by Mr.
Sloan*
Furthermore, the Court must consider that Mr. Sloan's
reputation is under attack; and further he must be concerned
about his own potential liability; both good reasons for him to
falsify what he claims to have told Mr* Doms.
17
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The Court ruled from the bench that it accepted the proposition contained in Jones v. Grow Investment Company, and subsequently reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Bergstrom v.
Moore, that even actual notice of encumbrances upon the property
does not relieve the seller from the responsibility of guaranteeing to the buyer that no encumbrances exist pursuant to Utah's
statute involving warranties contained in warranty deeds•
Therefore, the question becomes:

should the Court use some

vague date (which Mike Sloan was not even able to recall) when
Mr. Sloan supposedly told Mr. Doms that the encroachments existed, as the date from which the Court should attempt to determine the period of laches?
Defendant Doms maintains that even if the Court were to
conclude that Mike Sloan were telling the truth, no date prior to
January of 1985 should be used by the Court as a starting date
for laches since Mike Sloan was an agent of the sellers.

If

nothing else, the sellers put themselves on notice through their
agent Mike Sloan, that encumbrances existed.

However, Mr. Sloan

testified in his deposition and at the trial that he had walked
this road with Dewey Anderson.

If the question involved is

notice, Mr. Anderson obviously was aware of the existence of the
Loop Road and the encumbrances and had notice before the property
was ever sold!

Nevertheless, it is Defendant Doms' position,
18
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under any circumstances, that mere knowledge of the Loop Road
itself is not the issue.
be:

The issue for purposes of laches has to

When was Defendant Doms aware that a prescriptive easement

existed upon the Anderson parcel, such as would trigger a violation of the sellers' warranties against encumbrances?
III.
DEFENDANT DOMS WAS DILIGENT AND DID NOT
UNREASONABLY DELAY HIS OFFg&ER TO RESCIND.
It is the contention of Defendant Doms that the date the
Court should use for purposes of determining whether or not
laches should apply in this matter, is the date of January of
1985, when Mr. Kinghorn contacted Mr. Doms and informed him for
the first time that in his legal opinion, the encroachments on
the Anderson parcel were legal prescriptive easements; and that
said easements constituted a violation of the sellers1 warranty
against such encumbrances in the Warranty Deed dated March 10,
1982.

The Court should recall, however, that it was on or about

March 13, 1984, in a meeting with Edward S. Sweeney, when Mr.
Kinghorn first informed Plaintiffs in this case of the possibility of the existence of easements and encumbrances on the property
which could constitute a violation of the warranties against
encumbrances contained in the Warranty Deed.
The Facts portion of this Trial Brief goes into detail about
the efforts of Mr. Doms and Mr. Kinghorn to develop this property
19
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from the time of its purchase, and the problems that were confronted.

The testimony of Mr. Kinghorn and Mr. Doms also show

that it was not until at least the summer of 1983, almost a year
and a half after the property had been transferred by Warranty
Deed, that either one of them became aware of the fact that there
were potential encroachments upon the property which might
constitute prescriptive easements.

Mr. Kinghorn and Mr. Doms

both testified that they then diligently pursued efforts to
determine whether or not these encroachments existed (by obtaining a survey), and further, whether or not these encroachments
constituted legal prescriptive easements due to the length of
time they had been on the property and the ability to force the
sellers to remedy the situation.
Only in January of 1985 was the conclusion drawn by Mr.
Kinghorn, based upon his full investigation, that the encroachments constituted prescriptive easements.

He immediately commu-

nicated that conclusion to Mr. Doms, who contemporaneously
instructed Mr. Kinghorn to negotiate for rescission of the
Warranty Deed.
Even if the Court were to believe the inherently unbelievable testimony of Mike Sloan, the mere fact that Mr. Doms had
been informed of encroachments upon the property did not cause
Mr. Doms to reach any legal conclusions about whether or not such
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encroachments were irremediable and therefore constituted prescriptive easements.

Even Mr. Sloan testified that he had walked

the property with seller Dewey Anderson, and neither he nor Mr.
Anderson drew any conclusions regarding prescriptive easements.
In fact, Mr. Sloan testified that he informed Mr. Doms that the
Loop Road and the encroachments he allegeldy informed him about
were "no problem".

Therefore, Mr. Doms was not put on notice

that legal prescriptive easements existed on the parcel of
property he was about to buy.
In fact, Mr. Sloan admits that he encouraged Mr. Doms to buy
the property and showed him a proposed development plan; and
further, that he told him this was a "prime piece" of developable
property.

Therefore, the Court simply cannot believe that the

delay between the time Mr. Doms learned that there were legal
prescriptive easements upon the property, and the time he instructed his attorney to inform attorneys for the Plaintiffs that
such prescriptive easements existed, was unreasonable in any
fashion.

That period of time was instantaneous.

Mr. Doms and

Mr. Kinghorn both testified that during the same conversation in
which Mr. Kinghorn informed Mr. Doms that in his legal opinion
the encroachments that Mr. Kinghorn had heard about for the first
time in the summer of 1983 were actually prescriptive easements,
Mr. Doms informed Mr. Kinghorn to return to the Plaintiffs in
21
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this case and tender the property back to them for rescission
purposes.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that he made such a rescission

offer to the Plaintiffs and sellers through their attorney Edward
S. Sweeney on January 17, 1985.
Defendant Doms submits that under the facts of this case,
his Counterclaim seeking rescission of the sale and conveyance of
the property cannot be barred by the equitable doctrine of
laches.

There was no unreasonable delay; Defendant Doms and Mr.

Kinghorn were diligent in all respects relating to this matter;
and Defendant Doms has clearly exhibited the utmost good faith by
his attempts to negotiate a fair and reasonable settlement of the
dispute short of the protracted litigation now before this Court.
In "Plaintiffs' Trial Brief," dated April 16, 1990, submitted to the Court on the first day of trial, Plaintiffs cite
language from Egeter v. West & North Properties, 758 P.2d 361,
364 (Ore.App. 1988), as their leading case in regard to the issue
of laches.

Counsel for Defendant Doms submits that the citation

of the language from Egeter contained on page 3 of Plaintiffs'
Trial Brief is a calculated and deliberate attempt by counsel for
Plaintiffs to mislead this Court!

What Plaintiffs deliberately

have failed to point out to the Court is that the Oregon Court of
Appeals, analyzing a factual situation strikingly similar to the
instant case, held that an unmaintained dirt road did not consti22
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tute a sufficiently open and notorious condition to charge the
buyers with knowledge of its existence, even though the buyers
had been on the road and observed that it ran the entire length
of the parcel prior to the time they bought the property!
Although Plaintiffs have attached numerous cases as Exhibits
to their Trial Brief, a copy of the Egeter case was not attached
as an Exhibit, even though it is the lead case for Plaintiffs'
laches arguments.

Upon examination of this case, counsel for

Defendant Doms submits that it will be readily apparent to the
Court why a copy of Egeter was not attached.

Counsel for Defen-

dant Doms would ask the Court to carefully review this case,
which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
The Court will note that the Oregon Court of Appeals in
Egeter discussed the issue of laches in regard to one seeking to
rescind a contract, and held as follows:
A person seeking to rescind a contract must
do so promptly after obtaining knowledge of the
facts constituting the grounds for rescission.
(Citations omitted). However, delay alone
cannot constitute a waiver of the right to
rescind. (Citation omitted). A buyer is not
required to act immediately to rescind, so long
as he acts within a reasonable time. (Citation
omitted). Further, courts have recognized that
there may be a sufficient explanation for the
delay, even if it seems long. (Citations
omitted). We agree with the trial court that,
under the circumstances, plaintiffs did not
delay so long as to waive their right to rescind. The trial court did not err in rescinding the contract. (Emphasis added). 758 P.2d
23
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at 364-365.
Defendant Doms does not dispute the well-established rule
that one seeking to rescind must do so promptly after obtaining
knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for rescission.
The Utah Supreme Court has reiterated this general proposition in
many of its decisions.
The facts of the instant case clearly indicate that Mr. Doms
did act promptly after obtaining knowledge that the Loop Road and
lot encroachments constituted prescriptive easements on the
Plaintiffs1 argument that Defendant Doms is required

propertyI

under the law of rescission to seek rescission before he had
knowledge that he possessed grounds for rescission is just plain
inaccuate.

Even when presented with the same conclusive evidence

as presented in this trial, Plaintiffs refused to even respond to
the offer of Mr. Doms communicated by his attorney, Mr. Kinghorn
in January and again in March of 1985.
their foreclosure action.

Rather, Plaintiffs filed

Defendant Doms submits that this shows

a clear lack of good faith on the part of Plaintiffs, and that
they cannot now come into a court of equity and ask for relief in
equity.

They do not possess "clean hands".

The testimony of Mr. Doms and Mr. Kinghorn in this trial has
established that Mr. Doms diligently pursued a reasonable and
logical course of action to determine the nature and extent of
24
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the encroachments on the property.

It must be kept in mind, that

surveys take a considerable amount of time to complete, especially in the Park City area due to the long winters.

Furthermore,

Mr. Doms simply cannot in equity and fairness be punished for any
delays caused by the inadequate work of professionals he retained
to survey the property or the length of time it took such professionals to complete these surveys.
Counsel for Defendant Doms further submits that Plaintiffs
have again attempted to mislead this Court by citing language
from the Utah Supreme Court case of Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d
632, 637 (Utah 1984), on page 3 of Plaintiff's Trial Brief!
In Baker, the Utah Supreme Court was dealing with an action to
set aside a warranty deed on the grounds of undue influence by
one in a confidential relationship with the grantees, an elderly
couple.

The language cited by Plaintiffs on page 3 of their

Trial Brief is actually a synopsis of an Oklahoma case which
directly addressed the issue of fraud, undue influence and lack
of mental capacity.

The full quotation from Baker is set forth

as follows:
In In re Woodward, Okla., 549 P.2d 1207 (1976),
the nieces of a decedent attempted to set aside
a joint tenancy deed in favor of their brothers
on the grounds of fraud, undue influence and
lack of mental capacity. In holding that the
statute of limitations had expired on a claim
of fraud and undue influence, the court stated
that the means of discovering fraud and undue
25
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influence came into the hands of the plaintiffs
when the deed was filed of record and that they
failed to exercise ordinary diligence in discovering it.
(Emphasis added). 684 P.2d at
637.
The underlined language above is the only language cited by
Plaintiffs in their Trial Brief!

The Utah Supreme Court, in

Baker, was simply stating what the Oklahoma Supreme Court had
held in regard to the specific issue of cancelling a deed based
upon claims of fraud, undue influence and lack of mental capacity.

Furthermore, the next paragraph of Baker reveals that 14

years had elapsed after the deed was recorded, before cancellation was sought.

This case simply has no application to the

case now before the Court!
Counsel for Defendant Doms submits that the remaining cases
and authorities cited in Plaintiffs' Trial Brief in regard to the
issue of rescission and laches are clearly distinguishable on
their facts and simply do not stand for the selective propositions claimed by Plaintiffs.

Defendant Doms does not dispute the

well-established law that one cannot rescind, after he receives
knowledge of the fraud, if he waits an unreasonable amount of
time to seek rescission.

As pointed out by Plaintiffs, this is

the established law in Utah.

The cases of Perry v. Woodall, 438

P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968) and Frailey v. McGarry, 211 P.2d 840,
845 (Utah 1949), cited on pages 4-5 of Plaintiffs' Trial Brief,
26
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simply reiterate the long-established law in Utah that one, after
learning all of the facts which indicate that he haswbeen defrauded, or in other words, after discovery of the fraud, has a
duty to act promptly in seeking rescission.
This is exactly what Mr. Doms did in the instant case!
After diligently attempting to determine whether the encroachments constituted prescriptive easements on the land and would
therefore constitute a lawful ground for rescission based upon
breach of the covenants contained in the Warranty Deed, Mr. Doms,
through his attorney at that time, Mr. Kinghorn, promptly offered
a deal to Plaintiffs which was even better than rescission as far
as Plaintiffs' position is concerned!
CONCLUSION
This is a case of equity.

Equity dictates that the Court

make a fair and just determination with regard to the affirmative
defense of laches and whether or not Mr. Doms should be estopped
from receiving rescission of the March 10, 1982 Warranty Deed
because of unreasonable delay.

The burden of proof in this case

is on the Plaintiffs to establish this affirmative defense, and
they have failed miserably.

Utah law provides that in order to

find laches, the Court must find that there was a lack of diligence on the part of Defendant Doms in notifying Plaintiffs of
the violation of the warranty against encumbrances.
27
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The facts

and evidence show that from the date Mr. Doms purchased the
property, March 10, 1982, through the summer of 1983; he and his
attorney Gerald H. Kinghorn diligently pursued efforts to develop
the Anderson parcel in a combined development as had been represented to him to be possible by the real estate agent of the
sellers and Plaintiffs in this case.

The evidence further shows

that from the time Mr. Kinghorn first learned of the possibility
of prescriptive easements on the property, he diligently pursued
efforts to come to a legal conclusion with regard to that issue.
The evidence further shows that upon Mr. Kinghornfs reaching his
legal conclusion that such prescriptive easements did exist, he
immediately communicated his opinion to Mr. Doms, who immediately
instructed Mr. Kinghorn to tender the property back to Plaintiffs.

There simply can be no finding of unreasonable delay in

this case.
Furthermore, laches also requires a showing that somehow,
Plaintiffs have been injured by whatever delay the Court finds to
be unreasonable.

Even if the Court were to find unreasonable

delay, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence whatsoever as to how
they may have been injured by such unreasonable delay, if it
existed.
Finally, Plaintiffs are the ones who have the burden of
proof to establish their affirmative defense.
28
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They have failed

to do so.

Therefore, Defendant Doms urges the Court to reject

Plaintiffs' argument regarding laches and to rule that rescission
is the appropriate remedy in this case and allow the parties to
present additional arguments with regard to how such rescission
should occur and the other issues raised in the pleadings and the
Pretrial Order.
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Q

1

Avenue that had an inside pool that you or your brother

2

may have owned an interest in the unit?

3
4

Do you remember showing Mr. Doms a condo unit on Park

IA

I—I don't recall showing him that particularly, but

we did own a unit, Silver Town that had an inside pool.
6

I We owned Unit 406.

7

JQ
A

8

9 IQ

Did it involve a red brick unit?
Yes.
But other than that, most of the conversations then

10

were about this Rossi Hill property?

11

A

t2

mentioned the King Road property.

13

Q

14

the Rossi Hill property to Mr. Doms and attempting to sell

15

him on the idea of purchasing the parcel for development,

16

do you remember what representations you made to him

*7

regarding that property?

18

A

Specifically, no, I don't.

19

Q

Did you tell Mr. Doms that you believed that it was

20

the best undeveloped piece of property outside of Deer

21

Valley within walking distance to town?

22

A

I believe that I would have said that, yes.

23

Q

Did you tell him that the city was in favor of the

24

I believe I—at the same time, I probably would have

All right.

Now, at the time you were talking about

J development project, which would include the entire Rossi
1

Hill Parcel that we've shown you as Exhibit 3?
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-

A

I believe I did, yes.

2

Q

Uo"-yoii recall when you would have told him?

3

A

I do not recall when, but my recollection is that it

4

was discussed in conjunction with that plat

5

because the encroachments were of a nature that the roads

9

would b e — i t would be away from the property that was

7

needed to put the roads in.

8

Q

9

Sloan?

(indicating),

Do you know what a prescriptive easement is, Mr.

10

A

11

vague working knowledge of it, yes.

12

Q

13

person uses an area for ingress and egress to their

n

property for at least 20 years that they then have a right

IS

of passage and easement, even though it may not be

1

If I had to give you a definition, no.

Are you aware of Utah law which provides that if a

* J recorded?

Are you familiar_w:ith__that_aspect

17

'A

18

Q

19

be unrecorded easements with Mr. Anderson?

20

A

21

Q

I have a

of Utah law?

I anu
Did y^u p^*>r rlisrn^ thp possibility that these may

flo,

X-did not.

Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Doms?

22
I A

No.

I did not.

23

Q

Or Mr. McCoy?

24

A

Not to my knowledge, no.

25

*

Q

g

Essentially the fact that these roadways existed did

5L
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57

not give you or anyone that you talked with regarding this
property a reason for concern?

Is that a fair, st**"^**™*0

A

Yes.

Q

Did you ever walk the property with Ellen Anderson?

A

Not to my knowledge.

Q

Or Dan Scott?

A

No.

Q

Have you ever talked to any of the property owners

that front onto Ontario that may have a claim to this
roadway?
A

Never.

Q

Now, Mr. Sloan, answer me thisf if you will.

You

have previously identified Exhibit 3 as an exhibit that
you provided to Mr. Doms. At least, the first page and
the fourth page of this exhibit.
A

I think I've—I think that I said that I felt that I

could have.
Q

Could have provided it, but you weren't certain?

A

Right.

Q

Let's be accurate about it.

The exhibit that you—

Exhibit 3—which you could have provided to Mr. Doms
doesn't show the existing roadways or the then existing
roadways on the property, does it?
A

No, it does not.

Q

Did you at any time think it appropriate or necessary

RONALD F. HUBBARD
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t o t a l k with flrr nmng anH Mr. MrPny f|fr°"t t h o s e e x i s t i n g
roadways for any reason?
A

No.

Q

Have you ever been involved with any transactions

regarding Block 62 owned by Investors Ltd.?

I'd like to

show you a better map, if I could.
A

I know—the parcel you're speaking of—my only

involvement, I believe, would have been in trying to put
Mac Development, which is Bruce McMullen, into a position
to purchase that along with the Anderson parcel.
Q

Were you ever involved in the transaction which

changed ownership of that parcel to the best of your
recollection?
A

No.

Q

Were you ever involved with Investor's Ltd., as a

group or as an organization?
A

No.

Q

Let me ask you the same question with regard to the

Slipper parcel.

Have you ever been involved in a

transaction which transferred ownership of the Slipper
parcel?
A

No.

Q

Or involved in the Slipper parcel in any other way

than what you've talked about here today?
A

No.
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CQ

MR. KELLER:

1

you showed to the witness?

2
3

I

4
5

Mr. Biele, may I ask what the note was

MR. BIELE:

I'm going to ask him a question when

you're through.
I

MR. KELLER:

Oh, you're going to ask him a question.

6

And I have no objection to that, but I think I'm entitled,

7

since he's not your client, to know what your notes to him

8

are.

9

him a note, and I'd like to know what the note says.

And I'd like the record to reflect that he passed to

10

MR. BIELE:

11

MR. KELLER:

12

says, sir.

I'd just like to know what the note

That's all.

13

MR. BIELE:

1*

MR. KELLER:

15

May I ask him a question?

Let me ask a question.
Well, I'm going to ask you to answer my

question on the record.

What was the note you passed to

16 I Mr. Sloan?
17

MR. BIELE:

18

j "with Doms and McCoy"?

19

I

20

21

Q

Thank you very much.

(By Mr. Keller)

Now, my next question is, are you

I aware of any appraisals of the Anderson parcel prior to

22

23

MR. KELLER:

I asked him, "Did you walk the property

the sale of property in this situation to Doms and McCoy?
I A

24 ,
25 ,

I believe that there was one.

I don't believe that I

ever saw one.
Q

Do you know if one would have been a part of your
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records?
A

No, I'm pretty certain that it would not have been.

I believe that Dewey told me that he had an appraisal on

4

^the property that was so much per lot, or whatever; but I"

5

don't believe that I ever physically saw one or had one in

6

my possession.

7

Q

8

McCoy?

9

A

I believe I didf yes.

10

Q

Which one?

11

A

I believe—my mind tells me both of them, but I am

12

certain that I would have at least with Mr. Doms.

13

Q

14

Sloan.

15

A

I could not.

16

Q

Who else was present?

17

A

I don't recall.

18

Q

Why are you so certain, if you can't recall?

19

A

Because of the question that you asked me earlier

20

about my representation about the property being so

21

outstanding and the best development parcel in Park City.

22

You have to stand on it to know and believe it.

23

that reagpri pypryh^y

24

to walk them out on the property.

25

Did you ever walk the property with Mr. Doms or Mr.

You're certain of that?

Tell me when that was, Mr.

I don't recall.

fhaf T

+a<IVc^ ^ ,

T

And for

uta^e an effort

There is a nice knoll

out on about Lot 15 that has a nice, very nice,

RONAUO F HUBBARD
2 3 0 J U O O C BUILDING
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3

exceptionally nice view of the old town of Park City. And
^
^
as a salesperson I wouldn't miss that opportunity.
Q
So you might have stopped on that knoll with him?

4

A

5

call the turnaround down ?+• +»Ho Hrvt-f rflTL^J^fr*a"°° one of the

6

other things that—in looking at the map that is drawn, or

7

the schematic plan that was drawn, you have to understand

8

that the lower units, the lower units are going to have a

9

O^ery nice view and that the upper units are going to be in

1
2

J
|

I believe that I walked clear down around what we

|

10

such a way that they will look over that view.

11

Q

12

Doms never walked that property?

13

A

Yes, it would.

1*

Q

Because you specifically remember him walking that

IS

property, is that correct, under oath you're telling us?

16

A

Yes.

|

17

Q

What was said and by whom during that conversation?

j

18

A

I don't recall.

19

Q

What time of day was it?

20

A

I do not recall.

21

Q

What time of year was it?

22

A

I do not recall.

23

Q

How can you be positive about something, Mr. Sloan,

24

that you can't recall any of the details of?

25

A

Would you be surprised to learn, Mr. Sloan, that Mr.
Would that surprise you?

""~~

|

I guess I would have to throw it back and ask Mr.
;
RONALD F. HUBBARD
23O JUOOC SUILOIMO
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United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. his voluntary choice." 437 U.S. at 99, 98
117, 128, 101 S.Ct 426, 432, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 S.Ct at 2198.
(1980), quoting Burks v. United States,
The circumstances of this case are strik437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct 2141, 2147, 57 ingly similar to those in Scott After the
L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). The double jeopardy state had presented its case and jeopardy
clause prohibits retrying a defendant for had attached, defendant moved for a judgthe same offense after a judgment of ac- ment of acquittal. The trial court granted
quittal has been entered. See United the motion because of a variance between
States v. Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at 91, 98 the proof and the accusatory instrument
S.Ct at 2193. A defendant is "acquitted" The record does not indicate that the state
for double jeopardy purposes only when failed to establish defendant's guOt Guilt
some or all of the factual elements of the or innocence was not resolved at the first
offense charged are actually resolved in trial. Furthermore, the state was not afthe defendant's favor. United States v. forded an opportunity to supply evidence at
Dahlstrum, 655 F.2d 971, 974 (9th Cir. the second trial that it did not produce at
1981), cert den. 455 U.S. 928, 102 S.Ct the first trial. The granting of defendant's
1293, 71 L.Ed.2d 472 (1982). The trial motion, therefore, does not invoke the fedcourt's characterization of its own action as
eral prohibition against double jeopardy,
an "acquittal'1 is not controlling. United
United States v. Scott, supra, and the
States v. Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at 97, 98
state
was not barred from prosecuting deS.Ct at 2197. A defendant suffers "no
fendant
again.
injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause • • • " when he deliberately
Affirmed.
seeks and obtains termination of the proceedings in the trial c o u r t j ^ n a basis
unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.
United States v. Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at
98-99, 98 S.Ct at 2198; see United States
v. Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 678-79 (9th
Cir.), cert den. 479 U.S.
, 107 S.Ct
290, 93 L.Ed.2d 264 (1986).
92 OrApp. 118
In Scott, the defendant moved to dismiss
IngSteven R. EGETER and Linda M.
the first count of his indictment for preinEgeter, husband and wife, and
dictment delay. The trial court granted the
Roth V. Egeter, Respondents,
motion at the close of all the evidence,
v.
after jeopardy had "attached." 437 U.S. at
WEST
AND
NORTH
PROPERTIES, Ore95, 98 S.Ct at 2196. The defendant thus
gon
Ltd,,
a
limited
partnership, and
"successfully avoided * * * submission
Patrick
Gisler,
General
Partner, Appelof the first count of the indictment [to
lants,
the jury] by persuading the trial court to
dismiss it on a basis which did not deand
pend on guilt or innocence. He was thus
Cameron Cliff and Jane Doe Cliff,
neither acquitted nor convicted, because
husband and wife, Defendants.
he himself successfully undertook to per83-134CV-1; CA A43344.
suade the trial court not to submit the
issue of guilt or innocence to the jury
Court of Appeals of Oregon.
which had been empaneled to try him."
437 UJS. at 99, 98 S.Ct at 2198.
Argued and Submitted Jan. 25, 1988.
The Court concluded that the defendant
Decided July IS, 1988.
could not claim former jeopardy, because
the double jeopardy clause "guards against
government oppression, [but] does not rePurchasers brought suit to rescind
lieve a defendant from the consequences of land sale contract The Circuit Court, Kla-

finS I *3fl
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math County, Rodger J. Isaacson, J., allowed rescission, and the vendor appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Van Hoomissen, J.,
held that neighbor's use of unrecorded
easement was sufficient encumbrance to
allow rescission of contract
Affirmed.

1. Vendor and Purchaser *»I34
At common law, open and notorious
conditions are not encumbrances, even
though they are not excepted from the
warranty of title, because they are visible
for all to see.
2. Vendor and Purchaser *=»138
A purchaser of real property has an
obligation to inspect the property and to be
aware of open and notorious conditions.
3. Vendor and Purchaser *=»I38
Purchasers are deemed to have purchased the property with the knowledge of
the existence of any easements which reasonably could have been discovered.
4. Easements *=»22
Easement, although a public road, was
not so open and notorious that purchasers
were chargeable with knowledge of its existence where road was not maintained and
was not shown in county records and vendor's agent represented that purchasers
had right to lock out the public and»denied
that neighbor's easement claim was valid.
5. Vendor and Purchaser *=» 135(1)
The existence of an unrecorded easement that is not open and notorious is an
encumbrance and does constitute a material breach of contract.
6. Vendor and Purchaser «=»112(1)
Neighbor's use of easement to drive
cattle was sufficient encumbrance to warrant rescission of a real estate contract,
where, although not frequent, would interfere with purchasers' construction and use
of a residence.
7. Vendor and Purchaser «=»119
A person seeking to rescind a contract
must do so promptly after obtaining knowl-

edge of the facts constituting the grounds
for rescission.
8. Contracts *»262
Delay alone cannot constitute a waiver
of the right to rescind.
9. Vendor and Purchaser *»119
A buyer of land is not required to act
immediately to rescind, so long as he acts
within a reasonable time.
10. Vendor and Purchaser *=»114
Purchasers did not delay so long as to
waive their right to rescind; purchasers
contended that vendor's categorical denial
of the existence of an easement created the
delay.
Gerald A. Martin, Bend, argued the
cause for appellants. With him on the
briefs was Francis & Martin, Bend.
Claud Ingram, Eugene, argued the cause
for respondents. With him on the brief
was Bick & Monte, P.C., Eugene.
Before WARDEN, PJ., JOSEPH,
CJ., and VAN HOOMISSEN, J.
j^oVAN HOOMISSEN, Judge.
Defendant West and North Properties
(West) appeals from a judgment declaring
that defendants Cliff have an easement
over the parcel of property which plaintiffs
purchased from West and also rescinding
plaintiffs' land sale contract for that parcel.
The issues are whether the easement constitutes an encumbrance sufficient to allow
rescission and whether plaintiffs delayed
too long in seeking to rescind. On de novo
review, ORS 19.125(3), we affirm.
West's real estate agent showed plaintiffs the subject property in February,
1981. The agent drove than to the proper*
ty on the road which gave rise to this claim.
At that time, there were at least six inches
of snow on the ground. The road showed
little use, and trees and brush had to be
moved to drive on i t The real estate agent
represented that the "old stagecoach road"
ran alongside, not on the property, but did
provide legal access to it
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On May 8, 1981, plaintiffs and West entered into an earnest money agreement for
the property. Plaintiffs were on the property again in the spring of 1981 and
reached it by the same road that they had
used before. They observed that the road
ran across the entire parcel and that there
were gates at each end. They also observed cattle droppings on the property.
On September 10, 1981, the parties executed a land sale contract
In the spring of 1982, plaintiffs were
back on the property and saw cattle grazing there. They wrote a letter to Cameron
Cliff, explaining that they had placed locks
on the gates and sending him a key. On
June 14, plaintiffs received a letter from
Cameron advising them that he had an
easement across the property and that he
did not want the gates locked. Plaintiffs
could not reach him, because he was out of
town for the summer.
Plaintiffs consulted an attorney, who
wrote to West regarding the claimed easement West's attorney responded that the
Cliffs did not have an easement and suggested that plaintiffs resolve the matter by
litigation with the Cliffs. Plaintiffs went
to the property after Labor Day. They
testified that at that time, the road was
not well defined and that there imwere

West contends that the road does not
constitute an encumbrance, because it was
open and notorious and therefore known to
plaintiffs. It argues that the road is a
continuation of the road which provided
access to the property and that hait extends through the property with a gate at
each end. Plaintiffs argue that the road
was covered with snow the first time that
they aaw it, that it is nothing more than a
dirt trafl which had not been maintained

1. The trial court did not make any findings of
fact regarding the road and whether it was the
old stagecoach road (a public road) or a private
road over which the Cliffs could have an easement Defendants Cliff moved for summary
judgment, contending that they had an easement. The trial court ruled that there was a
question of fact regarding the status of the road
as public or private and denied the motion.
Following a telephone conference, the court issued the following order:
"At the time of the conference [call], Mr.
Johnson [Cliffs' attorney] pointed out that the
Court, in ruling on the motion for summary
judgment submitted on behalf of the Estate of
Cameron Cliff, deceased, and Ruth Cliff, determined that the issue of fact which remained was whether the road in question is a
public way or a private easement. He stated
that his clients had no further interest in the
case if in fact the only issue regarding the
road was its status either as a public way or a
private easement and that they were solely
concerned with their ability to travel over it
across the land in question and to transport
their cattle across it. Mr. Martin [West's attorney] pointed out that their pleadings had

admitted the existence of the road either as a
public way or a private easement, depending
on proof at trial Mr. Ingram [Egeters' attorney] stated he had no objection to the status
of the road being limited to that issue. Plaintiffs had filed no response to Defendants
Cliffs' motion for summary judgment.
-NOW THEREFORE. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that for purposes of trial the existence of the road is established but its status as
a public way or an easement existing in favor
of the Estate of Cameron Cliff and Ruth Cliff
remains in issue."
The imrnriffri judgment provides, in relevant
part:
"3. The estate of Cameron Cliff and Ruth
Cliff, pursuant to an Order entered herein*
have an easement over the subject pmucrty in
the location of the existing road."
The status of the road as public or private does
not affect the outcome of the dispute between
plaintiffs and West. Whether the road is public
or private, it constitutes a material breach of
contract. We do not decide whether the trial
court was correct in awarding the Cliffs an
easement.

trees down over it There was no evidence
of maintenance.
In December, plaintiffs decided that the
existence of the road easement was unacceptable to them; it runs through the area
in which they planned to build a house.
They ceased making payments that month
and sought a declaratory judgment in January, 1983. During Cameron Cliffs deposition, plaintiffs were told that the road is a
public road and is the old stagecoach road.
It does not appear in the Klamath County
records, but West found a map at the Oregon Historical Society showing the location
of the road on the property. The trial
court granted plaintiffs rescission and
awarded the Cliffs an easement over the
road.1
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and that it could only be used by removing
brush from it
[1-4] At common law, open and notorious conditions are not encumbrances, even
though they are not excepted from the
warranty of title, because they are visible
for all to see. A purchaser has the obligation to inspect the property and to be
aware of such conditions. Purchasers are
deemed to have purchased the property
with the knowledge of the existence of any
easements which reasonably could have
been discovered. Ford v. White, 179 Or.
490, 495-96, 172 P.2d 822 (1946); Barnum
v. Lockhart, 75 Or. 528, 540, 146 P. 975
(1915). It is not clear whether that rule
applies to a statutory warranty deed. In
Leach v. Gunnarson, 290 Or. 31, 40-42,
619 P.2d 263 (1980), the court recognized
that, although the purpose of the rule is to
put the onus on the buyer, not all conditions are obvious enough. 290 Or. at 42,
619 P.2d 263. Although the present case
does involve a public road, the road has not
been maintained and is not shown in the
county records. In reaching the parcel,
Wests agent drove plaintiffs across several parcels and at one point located a hidden
key to open a gate. West's agent represented to plaintiffs that they had the right
to lock out the public In addition, once
plaintiffs had informed West of the Cliffs'
claim, West denied that it was valid. We
agree with the trial court that the ease-*
ment is not so open and notorious that
plaintiffs should be charged with knowledge of its existence.
West next argues that, considering the
use which has been made of the roadway, it
does not constitute a material defect in the
title and that, therefore, plaintiffs are not
entitled to rescission. It points out that
Cameron Cliffs deposition establishes that
his only use of the road is to drive cattle in
the spring and again in the fall and that he
makes an occasional trip in the summer to
check on the cattle. Further, he did not
object to having the gates closed, only to
having them locked. West also argues
that, although plaintiffs claim that the
easement would interfere with their
planned building site, the actual recorded

road easement runs through a portion of
the building site and presumably would
have caused more interference.
[5,6] iiaPlaintiffs argue that the existence of the Cliffs' easement is a material
defect in the title. An encumbrance is
"any right to or interest in the land,
subsisting in a third person, to the diminution of the value of the land, though
consistent with the passing of the fee by
conveyance." Ford v. White, supra, 179
Or. at 494, 172 P.2d 822.
The existence of an unrecorded easement
that is not open and notorious is an encumbrance and does constitute a material
breach of contract Leach v. Gunnarson,
supra, 290 Or. at 42, 619 P.2d 263; Marshall v. Wattles, 67 OrApp. 442, 448, 678
P.2d 762 (1984). Use of the easement, although not frequent, would certainly interfere with the construction and use of a
residence. That is sufficient reason to allow rescission.
West contends that plaintiffs waited too
long to rescind the contract It argues
that, before June, 1982, plaintiffs became
aware that Cliff was using the road across
that property, that nothing changed between June and December of that year and
that plaintiffs waited until December to
stop making payments and untO January to
initiate this action. Plaintiffs argue that
they acted with reasonable diligence in
electing to rescind, that it was West's categorical denial of the existence of the easement that created the delay and that the
delay, if any, was not sufficient to deny
their right to rescind.
[7-10] A person seeking to rescind a
contract must do so promptly after obtaining knowledge of the facts constituting the
grounds for rescission. Engelking v.
Field, 268 Or. 537, 542, 522 P.2d 493 (1974);
Miller v. Barker, 233 Or. 113,123, 377 P.2d
343 (1962); Porras v. Bass, 63 OrApp. 832,
836, 665 P.2d 1249, rev. den. 295 Or. 840,
671 P.2d 1176 (1983). However, delay
alone can not constitute a waiver of the
right to rescind. McDonald v. Shore, 285
Or. 151, 157, 590 P.2d 218 (1979). A buyer
is not required to act immediately to rescind, so long as he acts within a reason-
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able time. Brown et ux v. Hasaerutab et
uz, 212 Or. 246, 256-57, 319 P.2d 929
(1957). Further, courts have recognized
that there may be a sufficient explanation
for the delay, even if it seems long. See
Bodenhamer v. Patterson, 278 Or. 367,
375-76, 563 P.2d 1212 (1977); Hampton v.
Sabin, 49 Or.App. 1041, 621 R2d 1202
(1980). We agree with the trial court that,
under the circumstances, plaintiffs did not
delay so long as to waive their right to
rescind. The trial court did not err in
rescinding the contract
1 laiAffirmed.
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1. Criminal Law *»435
Police officer who testifies at criminal
trial may read relevant portions of his po*
lice report into record if he has insufficient
present recollection to testify fully and accurately, notwithstanding rule of evidence
barring admission of police reports into evidence. Rules of Evid., Rule 803(5), (8KB).
2. Criminal Law <*=»662.40
Defendant was not denied his federal
and State constitutional rights to confront
witnesses when police officer was permitted to read portion of police report into
evidence as recorded recollection concerning matters of which officer had no present
recollection, where defendant had opportunity effectively to cross-examine officer
who was author of police report U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 6; Const Art 1, § 11.
Clint A. Lonergan, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the brief for appellant

92 OnApp. 149
I149STATE of Oregon, Respondent,

Stephanie Smythe, Asst Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent
With her on the brief were Dave Prohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Lander,
Sol. Gen., Salem.

v.

Alan James SCALLY, Appellant
M 695718; CA A45879.
Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Before WARDEN, PJ.f and VAN
HOOMISSEN and GRABER, JJ.

Argued and Submitted May 31, 1988.
Decided July 13, 1988.

Following trial before the District
Court, Multnomah County, William J.
Keys, J., defendant was convicted of driving under influence of intoxicants, and he
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Graber,
J., held that (1) permitting police officer
who had no present recollection to read
pertinent portion of police report to jury
was proper under rule permitting recorded
recollection, even though police report itself was inadmissible, and (2) reading portion of police report to jury did not violate
defendant's constitutional rights to confront witnesses.
Affirmed.
1. Defendant raises no other objection to the
admission of his statements made at the time of

r\l>

j^GRABER, Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction for
driving under the influence of intoxicants.
ORS 813.010. He argues that the court
erred in admitting testimony, under OEC
803(5), from the arresting police officer.
We affirm.
At trial, the officer testified to circumstances surrounding the stop and the arrest of defendant He had no present recollection of several questions that he had
asked or of the answers that defendant had
given. However, that information was contained in the police report that the officer
had prepared shortly after the arrest The
court allowed him to read the pertinent
portion of the report to the jury.1
his arrest.
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CONVEYANCES

57-1-12

57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect.
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form:
WARRANTY DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to
(insert name),
grantee, of
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
day of
,
19
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights and privileges
thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from all
encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives
will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs and
assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such covenants may be briefly inserted in such deed following the description of the
land.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1981;
C.L. 1917, § 4881; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-1-11.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
In an action by a grantee against his grantor
for breach of warranty because in a quiet title
action between the grantor and a third person,
the title was quieted in the third person, the
grantor cannot assert the defense that because
the third party had filed no lis pendens the
grantee was not bound by the earlier decree.
Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559, 252 P.2d 538
(1953).

ANALYSIS

Actions for breach of warranty.
Appurtenances.
—Parol evidence.
—Water rights.
Covenant against encumbrances.
Covenants running with land.
Determination of character of instrument.
"Encumbrances" construed.
Formal requirements.
—Presumptions.
—Signature of witness.
Interest conveyed.
Liability of grantor.
—Materialman's lien.
Limitation of actions.
Vendor's lien.
Way of necessity.
Actions for breach of warranty.
Where paramount title is in sovereign, purchaser may yield to that title, and such yielding constitutes constructive eviction which will
support action on covenant of warranty. East
Canyon Land & Stock Co. v. Davis & Weber
Counties Canal Co., 65 Utah 560, 238 P. 280
(1925).

Appurtenances.
On severance of estate by sale of part
thereof, all easements of permanent character
that have been created in favor of land sold,
and which are open and plain to be seen, and
are reasonably necessary for its use and convenient enjoyment, unless expressly reserved by
grantees, pass as appurtenances to land; cement walk constructed in front of several lots
which was used as easement in connection
with use and occupation of lots passed as an
appurtenance to lots on sale thereof. Rollo v.
Nelson, 34 Utah 116, 96 P. 263, 26 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 315 (1908).
A warranty deed conveys the fee simple title
"together with all the appurtenances, rights
and privileges thereunto belonging," by force
of this section, unless some rights are reserved
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grantee. Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 123 Utah
123, 255 P.2d 989 (1953).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 32
et seq.

C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 22.
Key Numbers. — Deeds e=> 29.

57-1-14. Form of mortgage — Effect.
A mortgage of land may be substantially in the following form:
MORTGAGE
(here insert name), mortgagor, of
(insert
place of residence), hereby mortgages to
(insert name),
mortgagee, of
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises).
This mortgage is given to secure the following indebtedness (here state
amount and form of indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and to
whom payable and where).
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on said premises, and the sum of
dollars attorneys' fee in case of foreclosure.
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this
day of
,
19
Such mortgage when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a
conveyance of the land therein described, together with all the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the mortgagee, his heirs,
assigns and legal representatives, as security for the payment of the indebtedness thereon set forth, with covenants from the mortgagor of general warranty of title, and that all taxes and assessments levied and assessed upon the
land described, during the continuance of the mortgage, will be paid previous
to the day appointed for the sale of such lands for taxes; and may be foreclosed
as provided by law upon any default being made in any of the conditions
thereof as to payment of either principal, interest, taxes or assessments.
History: R S . 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1983;
C.L. 1917, § 4883; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-1-13.
Cross-References. — Failure to discharge
mortgage after satisfaction, § 57-3-8.

Foreclosure of mortgages, § 78-37-1 et seq.
Mortgage not deemed a conveyance,
§ 78-40-8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Conveyance" construed.
Deed or mortgage.
Destruction of mortgaged property.
Equitable mortgage.
Form.
Title to mortgaged property.
Water rights.

"Conveyance" construed.
The term "conveyance," as used in this section, covers only transactions involving mortgages or encumbrances of land and not transfers of title or estate in view of § 57-1-1, so that
a provision in this section that a mortgage in a
statutory form "shall have the effect of a conveyance of the land" is not inconsistent with
former § 104-57-7, Code 1943 (§ 78-40-8) pro-
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57-1-17

REAL ESTATE
construction of house according to agreement,
but who used position to coerce mortgagor m
another transaction, could not claim that he
was acting in good faith so as to escape liability
under this section for failure to satisfy mortgage. Swaner v Union Mtg Co., 99 Utah 298,
105 P2d 342 (1940)

Attorney's fee.
Attorney's fees incurred by mortgagor in
bringing suit to cancel mortgage and note and
to recover damages against mortgagee were
proper item of damage to be assessed against
mortgagee Swaner v Union Mtg. Co , 99 Utah
298, 105 P.2d 342 (1940)
Defenses.
—Good faith.
Where a bank, relying upon the advice of
attorney and honestly thinking it had valid
and subsisting mortgages against appellant
which had not been satisfied, refused to release
the mortgages, it was acting in good faith and
was not liable for damages under this section
Shibata v Bear River State Bank, 115 Utah
395, 205 P.2d 251 (1949).
Liability of mortgagee.
—Breach of contract
Mortgagee who refused to advance money for

Proof of damages.
Where there are both chattel mortgages and
real estate mortgages which are not released it
is not incumbent that the person damaged separate and prove separately his damages.
Nalder v Kellogg Sales Co., 4 Utah 2d 117,
288 P2d 456 (1955)
Statutory construction.
This section is penal in nature and should be
strictly construed Shibata v. Bear River State
Bank, 115 Utah 395, 205 P.2d 251 (1949).

57-1-17, 57-1-18. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, § 24 repeals
§ 57-1-17 and 57-1-18, Utah Code Annotated

1953, relating to powers of attorney, effective
July 1, 1988

57-1-19. Trust deeds — Definitions of terms.
As used in Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36:
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in a
trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his
successor in interest.
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed
as security for the performance of an obligation.
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections
57-1-20 through 57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust
to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor or other person
named in the deed to a beneficiary.
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed
by trust deed, or his successor in interest.
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in Section
57-1-1.
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust
deed.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 1; 1988, ch.
155, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, substituted "Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36" for "this act" in

the introductory paragraph and in Subsection
(3), substituted "trustor" for "grantor" in Subsection (3), and substituted the present provision in Subsection (5) for the former definition,
which had listed various interests m land.
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant Doms
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OOOOO
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,
Plaintiffs,

DEFENDANT EUGENE E. DOMS'
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF
ELLEN ANDERSON, AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE ESTATE OF D.C.
ANDERSON

v.
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and EUGENE E.
DOMS,
Civil No. 8339
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
-ooOooELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representatiwe of the Estate
Of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON, personally, DAN
SCOTT, and JEANNE SCOTT,
Third-party Plaintiffs,
v.
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation,
Third-party Defendant.
-ooOoo-

Defendant Eugene E. Doms, by and through his counsel of
record, Larry R. Keller, and pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby requests
Plaintiff Ellen Anderson, as personal representative of the
Estate of D.C. Anderson, to produce for inspection and copying
on the 11th day of April, 1989, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., at
the law office of Larry R. Keller, 257 East 200 South, Suite
340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, or to otherwise respond to
this request, the following documents designated and set forth
below, which documents are in the possession, custody or under
the control of said Plaintiff, or to which said Plaintiff
might have access.
REQUESTED DOCUMENTS
1.

Please produce all documents or physical evidence you

intend to introduce at trial in support of the Complaint filed
against Defendant Doms in this action, the Third-Party
Complaint filed against Third-Party Defendant Summit County
Title Company in this action, and in defense to Defendant
Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim.
2.

Please produce all documents which support the

allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the
Affidavit of Jeanne Scott, dated August 10, 1988.
3.

Please produce all documents which support the

allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the
Affidavit of Dan Scott, dated August 10, 1988.
4.

Please produce all documents which support the

-2-

DATED this J$2_ day of March, 1989.

JLER,

&4&g£uSz#7m*^

Attorney for Defendant Doms
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant Doms
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OoOoo
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,

DEFENDANT EUGENE E. DOMSf
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF
DAN SCOTT

Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE E.
DOMS,
Civil No. 8339
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
-ooOooELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representatiwe of the Estate
Of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON, personally, DAN
SCOTT, and JEANNE SCOTT,
Third-party Plaintiffs,
v.
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation,
Third-party Defendant.
ooOoo

Defendant Eugene E. Doms, by and through his counsel of
record, Larry R. Keller, and pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby requests
Plaintiff Dan Scott to produce for inspection and copying on
the 11th day of April, 1989, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., at the
law office of Larry R. Keller, 257 East 200 South, Suite 340,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, or to otherwise respond to this
request, the following documents designated and set forth
below, which documents are in the possession, custody or under
the control of said Plaintiff, or to which said Plaintiff
might have access.
REQUESTED DOCUMENTS
1.

Please produce all documents or physical evidence you

intend to introduce at trial in support of the Complaint filed
against Defendant Doms in this action, the Third-Party
Complaint filed against Third-Party Defendant Summit County
Title Company in this action, and in defense to Defendant
Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim.
2.

Please produce all documents which support the

allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the
Affidavit of Jeanne Scott, dated August 10, 1988.
3.

Please produce all documents which support the

allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the
Affidavit of Dan Scott, dated August 10, 1988.
4.

Please produce all documents which support the

-2-

similar documents relating to the "Dan Scott Ranch Account"
for the period beginning January 1, 1980 to January 1, 1983.
22.

Please produce all documents which relate to any

joint ownership or control by Dan Scott and JeannefcScottof
any real property or business interest for the period January
1, 1980 to January 1, 1983.
23.

Please produce all documents relating to any marital

agreements, contracts, financial accounts, or any similar
documents by and/or between Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott for the
period January 1, 1980 to January 1, 1983.
DATED this Jj£_ day of March, 1989.
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant Doms
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,

DEFENDANT EUGENE E. DOMSf
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF
ELLEN ANDERSON, PERSONALLY

Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE E«
DOMS,
Civil No. 8339
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
-ooOooELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representatiwe of the Estate
Of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON, personally, DAN
SCOTT, and JEANNE SCOTT,
Third-party Plaintiffs,
v.
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation,
Third-party Defendant.
ooOoo

Defendant Eugene E. Doms, by and through his counsel of
record, Larry R. Keller, and pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby requests
Plaintiff Ellen Anderson, personally, to produce for
inspection and copying on the 11th day of April, 1989, at the
hour of 10:00 a.m., at the law office of Larry R. Keller, 257
East 200 South, Suite 340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, or to
otherwise respond to this request, the following documents
designated and set forth below, which documents are in the
possession, custody or under the control of said Plaintiff, or
to which said Plaintiff might have access.
REQUESTED DOCUMENTS
1.

Please produce all documents or physical evidence you

intend to introduce at trial in support of the Complaint filed
against Defendant Doms in this action, the Third-Party
Complaint filed against Third-Party Defendant Summit County
Title Company in this action, and in defense to Defendant
Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim.
2.

Please produce all documents which support the

allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the
Affidavit of Jeanne Scott, dated August 10, 1988.
3.

Please produce all documents which support the

allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the
Affidavit of Dan Scott, dated August 10, 1988.
4.

Please produce all documents which support the

-2-

DATED this //? day of March, 1989.

^w^-

urn

tUslhER^
Attorney for Defendant Doms
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant Doms
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OOOOO

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,

DEFENDANT EUGENE E. DOMS'
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF
JEANNE SCOTT

Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE E.
DOMS,
Civil No. 8339
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
-ooOooELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representatiwe of the Estate
Of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON, personally, DAN
SCOTT, and JEANNE SCOTT,
Third-party Plaintiffs,
v.
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation,
Third-party Defendant.
-ooOoo-

Defendant Eugene E. Doms, by and through his counsel of
record, Larry R. Keller, and pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby requests
Plaintiff Jeanne Scott to produce for inspection and copying
on the 11th day of April, 1989, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., at
the law office of Larry R. Keller, 257 East 200 South, Suite
340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, or to otherwise respond to
this request, the following documents designated and set forth
below, which documents are in the possession, custody or under
the control of said Plaintiff, or to which said Plaintiff
might have access.
REQUESTED DOCUMENTS
1.

Please produce all documents or physical evidence you

intend to introduce at trial in support of the Complaint filed
against Defendant Doms in this action, the Third-Party
Complaint filed against Third-Party Defendant Summit County
Title Company in this action, and in defense to Defendant
Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim.
2.

Please produce all documents which support the

allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the
Affidavit of Jeanne Scott, dated August 10, 1988.
3.

Please produce all documents which support the

allegations contained in or which were relied upon in the
Affidavit of Dan Scott, dated August 10, 1988.
4.

Please produce all documents which support the

-2-

similar documents relating to the "Dan Scott Ranch Account"
for the period beginning January 1, 1980 to January 1, 1983.
22.

Please produce all documents which relate to any

joint ownership or control by Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott of
any real property or business interest for the period January
1, 1980 to January 1, 1983.
23.

Please produce all documents relating to any marital

agreements, contracts, financial accounts, or any similar
documents by and/or between Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott for the
period January 1, 1980 to January 1, 1983.
DATED this JQ

day of March, 1989.

Attorney for Defendant Doms

-6-
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75-1-201

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Part 2
Definitions
75-1-201. General definitions.—Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent chapters which are applicable to specific chapters or parts, as used in this code:
(1) "Application" means a written request to the registrar for an
order of informal probate or appointment under part 3 of chapter 3.
(2) "Beneficiary/' as it relates to trust beneficiaries, includes a person who has any present or future interest, vested or contingent, and
also includes the owner of an interest by assignment or other transfer
and as it relates to a charitable trust, includes any person entitled to
enforce the trust.
(3) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child under
this code by intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is
involved and excludes any person who is only a stepchild, a foster child,
a grandchild, or any more remote descendant.
r ( 4 ) j "Claims," in respect to estates of decedents and protected persossr^includes liabilities of the decedent or protected person whether
arising in contract, in tort, or otherwise, and liabilities of the estate
which arise at or after the death of the decedent or after the appointment of a conservator, including funeral expenses. The term does not
include estate or inheritance taxes, Utah income taxes, or demands
or disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific
assets alleged to be included in the estate.
(5) "Court" means any of the district courts of the state of Utah.
(6) "Conservator" means a person who is appointed by a court to
manage the estate of a protected person.
(7) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamentary disposition of real or personal property and when used as a verb, means to dispose of real or personal property by will.
(8) "Devisee" means any person designated in a will to receive a devise. In the case of a devise to an existing trust or trustee, or to a trustee or trust described by will, the trust or trustee is the devisee, and the
beneficiaries are not devisees.
(9) "Disability" means cause for a protective order as described by
section 75-5-401.
(10) "Distributee" means any person who has received property of a
decedent from his personal representative other than as a creditor or
purchaser. A testamentary trustee is a distributee only to the extent of
distributed assets or increment thereto remaining in his hands. A beneficiary of a testamentary trust to whom the trustee has distributed
property received from a personal representative is a distributee of the
personal representative. For purposes of this subsection, testamentary
trustee includes a trustee to whom assets are transferred by will to the
extent of the devised assets.
12

75-3-801

PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION

The sections which follow facilitate collection of claims against decedents in
several ways. First, a simple written statement mailed to the personal representative is a sufficient "claim." Allowance of claims is handled by the personal representative and is assumed if a claimant is not advised of disallowance. Also, a personal representative may pay any just claims without presentation and at any time,
if he is willing to assume risks which will be minimal in many cases. The period of
uncertainty regarding possible claims is only four months from first publication.
This should expedite settlement and distribution of estates.

75-3-801. Notice to creditors.—Unless notice has already been given
under this section, a personal representative upon his appointment shall
publish a notice once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the county announcing his appointment and
address and notifying creditors of the estate to present their claims
within three months after the date of the first publication of the notice
or be forever barred.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-801, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4.
Editorial Board Comment.
Section 75-3-1203, relating to small
estates, contains an important qualification on the duty created by this section.
Failure to advertise for claims would
involve a breach of duty on the part of
the personal representative. If, as a
result of such breach, a claim is later
asserted against a distributee under section 75-3-1004, the personal representative may be liable to the distributee for
costs related to discharge of the claim
and the recovery of contribution from
other distributees. The protection afforded personal representatives under
section 75-3-1003 would not be available,
for that section applies only if the
personal representative truthfully recites that he has advertised for claims as
required by this section.
It would be appropriate, by court rule,

to channel publications through the personnel of the probate court. See section
75-1-401. If notices are controlled by a
centralized authority, some assurance
could be gained against publication in
newspapers of small circulation. Also,
the form of notices could be made uniform and certain efficiencies could be
achieved. For example, it would be compatible with this section for the court
to publish a single notice each day or
each week listing the names of personal
representatives appointed since the last
publication, with addresses and dates of
nonclaim.
Collateral References.
Executors and Administrators(S=3226.
34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators
§411.
31 Am. Jur. 2d 150, Executors and Administrators § 297.
Also see Am. Jur. 2d, New Topic Service, Uniform Probate Code.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Notice.
Where one such as a creditor claimed
to be interested, but never had actual
notice of the proceedings, and wanted to
attack the final judgment or any of the
proceedings as being void, his only
method of direct attack was through petition. In re Phillips' Estate, 86 U. 358,
44 P. 2d 699.
Administrator who failed to file copy
of notice to creditors and proof of its
publication as required by statute was
not entitled to mandamus to compel judge
to decree that due notice had been given;
although court could decree that due
and legal notice had been given, even
though proof had not been timely filed, it
was not compelled to do so and could refuse to so decree if in its discretion it

appeared that the late filing of proof of
publication resulted in prejudice. Harris
v. Turner, 96 U. 342, 85 P. 2d 824.
Constructive notice to creditors was
sufficient; where Federal Land Bank,
with claim against estate, knew of death
of deceased and appointment of administrator, it was its duty to keep informed
on time within which it could present its
claim, and if it failed to do so, the court
would not relieve it from its lack of diligence; whether creditor learned of said
facts before or after expiration of time
within which it could present its claim
was a question of fact. In re Ewles'
Estate, 105 U. 507,143 P. 2d 903.
Notice to nonresident creditors.
Notice mailed to nonresident creditors
who had listed their claims with railroad
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75-3-803

PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION

action accruing* at or after death of per- against estate claim antedating deceson in whose favor it would have accrued, dent's death, 146 A. L. R. 1179.
28 A. L. R. 3d 1141.
Nonclaim statute as governing claim
Direction in will for payment of debts barred, subsequent to death of obligor,
of testator, or for payment of specified
by general statute of limitations, 112 A.
debt, as affecting debts or debt barred L. R. 289. fc
by limitation, 109 A. L. R. 1440.
Relation back of appointment of adEffect of statement of claim against ministrator, running of statute of limidecedent's estate regarding debt appar- tations as affected by doctrine of, 3
ently barred by the statute of limitations, A. L. R. 3d 1234.
119 A. L. R. 426.
Waiver or tolling of statute of limitaEstoppel by silence or other conduct tions by executor or administrator, 8 A.
(other than failure to file) to assert L. R. 2d 660.
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Claims barred by statute of limitations.
Under former section, an executor or
administrator could not waive or abandon
statute of limitations; nor could court,
in passing upon claim of a decedent,
approve one against which statute had
run; therefore, where evidence showed
that claim was barred, it could not be
allowed although administrator did not
plead statute of limitation; defense of

statute of limitations was available although85not5 3pleaded.
Fullerton v. Bailey,
17 u
p
- >
- 1 0 2 ° ; Clayton v. Dinwoodey, 33 U. 251, 93 P. 723, 14 Ann.
C a s 926
J Hawkley v. Heaton, 54 U. 314,
180 p
-11544 °J
Gulbranson v. Thompson,
6
u
3 » 2 2 2 p - 59 °J Holloway v. Wetz
el, 86 U. 387, 45 P. 2d 565; Gray Realty
Co. v. Robinson, 111 U. 521, 184 P. 2d
237.

75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims.—(1) All claims
against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent,
including claims of the state and any subdivision of it, whether due or to
become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded
on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(a) Within three months after the date of the first publication of notice to creditors n notice is given in compliance with section 75-3-801;
provided, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's domicile before the first publication for claims in this state are also barred
in this state.
(b) Within three years after the decedent's death, if notice to
creditors has not been published.
(2) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the
death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision
of it, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated
or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are barred
against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(a) A claim based on a contract with the personal representative,
within three months after performance by the personal representative
is due;
(b) Any other claim, within three months after it arises.
(3) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
188

CREDITORS' CLAIMS

75-3-803

(a) Any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien
upon property of the estate; or
(b) To the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding
to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for
which he is protected by liability insurance.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-803, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §4.
Editorial Board Comment.
There was some disagreement among
the reporters over whether a short period of l i m i t a t i o n s , or of nonclaim,
should be provided for claims arising at
or after death. Subsection (2) was finally
inserted because most felt it was desirable to accelerate the time when unadjudicated distributions would be final.
The time limits stated would not, of
course, affect any personal liability in
contract, tort, or by statute, of the personal representative. Under section 753-808 a personal representative is not
liable on transactions entered into on
behalf of the estate unless he agrees to
be personally liable or unless he breaches
a duty by making the contract. Creditors
of the estate and not of the personal
representative thus face a special limitation that runs four months after performance is due from the personal representative. Tort claims normally will
involve casualty insurance of the decedent or of the personal representative,
and so will fall within the exception of
subsection (3). If a personal representative is personally at fault in respect to
a tort claim arising after the decedent's
death, his personal liability would not be
affected by the running of the special
short period provided here.
The limitation stated in subdivision
( l ) ( b ) dovetails with the three-year
limitation provided in section 75-3-108
to eliminate most questions of succession
that are controlled by state law after
three years from death have elapsed.
Questions of interpretation of any will
probated within such period, or of the
identity of heirs in intestacy are not
barred, however.
Cross-References.
Where party dies after verdict or de
cision and before judgment, Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 58A (d).
Collateral References.
Executors and AdministratorsC=>225.
34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators
§§ 405-408.
31 Am. Jur. 2d 148, Executors and
Administrators § 291.
Action on contingent claim, presen-

tation of claim as condition precedent,
34 A. L. R. 372.
Amendment of claim against decedent's estate after expiration of time for
filing claims, 56 A. L. R. 2d 627.
Applicability of nonclaim statute to
claims arising under contract executory
at time of death, 47 A. L. R. 896.
Bar of statute of nonclaim of decedent's domicile as affecting assertion of
claim elsewhere, 72 A. L. R. 1030.
Claims for taxes as within contemplation of statute requiring presentation of
claims against decedents' estates, 109
A. L. R. 1370.
Condition precedent to suit for specific performance of contract to make
will in favor of another or to will latter
a specified sum or property, presentation
of claim against decedent's estate as, 113
A. L. R. 1070.
Counterclaim or setoff, presentation of
claim to executor or administrator as
prerequisite of its availability as, 36
A. L. R. 3d 693.
Delay in appointing administrator or
other representative, effect on cause of
action accruing at or after death of
person in whose favor it would have
accrued, 28 A. L. R. 3d 1141.
Effect of recovery of judgment on unfiled or abandoned claim after expiration
of time allowed for filing claim against
estate, 60 A. L. R. 736.
Filing claim against estate of decedent
as affecting or precluding other remedies
against estate, 120 A. L. R. 1225.
Funeral expenses, presentation of claim
for to executor or administrator, 34 A. L.
R. 375, 120 A. L. R. 275.
Government: claim of government or
subdivision thereof as within provision
of nonclaim statute, 34 A. L. R. 2d 1003.
Guaranty, suretyship, or endorsement,
claim on decedent's contract of, as contingent, 94 A. L. R. 1155.
Judgment lien, presentation of claim
against deceased debtor's estate as condition of action to enforce, 114 A. L. R.
1167.
Land contract, application of nonclaim statute to claim for unmatured
payments under, 99 A. L. R. 2d 275.
Limitations, effect of statement ^ of
claim against decedent's estate setting
out debt apparently barred by statute of,
119 A. L. R. 426.
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Relief from judgment or order, U.R.C.P. 60.
Requirements of signature. U.R.C.P. 11.
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and
other papers, U.R.C.P. 5.
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P.
tioBia/.

Rule 8

Supreme Court, rulemaking power of,
§ 78-2-4.
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside,
U.R.C.P. 65A.
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P.
6(d).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Motions.
—Amendments.
Prayer for relief.
—New trial.
Particularization.
—Setting aside conditional order.
Orders.
—Correction.
Cited.
Motions.
—Amendments.
Prayer for relief.
Although a trial court may deny a motion to
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to
present a written motion and a proposed
amended complaint, that rule does not apply to
the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c),
the prayer does not limit the relief which the
court mav grant. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills
Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983).
—New trial.
Particularization.
Only purpose for requiring particularization
of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform
court and other party of theories upon which
new trial is sought; where defendant filed affidavit with motions setting forth theories, and

judgment had been on pleadings, court and
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds
for motion. Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d
149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960).
—Setting aside conditional order.
Where court on own initiative lowered from
$2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by
jury and entered conditional order granting
new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduction, court could restore jury findings under
authority of this Rule, since plaintiff filed motion to set aside conditional order for new trial
within ten days. National Farmers' Union
Property & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7,
286 P.2d 249, 61 A.L.R.2d 635 (1955).
Orders.
—Correction.
Where judge made perfunctory or clerical
mistake resulting from erroneous assumption
that order prepared by counsel correctly reflected judgment of Supreme Court and trial
court, judge could correct order on his own motion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 U t a h 2d 196,
299 P.2d 827 (1956).
Cited in Boskovich v. U t a h Constr. Co., 123
Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Thomas v.
Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507
(1956).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. J u r . 2d Motions,
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq.; 61A Am. Jur. 2d
Pleading §§ 1 et seq., 238.
C . J . S . — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 1
et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 63 to 210, 140 et
seq., 211 et seq.
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment
as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8
A.L.R.3d 1361.

Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action
as affected by opponent's motion for summary
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.
Key Numbers. — Motions «=» 1 et seq.;
Pleading *= 38 V2 to 186, 187 et seq.

Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim,
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or para-
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graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially the same as Rule 8, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Amended and supplemental pleadings, U.R.C.P. 15.
Arbitration, § 78-3la-1 et seq.
Comparative negligence, § 78-27-38.
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13.
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1
et seq.
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12.
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim,
§§ 21-1-5, 78-6-14.
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2.
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10.
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and
brevity of statement, U.R.C.P. 84.
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22.
Hearing of certain defenses before trial.
U.R.C.P. 12(d).
Interpleader, U.R.C.P. 22.

Motions, forms for. Forms 20, 23, 24.
Numbered paragraphs, U.R.C.P. 10(b).
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2.
Reply to answer, order for, U.R.C.P. 7(a).
Security interest, enforceability of, § 70A9-203.
Special forms of pleadings and writs abolished. U.R.C.P. 65B(a).
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq.
Statute of frauds, investment securities.
§ 70A-8-319.
Statute of frauds, sales, S 70A-2-201.
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial
Code, personal property not otherwise covered,
§ 70A-1-206.
Third-party practice, U.R.C.P. 14.
Time for answer, U.R.C.P. 12(a).
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affirmative defenses.
—Accord and satisfaction.
Pleading.
Time limitation.
—Avoidance.
—Consent.
—Election of remedies.
—Estoppel.

Failure to plead.
—Failure of consideration.
Failure to plead.
Pleading.
—Failure to plead.
Affidavit opposing summary judgment.
Denial.
Notice and opportunity.
Waiver of defense.
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Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim.
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if Q) at the time the action
was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on
that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule
13.
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim.
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or
may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may
claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the
pleading of the opposing party.
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which
either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may,
with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading.
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment.
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim
any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties
other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall
order them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained.
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may
be rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of
the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross
demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one
had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set
up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each
other, and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or
death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule.
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to
negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an assignor at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted
against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee.
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. Where any counterclaim or
cross-claim or third-party claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court does not have the power to
grant the relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire
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plaint was filed and two weeks before the
scheduled trial date, where reasons for the untimely motion were inadequate and where the
parties failed to demonstrate that the court's
denial of the motions resulted in prejudice.
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Tripp v. Vaughn. 746 P.2d 794 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
Cited in Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc.,
743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties
§ 188 et seq.
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84.
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution

or indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20
A.L.R.4th 338.
Key Numbers. — Parties <s= 49 to 56.

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall
so order, specifying the time therefor.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 15, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amendments.
—After pretrial order.
—Alternative to dismissal.
Payment of attorney fees.
Prolix complaint.
—Amendment of response.
—Answer.
To include counterclaim.

—Complaint.
To defeat motion for summary judgment.
To include damages.
—Considerations.
Prejudice.
—Court's discretion.
Abused.
Not abused.
—Dismissal without opportunity to amend.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 62A Am. Jur. 2d Pretrial
Conference and Procedure § 1 et seq.
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial § 17(2).
A.L.R. — Failure of party or his attorney to
appear at pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Propriety of allowing state court civil litigant to call nonexpert witness whose name or
address was not disclosed during pretrial discovery proceedings, 63 A.L.R.4th 712.
Consideration or submission at trial, under
Rule 16 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of

issues not fixed for trial in pretrial order, 11
A.L.R. Fed. 786.
Validity and effect of local district court
rules providing for use of alternative dispute
resolution procedures as pretrial settlement
mechanisms, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 211.
Imposition of sanctions tinder Rule 16(f),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failing to
obey scheduling or pretrial order, 90 A.L.R.
Fed. 157.
Key Numbers. — Trial «=> 9(1).

PART IV.
PARTIES.
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant.
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may
sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the
action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of,
the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the
real party in interest.
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent
person who is a party must appear either by a general guardian or by a
guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in which the
action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it
is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or
proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian
and may have appeared by the guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be
necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might
be a minor or an incompetent person.
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by
a court must be appointed as follows:
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if
the minor is of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the
application of a relative or friend of the minor.
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if
the minor is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after
the service of the summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so
to apply, then upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor, or
of any other party to the action.
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon
motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable
person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant or someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after service of
notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such
minor. Service of such notice may be made upon the defendant's general
or testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is
none, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be
served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon such

55

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 18

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations
and Clubs §§ 50, 51; 36 Am. Jur. 2d Foreign
Corporations § 193 et seq.; 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incompetent Persons §§ 115 to 121; 42 Am. Jur.
2d Infants §§ 155 et seq., 175; 59 Am. Jur. 2d
Parties 88 31, 38 to 44, 249 to 252, 255; 60 Am.
Jur. 2d Partnership 8 324.
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Associations 88 36, 38; 20
C.J.S. Corporations 8 1828 et seq.; 43 C.J.S.
Infants 88 108, 110; 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons
88 133 to 146; 67 C.J.S. Parties 88 17, 18, 133
to 138; 68 C.J.S. Partnership 8 206 et seq.
A.L.R. — Power of incompetent spouse's
guardian, committee or next friend to sue for
granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of
marriage, or to make a compromise or settlement in such suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681.
Insurance, proper party plaintiff, under real
party in interest statute, to action against tortfeasor for damage to insured property where
insured has paid part of loss, 13 A.L.R.3d 140.
Insurance, proper party plaintiff, under real
party in interest statute, to action against tortfeasor for damage to insured property where
loss is entirely covered by insurance, 13
A.L.R.3d 229.
State Consumer Protection Act, right to private action under, 62 A.L.R.3d 169.

Who is minor's next of kin for guardianship
purposes, 63 A.L.R.3d 813.
Bailor's right of direct action against bailee's
theft insurer for loss of bailed property, 64
A.L.R.Sd 1207.
Proper party plaintiff in action for injury to
common areas of condominium development,
69 A.L.R.3d 1148.
Necessary or proper parties to suit or proceeding to establish private boundary line, 73
A.L.R.3d 948.
Necessity of requiring presence in court of
both parties in proceedings relating to custody
or visitation of children, 15 A.L.R.4th 864.
Right of illegitimate child to maintain action
to determine paternity, 19 A.L.R.4th 1082.
Required parties in adoption proceedings, 48
A.L.R.4th 860.
Joint venture's capacity to sue, 56 A.L.R.4th
1234.
Standing to bring action relating to real
property of condominium, 74 A.L.R.4th 165.
Key Numbers. — Associations «=» 20, 26;
Corporations «=» 662; Courts «= 12; Infants «=»
78, 80; Mental Health «=» 471 to 497; Parties «=
1, 2, 6, 8, 21; Partnerships «=» 191.

Rule 18. Joinder of claims and remedies,
(a) Joinder of claims. The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting
forth a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims
either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party.
There may be a like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties if the
requirements of Rules 19, 20, and 22 are satisfied. There may be a like joinder
of cross-claims or third-party claims if the requirements of Rules 13 and 14
respectively are satisfied.
(b) Joinder of remedies; fraudulent conveyances. Whenever a claim is
one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a
conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action; but the court shall
grant relief in that action only in accordance with the relative substantive
rights of the parties. In particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for money and
a claim to have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first
having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 18, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Joinder of claims.
—Tort, contract and equity.
Auto accident.
Same transaction.
—Unrelated claims by assignee.
Joinder of remedies.
—Insurer and tort-feasor.
Cited.
Joinder of claims.
—Tort, contract and equity.
Auto accident.
Where insurer of a vehicle involved in an
auto accident filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to void insurance policy due to

misrepresentations by the vehicle's owner in
the policy application, and one of the defendants in the declaratory judgment action counterclaimed against the insurer and crossclaimed in tort against the other defendants, in
determining whether to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim and cross-claim or permit
their joinder, the trial court should have permitted the joinder unless the insurer could
show that it would be prejudiced because of
bias by the trier of fact if joinder was allowed;
trial court should not have dismissed defendant's counterclaim and cross-claim on basis
that joinder was of both tort and contract actions. Dairvland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d
737 (Utah 1982).
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Same transaction.
All issues, whether in contract, tort, law or
equity, arising out of a transaction between
two parties, may be pleaded and proved in a
single action. Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168,
369 P.2d 933 (1962).
—Unrelated claims by assignee.
Where seven different claimants assigned
twelve different causes of action to plaintiff for
purpose of collecting on them from a single defendant, and each cause of action arose from
facts unrelated to any of the other causes of
action so assigned, the single collector-plaintiff
was not permitted to join all of the claims
against defendant in one action despite the
provisions of the rule, since the assignors could
not have joined together and asserted their
various claims m one action against defendant
(Rule 20(a)), and an assignee cannot possess
any greater rights than those possessed by his
assignor. Stank v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 96, 404
P.2d 964 (1965).

Joinder of remedies.
, , .r
T
~ * n S U r * £ " " ! tor*-feasoi\
.
Plaintiffs attempt to join defendants msurance
company as a party defendant in a personal injury action, based on insurance policy
providing that the insurance company "has
agreed to pay a claim only after another claim
n a s Deen
prosecuted to a conclusion," did not
come within the joinder provision of either
Subdivision (b) or Rule 20 Young v. Barney,
20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967).
Because there is no reason to believe the new
rules were intended to change prior practice of
not permitting disclosure to a jury of insurance
coverage in a personal injury suit, joinder of
tort-feasor with plaintiffs uninsured motorist
Chnstensen v. Peterson,
m s u r e r 1S
25 U t a h 2d 4 n

4g3 p 2 d

44?

(19?1)

Cited in Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287,
351 P.2d 959 (1960).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions
§§ 100 to 126.

C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions §§ 61 to 101.
Key Numbers. — Action o=> 39 to 60.

Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible, A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If
he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or,
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be
dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person
as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the
court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties: second, the extent
to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons
why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of
Rule 23.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
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Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order
compelling discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance
with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion
made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees,
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion
among the parties and persons in a just manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken,
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
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purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such
person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to
admit.
id) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)

!37

UTAH

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 5 4

PART VII.
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
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i M I H U J U D I C I A L DISJHICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT -

STATE OF UTAH

FILE NO.

TrTT

( J PARTIES PRESENT)

8339

COUNSEL: (^ COUNSEL PRESENT)
IRVING H. BIELE, 50 W BROADWAY.4TH FL,SLC 84
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, 1399 S 700 E*?SLC 84105

ELLEN ANDERSON, as p e r s . r e p , of ESTATE of
D.C.ANDERSON, ETAL, DAN & JEANNE SCOTT
V
MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE E. DOMS

LARRY R. KELLER.257 E 200 S-10,#340, SLC 841

V
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE CO.

BRANT H. WALL, 9 EX PL, #800, SLC 84111

JOYE D. OVARD
CLERK

HON.

J, DENNIS FREDERICK

REPORTER

DATE

JUNE 22, 1989

JUDGE

BAILIFF

After RKQUEST FOR RULING was received and respective MEMORANDA reviewed, also OBJECTIONS
thereto, Court rules as follows:
Involuntary Plaintiffs Anderson & Scott's MOTION FOR SANCTIONS RE: DOM'S OBJECTIONS TO
REQUESTS is granted to the extent that the discovery sought relates to real property
transactionsCas opposed to personalty).

Defendant Doms is directed to respond to the

discovery request within 30 davs of the date of this minute entry ruling. Movant is
granted reasonable attorney fees for necessity of bringing motionyto pe determined at
trial.
2.

Counsel far Movants is to prepare order,

Copies mailed tp"Counsel as shown above 6-22-89.

r\t}
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COUNTY OF SUMMIT -

STATE OF UTAH
FILE NO.

rPLE:

(^ PARTIES PRESENT)

COUNSEL.

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal rep. of Estate:

8339

I ' COUNSEL PRESENT)

IRVING H. BIELE
333 N 300 W, SLC 84103

of D.C.ANDERSON, ET AL
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, .SUITE 1 4 , INTRADE BLDG,
1399 S 700 E , SLC 84105
MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE E. POMS

:

LARRY R. KELLER, 257 TOWERS, SUITE 3 4 0 ,
257 E 200 S # 1 0 , SLC 84111

ANDERSON & SC0TT(3rd Party Plaintiffs)
:
v SUMMIT C O . TITLE CO. (3rd Party Defendant)

BRANT H. WALL, 9 EX PL,#800, SLC 8 4 l T T ~

JOYE D. OVARD
Cl ER

- "-

HON.

J. DENNIS FREDERICK
JUDGE

REPORT

"

2£LL

AUG. 1 0 .

1989

BAILIFF

After REQUEST FOR RULING ON MOTIONS PERTAINING TO JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK'S JUNE 2 2 , 1989
MINUTE ENTRY RULING, REQUEST FOR HEARING OR TELEPHONE CONFERENCE and OBJECTIONS thereto having
been filed and Court's review of MEMORANDA, Court rules as follows:
1.

Defendant Poms' MOTION FOR EXTENSION O F TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY REQUES r
is denied.

2.

Defendant Poms' MOTION FOR HEARING ON COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES is denied.

Hearin:

as to reasonableness of fees awarded is reserved for trial.
3.

Defendant Doms' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF COURT'S MINUTE ENTRY RULING OF JUNE 2 2 , 198<
and REQUEST FOR HEARING OR TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is denied.

4.

Counsel for Anderson and Scott is awarded reasonable Attorney Fees on the instant matte:
to be determined at trial.

5.

Counsel for Anderson and Scott is to prepare Order.

Copies mailed to Counsel as shown above.

JO
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E. Russell Vetter, (#4934) of
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1666

^yO

D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
D.C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT,

)1
]1
)

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS

Plaintiffs,

vs.
MICHAEL R. McCOY and
EUGENE E. DOMS,

]
]i

Civil No. 8339

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
• ss .
j

E. RUSSELL VETTER, after being first duly sworn and upon oath,
deposes and says as follows:
1. He is a member of the Utah State Bar and in good standing.
2.

He is employed with the law firm of Biele, Haslam & Hatch and

in such capacity has represented the above-named plaintiffs.
3. He has undertaken effort in behalf of the plaintiffs in the
prosecution of this matter as follows:
DATE
03/13/84

11/08/84

DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

Discussion with Jerry Kinghorn attorney for parties
who are purchasing the Rossi Hill contract from the
Dewey Anderson Estate. (ESS) 1.00

$ 85.00

Preparation of memo to co-counsel. (ESS) .25

$ 21.25

r\ r\ r\ /*\ r> r\

11/26/84

Discussion with Ellen Anderson on payment on Rossi
Hill contracts. (ESS) .50

$ 42.50

Conference with Jerry Kinghorn related to Rossi Hill
contracts. (ESS) .50

$ 42.50

Conference with Jerry Kinghorn concerning the
January 25 payment owing the estate from Ooms McCoy.
Review of documentation relative to easement problem.
(ESS) 2.00

$170.00

01/29/85

Review publishing of service by p u b l i c a t i o n . (IHB) .75

$ 86.25

02/14/85

Office conference, review f i l e . (JPM) .50

$ 42.50

02/15/85

Going over Rossi H i l l Doms/McCoy foreclosure w i t h
co-counsel . Conference w i t h c r e d i t o r of e s t a t e .
(ESS) .50

$ 42.50

Review of f i l e , l e t t e r t o opposing counsel regarding
encroachment d i s p u t e , assessing over-due amounts
on c o n t r a c t , phone c a l l t o Valley Bank Trust Dept
regarding over-due amounts. (JPM) 3.50

$297.50

Calls t o opposing counsel and Valley Bank Trust
Dept. regarding Rossi H i l l s c o n t r a c t . (JPM) .50

$ 42.50

Conference w i t h Dan Scott concerning the Rossi
H i l l p r o p e r t y . (ESS) .25

$ 21.25

Conference w i t h Jerry Kinghorn r e l a t e d t o the
Doms/McCoy t r a n s a c t i o n . (ESS) .25

$ 21.25

Meeting w i t h Jerry Kinghorn on the Rossi H i l l
property which the estate has a 1/2 i n t e r e s t .
Review of Doms and McCoy's p o s i t i o n of d e f a u l t by
the estate and Dan Scott concerning t r a n s f e r of
property without encumbrances. (ESS) 1.00

$ 85.00

Meeting w i t h opposing counsel, review of p l a t
maps, d r a f t i n g memorandum t o f i l e (JPM) 2.50

$212.50

Call t o opposing counsel, revisions t o memo.
(JPM) .50

$ 42.50

Discussion w i t h Mike Sloan concerning the Rossi
H i l l s contract (ESS) .25

$ 21.25

Review of f i l e , revisions to Complaint. (JPM) .50

$ 42.50

12/05/84
01/17/85

02/15/85

02/20/85
02/28/85
03/12/85
03/18/85

03/18/85
03/19/85
03/25/85

04/09/85

r m n n o n

04/10/85

Revisions to Complaint, phone calls regarding
service of process, preparation of discovery
requests. (JPM) 2.00

$170.00

Phone conference with t i t l e company related to
obtaining address for Doms and McCoy (ESS) .25

$ 21.25

Review and direction on setting up the Complaint
for foreclosure. (IHB) .50

$ 42.50

05/24/85

Drafting Complaint, office conference. (JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

05/28/85

Review of and modifications to Complaint for
foreclosure. (IHB) 1.00

$115.00

Conference with co-counsel, revisions to Complaint,
(JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

Meeting with Mike Sloan to go over the Rossi H i l l
lawsuit, in p a r t i c u l a r , the facts surrounding the
sale of the property to Doms and McCoy. (ESS) .50

$ 42.50

06/05/85

Review of Complaint and approval. (IHB) .50

$ 57.50

05/21/85

Search for documents related to deposition on
06/24/85. (CM) .25

$ 10.00

Arranging for service of process, l e t t e r to Los
Angeles county s h e r i f f , phone call to same,
tracing address. (JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

06/28/85

Phone call to Dan Scott. (JPM) .25

$ 21.25

09/16/85

Phone call to opposing counsel. (JPM) .25

$ 21.25

10/25/85

Conference with opposing counsel, l e t t e r to same.
(JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

Phone call to opposing counsel, preparation of
default papers. (JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

Preparation of default papers, phone call to
Jerry Kinghorn. (JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

Phone calls to Dan Scott, Summit County Clerk
and opposing counsel. (JPM) 1.00

$ 85.00

01/02/86

Conference with opposing counsel. (JPM) .25

$ 21.25

04/05/86

Review of f i l e and preparation to f i l e default
judgment against Doms and to proceed against
Michael McCoy. (ESS) 1.00

$ 85.00

05/14/85
05/24/85

05/29/85
06/03/85

06/25/85

10/31/85
11/19/85
12/03/85

-3-

nnnnoi

12/23/86
04/26/87

Preparation of l e t t e r t o c l i e n t .
(ERV) .40

Review f i l e .
$ 28.00

Review of f i l e r e l a t e d t o status of case. Further
review of case and discussions with court c l e r k
r e l a t e d t o status of case. (ERV) .50

$ 35.00

Attorney's conference r e l a t e d t o strategy in
case. Discussions w i t h Summit County Clerk
related t o pleadings i n f i l e . Preparation of
l e t t e r t o c l i e n t . (ERV) .25

$ 17.50

Discussions with James Sandal 1 r e l a t e d t o proceedings i n case. (ERV) .25

$ 17.50

Discussions with Summit County Clerk on t r a c k i n g
down documents i n case. (ERV) .50

$ 35.00

Discussions with Summit County Clerk regarding
l o c a t i o n of documents. (ERV) .25

$ 17.50

07/10/87

Preparation f o r hearing t o d e f a u l t Doms. (ERV) .25

$ 17.50

07/20/87

Appearance at C o a l v i l l e Court f o r hearing on
motion f o r d e f a u l t judgment. Discussions with
counsel f o r defendants regarding resolution of
d i s p u t e s . (ERV) 2.00

$140.00

07/21/87

Preparation of s t i p u l a t i o n . (ERV) .25

$ 17.50

08/21/87

Preparation of d e f a u l t c e r t i f i c a t e on defendant
Doms. (ERV) .25

$ 17.50

04/28/87

05/06/87
06/18/87
07/02/87

12/01/87

Preparation of Default Judgment and Affidavit
in Support of Attorneys1 Fees. (ERV) 2.00

$140.00

TOTAL

$3,004.25

Costs: Filing Fees
Service Fees

$
$

TOTAL COSTS
4.

50,.00
33,.00
$ 83.00

In his opinion, considering the amount for which judgment was

prayed, the time and effort involved in the matter and the time that will
be required to enforce the judgment, that the sum of $3,004.25 is a reason-

-4nrsnn

no

able attorney's fee to be allowed plaintiff in this action, plus $83.00
as costs.
DATED this

/*> day of January, 1988.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
<

{/sO

E. RUSSELL VETTER
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
/V'day
i> _fiA

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

NOTARY
ITARYPUBLIC
PUBLIC <~
^ .\ ',

Residing at: /jfotT
My Commission Expires:

-5-
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of January, 1988.

y . ~ ^\ "

J^lKJL L-uTtj
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TRVTNG H. BIELE, A0317, of,
BIELE HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys For Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1666

> U* *

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal
Representative of t h e Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON and D A N SCOTT

vs >

)
)
)
]
)
]

M I C H A E L R- M c C O Y and EUGENE E . D O M S

]

Plaintiffs,

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
A N D COSTS
Civil N o . 8339

)

)
ss.
)

IRVING H. BIELE, after being first duly sworn, and upon oath deposes
and says as follows:
1.

He is a member of the Utah State Bar and in good standing.

2.

He is employed with the law firm of Biele, Haslam & Hatch and in

<"ich caDacity has represented the above-named plaintiffs.
3.

This supplemental affidavit is filed showing attorney's fees and

costs incurred in this case since December 31, 1987, which fees and costs are as
follows:

ooooco

HATE

DESCRIPTION

01/29/88

03/03/88

04/05/88

04/29/88

05/02/88

05/03/88

AMOUNT

Discussions with court clerk of execution of
order defaulting parties. Review of Answer
and Counterclaim.

37.50

Review of documentation. Call to the court
to determine if a judgment had been filed.
preparation of letter to opposing counsel
indicating that our judgment was of record
prior to his filing of the answer and
counterclaim. Client updates.

125.00

Receipt of Motion to Set Aside Judgment.
Research in relation to the legal issue on
setting aside the judgment. Preparation of
Order of Sale and forwarding to Sheriff.

187.50

Research on the law and preparation of a reply
to Mr. Kinghorn's Motion to Set Aside. Delivery
of the same to Judge Brian, the opposing counsel
and forwarding to the Court Clerk.

462.50

Travel to Coalville to attend hearing on Motion
to Set Aside Judgment. Appearance in court and
return.

275.00

Preparation of Order pursuant to instructions of
the Court, preparation of Supplemental Affidavit
for Attorney's Fees, letter to Sheriff cancelling
the sale.

125.00

Total Fees:

$1,212.50

COSTS ADVANCED:
Photo Copies:
Long Distance Calls:
Certified copy of Judgment and Exhibits:
Sheriff's Fees on Order of Sale (Sale cancelled as
result of order)
Total Costs & Fees:

$1,380.35

PLUS:

$3,087.25

Costs and Fees from original Affidavit

Total Costs and Fees expended to date:

Page - 2 -
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13.60
.50
3.75
150.00

$4,467.60

DATED this

(^/

day of May, 1988

2^^
day of May, 1988.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN

<^j>tAS-''

./
/'/

ROTARY PUBLIC
^Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

^/^r
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing supplemental Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs to
the Defendant, Eugene E. Doms, by delivering the same to counsel for this
Defendant, Mr. Gerald H. Kinghorn, at his office at 9 Exchange Place, Suite
#1000, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of May,

000083
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BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT

16-10-74

16-10-74. Sale or mortgage of assets other than in regular
course of business.
A sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition of all, or
substantially all, the property and assets, with or without the good will, of a
corporation, if not made in the usual and regular couise of its business, may
be made upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration, which
may consist in whole or in part of money or property, real or personal, including shares of any other corporation, domestic or foreign, as may be authorized
in the following manner:
(a) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution recommending such
sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition and directing
the submission thereof to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, which may
be either an annual or a special meeting.
(b) Written or printed notice shall be given to each shareholder of
record entitled to vote at such meeting within the time and in the manner
provided in this act for the giving of notice of meetings of shareholders,
and, whether the meeting be an annual or a special meeting, shall state
that the purpose, or one of the purposes, of such meeting is to consider the
proposed sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition.
(c) At such meeting the shareholders may authorize such sale, lease,
exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition and may fix, or may
authorize the board of directors to fix, any or all of the terms and conditions thereof and the consideration to be received by the corporation
therefor. Each outstanding share of the corporation shall be entitled to
vote thereon, whether or not entitled to vote thereon by the provisions of
the articles of incorporation. Such authorization shall require the affirmative vote of the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares
of the corporation, unless any class of shares is entitled to vote as a class
thereon, in which event authorization shall require the affirmative vote
of the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares of each class
of shares entitled to vote as a class thereon and of the total outstanding
shares.
(d) After such authorization by a vote of shareholders, the board of
directors nevertheless, in its discretion, may abandon such sale, lease,
exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition of assets, subject to the
rights of third parties under any contracts relating thereto, without further action or approval by shareholders.
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 74.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Noncompliance with statute.
Sale by majority stockholders.
Sale without stockholders' authorization.
Noncompliance with statute.
Contract for sale, not in regular course of
business, of all corporate property, made without attempt at compliance with terms of this

section, was unenforceable. Davis v. Heath
Dev. Co., 558 P.2d 594 (Utah 1976).
Sale by majority stockholders.
Contract for sale of "dry farm" executed by
owners of substantially all of the stock of a
corporation was binding upon the corporation
notwithstanding the fact that sellers had not
complied with the procedure set forth in this
section. Grover v. Gam, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464
P.2d 598 (1970).
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BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT

16-10-100

16-10-97. Decree of dissolution.
In proceedings to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation, when
the costs and expenses of such proceedings and all debts, obligations and
liabilities of the corporation shall have been paid and discharged and all of its
remaining property and assets distributed to its shareholders, or in case its
property and assets are not sufficient to satisfy and discharge such costs,
expenses, debts and obligations, all the property and assets have been applied
so far as they will go to their payment, the court shall enter a decree dissolving the corporation, whereupon the existence of the corporation shall cease.
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 97.

16-10-98. Filing of decree of dissolution.
In case the court shall enter a decree dissolving a corporation, it shall be the
duty of the clerk of such court to cause a certified copy of the decree to be filed
with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. No fee shall be
charged by that division for the filing thereof.
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 98; 1984, ch. 66,
§ 114.

16-10-99. Deposit with state treasurer of assets due unknown creditor or shareholder.
Upon the voluntary or involuntary dissolution of a corporation, the portion
of the assets distributable to a creditor or shareholder who is unknown or
cannot be found, or who is under disability, and there is no person legally
competent to receive such distributive portion, shall be reduced to cash and
deposited with the state treasurer to be held and disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions of the Utah Unclaimed Property Act.
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 99.
Cross-References. — Uniform Unclaimed
Property Act, Chapter 44 of Title 78.

16-10-100. Survival of remedy after dissolution.
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certificate of
dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2) by a
decree of court when the court has not liquidated the assets and business of
the corporation as provided in this act, or (3) by expiration of its period of
duration, shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or against
the corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders, for any right or claim
existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other
proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after the date of such
dissolution. Any such action or proceeding by or against the corporation may
be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name. The shareholders, directors and officers shall have power to take such corporate or other
action as shall be appropriate to protect such remedy, right or claim. If such
corporation was dissolved by the expiration of its period of duration, such
167

16-10-101

CORPORATIONS

corporation may amend its articles of incorporation at any time during such
period of two years so as to extend its period of duration.
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 100; 1984, ch.
66, § 115.

Meaning of "this act" — See the note under the same catchline following § 16-10-66.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Quiet title action.
A dissolved corporation may maintain an action to quiet title. Falconaero Enter., Inc. v.

Valley Investment Co., 16 Utah 2d 77, 395
P.2d 915 (1964).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations
§§ 2838, 2842, 2843.
C.J.S. — 19 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 879 to
882.
A.L.R. — Liability of shareholders, direc-

tors, and officers where corporate business is
continued after its dissolution, 72 A.L.R.4th
419.
Key Numbers. — Corporations «=» 630(2).

16-10-101. Continuation of corporate existence to wind up
after dissolution.
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance
of a certificate of dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code, or (2) by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its period of duration,
the corporate existence of such corporation shall nevertheless continue for the
purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any property and assets which
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution,
and to effect such purpose such corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of
such property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and exercise all other
incidental and necessary powers.
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 101; 1984, ch.
66, § 116.

Cross-References. — Remission of forfeiture, Utah Const., Art. XII, Sec. 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Directors.
—Authority.
—Duty.
Dissolution.
—Effect.
—Manner.
Waiver of forfeiture.
Directors.
—Authority.
Board of directors in winding up affairs of
corporation on forfeiture of its charter had authority to confess judgment on indebtedness of
the corporation. Henriod v. East Tintic Dev.
Co., 52 Utah 245, 173 P. 134 (1918).
—Duty.
When corporation's charter was forfeited, it

was duty of the directors, who were trustees for
stockholders and creditors, to assemble its assets, liquidate its indebtedness, and generally
conduct its affairs in such manner as would
properly expedite winding up of corporation's
business. Houston v. Utah Lake Land, Water
& Power Co., 55 Utah 393, 187 P. 174, 47
A.L.R. 1282 (1919).
Dissolution.
—Effect.
After charter of corporation was forfeited for
failure to pay license tax, it could not subsequently purchase stock of another corporation
and engage in business that was beyond scope
of its power even before its civil death, instead
of winding up affairs of company as required
by former § 16-1-2. Houston v. Utah Lake
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57-4a-4

REAL ESTATE

History: C. 1953, 57-4a-3, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 155, § 21; 1989, ch. 88, § 10.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective July 1, 1989, rewrote Subsection (3)(b), which read "this state or any of its
political subdivisions, provided, however, that
any document conveying an interest m real
property executed under the authority of this

state or any of its political subdivisions after
July 1, 1988, may not be recorded unless it is
acknowledged and certified."
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155,
§ 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988.
Cross-References. — *,fAcknowledgement"
and «
t» d e f i n e d, § 46-1-2.

57-4a-4. Presumptions,
(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title
to the real property affected:
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person purporting to execute it;
(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf
it is executed are the persons they purport to be;
(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a
minor at any relevant time;
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates
on the document and the date of recording;
(e) any necessary consideration was given;
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or described by the document acted in good faith at all relevant times;
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer
of an organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity:
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the
scope of his authority;
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized
under all applicable laws to act on behalf of the organization; and
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he
acted for a principal who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any
relevant time;
(h) a person executing the document as an individual:
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was
married on the effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona
fide purchaser and the grantor received adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth so that the joinder of the
nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 75-2-201
through 75-2-207;
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final
determination in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed pursuant to a power of eminent domain, the court, official body, or
condemnor acted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the
execution of the document were taken; and
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including without limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are true.
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the document purports only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or interest
of the person executing it or the person on whose behalf it is executed.
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Illen Anderson f s Address:
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a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 84108
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Larry R. Keller, Esq.
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C O R R E C T E D
S H E R I F F ' S
DEED
3IS CORRECTED SHERIFF'S DEED AMENDS, MODIFIES AND CORRECTS THAT CERTAIN
ffiRIFF'S DEED DATED JUNE 26, 19 89 AND RECORDED ON JULY 7, 19 89 AS ENTRY
D. 310188, IN BOOK 527, AT PAGES 253 AND 254.
THIS INDENTURE, made this 26th day of June, 1989, between D. Fred
Ley, Sheriff, Summit County, State of Utah, party of the first part, and
Lien Anderson as Personal Representative for the Estate of D. C. Anderson,
an Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott, parties of the secid part.
WITNESSETH, WHEREAS, in and by a certain judgment and decree made
id entered by the Third Judicial District, in and for Summit County, of
le State of Utah on the 20th day of January, 1988, in a certain action
len pending in said Court, wherein Ellen Anderson as Personal
ipresentative for the Estate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson
irsonally, and Jeanne Scott, Plaintiffs, and Michael R. McCoy and Eugene
Doms, Defendants, was among other things ordered and adjudged that all
d singular all the right, title and interest of Michael R. McCoy in and
the premises in said judgment and hereinafter described should be sold
public auction, by and under the direction of the Sheriff of Summit
unty, State of Utah, in the manner required by law; that either of the
rties to said action might become purchaser at such sale, and that said
eriff should execute the usual certificates and deeds to the purchaser as
quired by law; and
WHEREAS, the Sheriff did, at the hour of 11:00 a.m., on the 12th
y of December, 1988, at the County Courthouse in the City of Coalville,
jnty of Summit, Stare of Utah, after due pubiic notice had been given, as
juired by law and said judgment, duly sell at public auction, agreeable
law and said judgment, all of the right, title and interest of Michael
McCoy in and to the premises and property in said judgment and hereinaf: described at which sale said premises and property were fairly struck
: and sold to Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative for the Estate of
C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott, for
> sum of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS it being highest bidder and that being the
fhest sum bid at said sale; and
WHEREAS, said Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative for the
ate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne
>tt, paid to said Sheriff said sum of money so bid, and said Sheriff
reupon made and issued the usual certificate in duplicate of such sale
due form, and delivered one thereof to said purchaser, and caused the
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her to be filed in the office of the County Recorder, County of Summit,
ate of Utah,
NOW TS INDENTURE WITNESSES, that the said party of the first
rt, Sheriff aforesaid, in order to carry into effect said sale in pursuce of said judgment and of the law, and also in consideration of the
emises and of the money so bid and paid by the said Ellen Anderson as
rsonal Representative for the Estate of D. C. Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen
derson personally, and Jeanne Scott, the receipt whereof is hereby
knowledged, has granted, sold, conveyed, and by these presents does
ant, sell and convey, and confirm unto the said party of the second part,
s successors and assigns forever, all of the right, title and interest of
chael R. McCoy in and to the following described real estate forever, the
llowing real estate lying and being in Summit County, State of Utah,
ing all right, title, claim and interest of the above named defendants
', in and to the following described property tc-wit:
Parcel No. 1:
All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey,
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder.
Parcel No. 2:
All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder,
excepting therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights-of-way as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401,
Entry No. 13 316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No.
13610 in Book H at Page 37 3, records of Summit County,
Utah.
Parcel No. 3:
All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to
the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting thereway as described in those certain documents recorded as
Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in
Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at
Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah.
TOGETHER WITH an easement for utilities, including sewer
and water lines over and southerly five feet and
northerly five feet of the following described lots:
All of Lot 14', the South Half of Lot 15/ Block 58,
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat
thereof as filed and of record in the office of the
Summit County Recorder, Coalville, Utah.

«•, 559.-627

The above described real property is located in Park
City, Summit County, Utah.
OGETHER WITH all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and
ppurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, to have and
o hold the same unto said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns
orever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said party of the first part has hereunto set
is hand and seal the day and year firsjb-^atoove jtrijztei

Sheriff dt Sunimit County, Utah
TATE OF UTAH
) ss
Dunty of Summit

)

On the 26th day of June, 1989, before me, LINDA SMITH, a Notary
iblic in and for the County of Summit, State of Utah, personally appeared
, FRED ELEY, Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, personally known to
i to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
10 acknowledged to me that he executed the same as such Sheriff, freely
id voluntarily, and for the uses and purposes therein mentioned.
WITNESSED my hand notarial seal, this 26th day of Junfe*, 19&9..

^?

i

/:

/

A

/•iX/L
-^*

R e s i d i n g i n Hen^fer, Utah
My (/ommission E x p i r e s : J u l y '15, 1991
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ADDENDUM 34

GENERAL PARTNERSHIP

48-1-4

48-1-3.1. Joint venture defined — Application of chapter.
(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners of a single business enterprise.
(2) This chapter governs the property and transfer rights of joint ventures.
History: C. 1953, 48-1-3.1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 14, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Agreement to share profits required.
Continuation of venture presumed.
Joint venture not found.
Litigation.
Shared facilities.

for the venture's entire loss. Producer's Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. Christensen, 588 P.2d 156
(Utah 1978).
Joint venture not found.
There was no joint adventure or partnership
by estoppel where one of the two alleged joint
adventurers had not given his consent to being
held out as a joint adventurer with the person
making the representation, and where the
third person to whom the representation had
been made had not relied upon it. Bates v.
Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952).

Agreement to share profits required.
To establish a joint adventure there must be
an agreement, express or implied, for the sharing of profits. Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165,
239 P.2d 749 (1952).
Fact that the person who finances the sale of
a used car thereby realizes profit does not
make him a joint adventurer with the seller.
Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749
(1952).

Litigation.
Joint venturers may sue in the name of the
joint venture. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767
P.2d 499 (Utah 1988).

Continuation of venture presumed.
Fact that one joint venturer reimbursed the
other for the latter's contribution did not, in
itself, indicate termination of the joint venture,
thereby making first joint venturer responsible

Shared facilities.
Used car dealers who share a lot, building,
and telephone do not become joint adventurers
by reason of that working arrangement. Bates
v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Joint Ventures §§ 1 to 71.
C.J.S. — 48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures §§ 1 to
73.
A.L.R. — Construction of agreement be-

tween real-estate agents to share commissions,
71 A.L.R.3d 586.
Joint venture's capacity to sue, 56 A.L.R.4th
1234.

48-1-4. Rules for determining the existence of a partnership.
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by Section 48-1-13, persons who are not partners
as to each other are not partners as to third persons.
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by entireties, joint
property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself establish
a partnership, whether such co-owners do or do not share any profits
made by the use of the property.
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common
right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived.
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(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is
prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such
inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise.
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord.
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of av deceased partner.
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of payment vary
with the profits of the business.
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will of a business or
other property by installments or otherwise.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 7; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 69-1-4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Evidence.
—Burden of proof.
—Presumptions.
Existence of partnership.
Cited.
Evidence.
—Burden of proof.
In action for accounting and dissolution of
partnership, plaintiff had burden of proving
existence of partnership. Benson v. Rozzelle, 85
Utah 582, 39 P.2d 1113 (1934).
—Presumptions.
The fact that two persons share profits of a
business raises a presumption that they are
partners. Kimball v. McCornick, 70 Utah 189,
259 P. 313 (1927).
Where payment of a portion of profits to defendant constituted partial reimbursement for
defendant's expenditures in connection with
the business premises, there was no presumption of partnership, and plaintiff was required
to meet his burden of proof without the aid of
the presumption. Koesling v. Basamakis, 539
P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975).
Existence of partnership.
Evidence held insufficient to show that a
partnership was ever formed, but did show that
a business arrangement was entered into that

constituted a preliminary to a partnership.
Millett v. Langston, 8 Utah 2d 15, 327 P.2d 253
(1958).
Where defendant had turned over operation
of tavern, equipment, furnishing, and inventory that he owned to plaintiff pursuant to an
agreement to divide profits from the business
equally, plaintiff had full authority to manage
the business, including purchase of supplies,
payment of bills, and keeping of books, and income from the business was reported on partnership income tax forms, trial court could
properly find that a partnership existed, entitling plaintiff to half the compensation paid for
disruption of business upon condemnation of
the building where the tavern was located.
Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975).
Evidence established the existence of a partnership where two parties entered into an
agreement requiring them to work together to
obtain a zoning change and to develop land,
and providing for sharing the profits derived
from their joint efforts; classification of the
project as a single undertaking rather than a
continuous business transaction did not render
the trial court's finding of a partnership erroneous. Nupetco Assocs. v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d
877 (Utah 1983) (decided before enactment of
§ 48-1-3.1).
Cited in Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 1.
Key Numbers. — Partnership «=> 1 to 26.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 1 to 4.
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48-1-5

48-1-5. Partnership property.
All property originally brought into the partnership stock, or subsequently
acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the partnership, is partnership property.
Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired with partnership
funds is partnership property.
Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name. Title
so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name.
A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, though without
words of inheritance, passes the entire estate of the grantor, unless a contrary
intent appears.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89,1 8; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 69-1-5.

Cross-References.
57, Chapter 1.

Conveyances, Title

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assignment for benefit of creditors.
Death of partner.
Property purchased with partnership funds.
Security for loan.
Assignment for benefit of creditors.
Assignment of property of partnership for
benefit of its creditors is not rendered invalid
by noninclusion therein of individual property
of each partner. Wilson v. Sullivan, 17 Utah
341, 53 P. 994 (1898).
Death of partner.
In suit by surviving partner against widow
of deceased partner to recover title to certain
real property held in the name of defendant,
evidence held sufficient to require such land to
be held in trust for partnership. Matson v.
Matson, 56 Utah 394, 190 P. 943 (1920).
Property purchased with partnership
funds.
Property purchased with partnership funds

is prima facie the property of the firm, though
the title is taken in the individual name of one
or more of the partners. Deming v. Moss, 40
Utah 501, 121 P. 971 (1912); Staats v. Staats,
63 Utah 470, 226 P. 667 (1924).
Although two partners entered into a contract in their individual names to purchase
lands, assignments of the contract referred to
these buyers as individuals, the property was
referred to as that of the individuals by name
in the trial, and the parties submitted memorandums concerning the issue of cotenancy,
nevertheless the partnership was the purchaser because of the use of partnership funds.
Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976).
Security for loan.
Where partnership money was loaned and
note and mortgage securing the indebtedness
were taken in name of partner, note and mortgage were property of partnership so that partner could not be charged with amount of loan
upon dissolution of partnership. Buzianis v.
Buzianis, 81 Utah 1, 16 P.2d 413 (1932).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 329 to 356.
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 69.

A.L.R. — Insurance on life of partner as
partnership asset, 56 A.L.R.3d 892.
Key Numbers. — Partnership *=> 67.
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